

Midterm Review of the
Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening Programme

Executive Summary

1. Background

The goal of the project is to enhance the management and sustainable use of marine resources for the benefit of all Cook Islanders. The purpose of the project is to build the capacity of MMR and related agencies to ensure that Cook Islands marine resources are sustainably managed. MMR was identified as the executing agency.

2. Methodology

The review was carried out on Rarotonga over 12 days beginning Friday, 16 November, and ending Tuesday, 27 November, 2007. The methodology consisted of reviewing project documents, interviewing stakeholders, and visiting field sites on Rarotonga.

3. Key Findings

Section 4.1: What changes have occurred in the implementing environment, including risks, scope and the approach used by LI?

LI has broadened the scope of institutional strengthening activities somewhat by applying more inputs more broadly to strengthen PSC, Health, NES, REA, and associated private contractors in matters relating to marine resource management. The broadening of scope has been approved by the PCC and NZAID in each case. The review team finds the broadening of scope to be generally appropriate.

Section 4.2: How relevant are the CIMRIS programme's agreed objectives and implementation plans in the current context?

The agreed objectives and implementation plans remain as relevant in the current context as they were at the start of the project.

Section 4.3: What has gone well and less well in the implementation of CIMRIS?

a. *With respect to management of the project by LI?*

LI has managed the project well. In particular, LI has managed well the complexity of inputs, activities, and outputs required by its approach to institutional strengthening, which has emphasized local ownership as well as flexibility of scope and timing in response to local needs, local work plans, and local absorptive capacity. LI has balanced well the scope, content, and timing of inputs needed to address diverse needs in technical training, policy development, planning, and management across the sector. LI has also worked well facilitating and supporting local stakeholder activities rather than doing the work and producing the outputs themselves. LI has also managed well the coordination of project inputs with those of other external agencies such as ADB, FFA, MFish, NIWA, and SPC.

b. *With respect to management of the project by NZAID?*

NZAID has adapted to the requirements of a complex and flexible project work plan and budget, but the adjustment process has been slow and sometimes difficult.

The lack of fit between the NZAID three-year project contract period and the explicit assumption of a five-year project implementation cycle has led to confusion amongst major stakeholders. The lack of fit between the contract amount of \$4.2 million and the nominal project cost of \$5 million has also led to confusion.

The LI contract and other communications from NZAID made it clear that LI was not to assume that either the project or the LI contract would necessarily be extended from three years to five. In response, LI quite reasonably planned to expend the \$4.2 million budget and associated inputs within a three-year implementation period when a four or five-year period would probably have been more appropriate overall and would probably have provided better results in some components.

c. With respect to governance structures?

The review team has not identified significant issues with governance structures in the current implementation of CIMRIS.

d. What has the CIMRIS Programme achieved during the post-inception period (expected/unexpected; positive/negative) in terms of the sustainable management of the Cook Islands' marine resources and how consistent are these activities with the original goals and objectives?

The main achievement to date has been a substantial improvement in the management of MMR and to a lesser but still significant extent in the management of NES, NEA, PSC, and Public Health. Technical capacity of those agencies has also been improved along with technical capacity of some private stakeholders.

It is still too early to expect much in the way of tangible improvement in that regard—such as more fish in the boat and in the lagoon, a cleaner lagoon, and more income from pearl and aquaculture farming.

All project achievements to date are consistent with the original project goals and objectives. All or almost all project activities are also consistent with the original project goals and objectives.

CIMRIS has not yet achieved much success in addressing issues of enforcement, which are generally the most difficult and delicate issues to deal with in institutional strengthening projects.

e. What is the CIMRIS Programme likely to achieve a) during the remainder of the current contract project assuming it continues its present course as approved by the PCC, and b) in the anticipated second two-year phase/ (i.e. within anticipated five-year implementation period)?

Component 1: Institutional Strengthening

CIMRIS is likely to achieve most or substantially all of its original and expanded objectives in Component 1 by June 2009. CIMRIS has extended their institutional strengthening activities to associated agencies. The sustainability of CIMRIS achievements in those agencies is more tenuous because they have been targeted in a more limited fashion for participation only in certain institutional strengthening activities and generally only at the level of those divisions or sections that are related to marine resource management.

The review team expects that CIMRIS will only be partially successful in strengthening CIES and NEA by June 2009 or even by June 2010.

The institutional strengthening that does result from CIMRIS activities is likely to be eroded fairly quickly unless governance mechanisms are strengthened and in some cases reformed to increase checks and balances and thus to increase transparency and accountability in government operations.

Component 2: Pearl Industry Recovery

Activities are generally going as planned. The immediate viability of the local pearl industry is at risk from very basic causes whereas much of the CIMRIS program in Component 2 addresses higher level, longer range, and more sophisticated issues that will not have immediate payoff. A successful outcome for Pearl Industry Recovery appears to depend as much on lower level technical training, financing, marketing, cooperation among individual farmers and related activities that are being carried on outside of CIMRIS than on the mostly higher level planning, research, analysis, policy, and market-branding activities being carried out by CIMRIS.

Component 3: Commercial Inshore Fishery and Aquaculture Development

The review conclusions for Component 3 generally mirror those for Component 2 with the exception that CIMRIS is carrying on fewer activities in Component 3.

Component 4: Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management

Progress has been made in some areas of Component 4—perhaps most importantly in the belated collection and analysis of data on groundwater pollution in the area of Takitumu lagoon (see Richards, no date)—but Component 4 has not progressed well overall. Little progress has been made in mobilising the community or other major stakeholders in cleaning up the lagoon. At present there is little promise of either outcome arising from project activities.

Various collateral activities carried out or facilitated by CIMRIS are intended to support the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot by reducing pollution flowing into the Takitumu lagoon. No significant implementation of the current plan has occurred, however, and the Vaka Council itself is about to be dissolved. Most direct CIMRIS activities in support of the pilot have been slowed pending the appearance of an institution to take over the role of the Vaka Council in implementing the lagoon management plan.

Component 5: Offshore Fisheries Development

MMR and members of the offshore fishing industry are generally pleased with the support provided by CIMRIS. Like Components 2 and 3, Component 5 is directed primarily at high level planning, policy, and marketing initiatives that are useful but have not yet put more fish in the boats or in local processing facilities or put more license revenue in government coffers. In the medium to long term, the main issue for development of the offshore fisheries appears to be lack of fish.

- f. *What are some possible options or scenarios to ensure the achievements are sustainable? In considering this question the reviewers should consider timeframe, scope, project structure, project management (including the roles of*

NZAID, AMD, agency counterparts to the programme advisers, governance, and the MSC), resourcing, partnerships and other relevant factors. e.g.:

g. Narrow, broaden or retain the original scope?

The scope of CIMRIS has already been broadened significantly at the instigation of the contractor. The review finds the current scope to be appropriate and commends the contractor for that move.

h. Retain focus on Fisheries/MMR or expand work to incorporate more agencies?

The focus of CIMRIS has already been expanded to include all CIGov agencies whose work relates to marine resource management.

i. Limit to existing resources and timeframe or increase funding and length of engagement (e.g. to 5 yrs, as allowed in the contract[.]

Three should be considered:

Option A: Status Quo

Complete the contract and project as currently scheduled at the end of June 2009.

Option B: Project Design Document (PDD)

Stretch out the current \$4.2 million funding and inputs to extend beyond the present contract end date of June 2009—say, to June 2010 or to some earlier time if the natural progression of contracted activities comes to an end somewhat sooner. This option is essentially the PDD.

Option C: LI Proposal of December 2007

Add more funds and more inputs in a contract variation to extend the project under its current scope to a later date—say, to June 2010. This is, in effect, the draft proposal LI has made now at the request of the review team, but the exact amount and duration of any extension and addition of funds would be determined later rather than sticking necessarily to the terms of the draft proposal.

The review team sees no advantage to Option A. Option B is to be preferred over Option A because of its greater flexibility, practicality, and responsiveness to local needs and conditions. Deciding between Option B and Option C depends on what in detail is proposed for Option C. Such a proposal should come from LI and its counterpart institutions rather than from the review team.

In response to a request from the review team, LI quickly prepared a preliminary draft proposal to extend project implementation to the end of June 2010 at an additional cost of \$1.7 million. The draft proposal itself provides a general listing of activities that LI proposes to carry out during the 12 months from July 2009 through June 2010. LI and its counterpart institutions should now develop details of the proposed or suggested activities and corresponding indicative work plan together with brief justifications for each and a breakdown of individual costs.

Section 4.4: How sustainable are the CIMRIS programme's achievements likely to be under the various scenarios taking into consideration possible changes to the methodology at strategic, operational and administrative levels?

The sustainable success of CIMRIS and of any institutional strengthening program depends heavily on the wider institutional framework and climate in which it operates. The capacity building that CIMRIS has achieved at the individual and institutional levels must be supported by both formal and informal accountability mechanisms to raise standards of expected performance.

Section 4.5: What has been the expenditure of the CIMRIS programme to date in each component area and how does this compare to the expected achievements and benefits?

LI has not been able to supply the required information during the term of the review. This item of the TOR should be taken up once LI supplies the information.

Section 4.6: What are the strengths, weaknesses and costs of each scenario in terms of achieving the CIMRIS programme goal of sustainable management of the Cook Islands marine resources, and the various components of the Project Design Document?

A direct and detailed answer to the question depends on three things:

- The content of a detailed proposal from LI and its local counterparts for extending the project timeline and increasing its inputs.
- A decision by CIGov to pursue broader and more fundamental governance reforms.
- CIMRIS pursuing more directly the issues of transparency and accountability—notably including enforcement—as part of its institutional strengthening program.

The question should be revisited once these matters are better known.

Section 4.7: What evidence and factors should the CI Government take into consideration when allocating development assistance for the CIMRIS Programme in the context of competing priorities for the Cook Islands Government when it allocates ODA?

According to the LI proposal, the purpose of extending CIMRIS would be to help ensure the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits rather than to add new benefits. Some stakeholders are understandably concerned that further NZAID and AusAID support for an extension of CIMRIS with additional funding would take resources away from what might be considered a higher priority need for governance reform.

The review team concludes that higher level and broader governance reforms that would have to be pursued outside of CIMRIS itself are not so much an alternative as the primary means to help ensure the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits. Thus, adding substantially more funds to extend CIMRIS activities might end up undermining the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits if those funds were to come at the expense of assisting governance reforms.

Section 4.8: What is the wider learning for NZAID and CIGov from the implementation of a sector-based ISP in the Cook Islands?

- a. *What have the CIMRIS programme partners learned about addressing wider institutional issues while trying to maintain programme focus?*

The main lesson as reported by LI is that the success of sector-based institutional strengthening projects depends on governance mechanisms operating in diverse institutions at both higher and lower levels of government. The experience of the review team supports that conclusion and also highlights the fundamental importance of strengthening governance mechanisms that operate by making government operations transparent to the public.

- b. *What have the CIMRIS partners learned about communications and institutional relationships?*

Transparency with stakeholders, consultation with stakeholders, and participation of stakeholders leads to better, more constructive relationships and to better outcomes. A sector approach requires communication among agencies at the top level. CIMRIS activities across ministries have necessarily (by project design) been focused mainly at lower levels.

- c. *What has been learned about the incentive environment for individuals?*

Governance is good when incentive environments induce individuals to serve the public good whether they act altruistically or pursue their own personal interests.

- d. *What has been learned with respect to the importance of formal and informal rules, norms and behaviours in the wider enabling environment?*

Formal and informal rules and norms all require effective sanctions—both positive and negative—in order to be effective in shaping individual behaviour for the common good. These issues are particularly important in the Takitumu pilot, in preparing and implementing a fishery management plan on Palmerston, and in improving local conditions in the pearl industry in Manihiki.

- e. *What has NZAID learned about supporting an institutional strengthening programme in partnership with the Cook Islands?*

Institutional strengthening programmes need to be adaptable and responsive to local needs, priorities, work plans, and absorptive capacity, and the adaptability and responsiveness of the programme in turn needs project oversight and accounting mechanisms that are equally adaptable and responsive.

CIMRIS and other institutional strengthening projects must necessarily take in a broader scope than a single institution just because institutions must work cooperatively.

4. Value for Money

Project implementation is generally going well and project outputs are generally well matched to project inputs. At its midpoint, the project thus appears to be providing good value for money in the terms laid out by the project design.

5. Recommendations

Ask LI and its counterpart institutions to develop details of the activities, corresponding work plan, justifications for each, and a breakdown of individual costs under its proposal for a project extension through June 2009 together. The resulting proposal would be similar to what would normally be required in tendering for a \$1.7 million project. NZAID, CIGov, and the review team should then review that more detailed proposal. LI notes in its preliminary proposal that its listing of proposed inputs and activities should be taken as a menu from which items could be chosen or not chosen as determined by a detailed assessment. The review team supports that approach.

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Midterm Review of the Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening Programme

1. Background

The 2001 – 2007 Cook Islands Country Strategy identified the marine sector as having high potential for economic development but also as needing management, technical, and training support. The New Zealand government, through its Agency for International Development (NZ Aid), agreed to assist by providing a programme to strengthen the Cook Islands marine sector. Project planning began in November 2003 with a scoping mission to identify areas for support. The scoping mission carried out extensive consultations with industry, NGOs, CIGov agencies and other stakeholders. A Project Design Document was then developed in 2004 through an intensive workshop with staff from the Ministry of Marine Resources (MMR) and the Cook Islands Environment Service (NES).

The goal of the resulting project is to enhance the management and sustainable use of marine resources for the benefit of all Cook Islanders. The purpose of the project is to build the capacity of MMR and related agencies to ensure that Cook Islands marine resources are sustainably managed. MMR was identified as the executing agency.

2. Methodology

The structure of this report follows NZ Aid guidelines provided to the review team. Findings and Conclusions presents and then answers the eight specific review questions and respective sub-questions posed by the review TOR.

The review was conducted by Dr. Tim O'Meara (Team Leader) and Mr. Petero Okotai (Team Member) using a participatory methodology. The review team collected information about the project and related matters by reviewing documents (see Appendix 3), interviewing stakeholders (see Appendix 4), and visiting project-related sites on Rarotonga. The team did not travel to the outer islands and did not speak directly to stakeholders outside Rarotonga as relevant stakeholders were available on Rarotonga and as this was not deemed necessary in the TOR. Several relevant Rarotonga-based stakeholders were off island during the period of the review and were not interviewed.

Members of the project Steering Committee briefed the review team at the beginning of the review on Friday, 16 November. The review team presented a brief status report to the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) and other stakeholders on 21 November because several major stakeholders were flying out that evening. As part of its presentation at that meeting, the review team also presented a draft design and plan for the review, which included interviewing relevant stakeholders and reviewing relevant documents. The team provided informal status reports to NZ Aid throughout the review.

The debriefing meeting originally planned with the PCC for 26 November was cancelled because too many people were off island. Instead, the Team Leader briefed Mr. Tom Lee (NZ Aid Wellington) on Sunday, 25 November, before his departure, and then briefed Dr. Stephanie Knight (NZ Aid Manager, Rarotonga) on Monday, 26 November, before his own departure.

3. Timing of the Review

The review was carried out on Rarotonga over 12 days beginning Friday, 16 November, and ending Tuesday, 27 November, 2007. Dr. O'Meara worked on Rarotonga from 16 through 26 November. Mr. Okotai worked on Rarotonga from 16 November through 21 November.

4. Findings and Conclusions

The Terms of Reference (TOR) directs the review to address eight main questions, two of which have several sub-questions. The questions and sub-questions and the respective review findings and conclusions are presented below in Sections 4.1 through 4.8.

4.1 What changes have occurred in the implementing environment, including risks, scope and the approach used by LI?

The review interprets the question to mean changes in the implementing environment since preparation of the PID and to mean changes both inside and outside CIMRIS.

The law creating the Vaka Councils on Rarotonga was repealed, and the councils will cease to exist as of February, 2008. CIMRIS and associated stakeholders chose the Titikaveka Vaka Council as the operating mechanism for the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot. The Lagoon Pilot is, in turn, the primary vehicle for the implementation of CIMRIS Component 4: Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management. CIMRIS has slowed down most pilot activities pending selection of a new operating mechanism for the Pilot. No obvious candidate has appeared.

LI has broadened the scope of institutional strengthening activities somewhat by applying more inputs more broadly to strengthen PSC, Public Health, NES, REA, and associated private contractors in matters relating to marine resource management. The broadening of scope has been approved by the PCC and NZAID in each case. The review team finds the broadening of scope to be generally appropriate (minor qualifications noted below).

NZAID and LI have worked out reasonable adjustments to adapt project accounting and payment systems to fit the required flexibility of project inputs, outputs, and timing.

NZAID passed direct authority for CIMRIS from the Desk in Wellington to the Post in Rarotonga. All parties appear to have adjusted well to the change.

Crown law office recently provided a legal opinion to the effect that the demise charter arrangements currently used by the majority of the pelagic fishing fleet operating out of the Cook Islands are illegal. CIGov is using this as an opportunity to review the need for having any demise charters at all, and CIMRIS is assisting MMR to identify and evaluate alternatives to put before the Minister. The review team was not able to pursue the implications of that ruling for the project.

4.2 How relevant are the CIMRIS programme's agreed objectives and implementation plans in the current context?

The agreed objectives and implementation plans remain as relevant in the current context as they were at the start of the project.

4.3 What has gone well and less well in the implementation of CIMRIS?

a. *With respect to management of the project by LI?*

LI has managed the project well. In particular, LI has managed well the complexity of inputs, activities, and outputs required by its approach to institutional strengthening, which has emphasized local ownership as well as flexibility of scope and timing in response to local needs, local work plans, and local absorptive capacity. LI has balanced well the scope, content, and timing of inputs needed to address diverse needs in technical training, policy development, planning, and management across the sector. LI has also worked well facilitating and supporting local stakeholder activities rather than doing the work and producing the outputs themselves. This overall approach is key to institutional strengthening, and LI is to be commended for taking that approach and sticking to it. Reporting to NZAID, PCC, and other stakeholders has been thorough and timely.

CIMRIS has generally kept a low public profile so as not to overshadow the project counterpart institutions, which is appropriate. Interviews with local marine industry representatives suggest that they are not well informed about some project-assisted activities that are relevant to their businesses, however, and interviews with local media professionals indicate that the project counterpart institutions themselves are generally media shy. As a result, the activities and the data and other outputs facilitated by CIMRIS are not generally known in the community or in some cases even in the relevant industry. Transparency with the public is a core responsibility of government agencies, and CIMRIS should help strengthen those agencies by facilitating more active communication strategies.

LI has supplied a team of qualified professionals (note that the review team has not examined the qualifications or reviewed the outputs of all LI consultants and staff).

LI has also managed well the coordination of project inputs with those of other external agencies such as ADB, FFA, MFish, NIWA, and SPC.

LI has chosen to field project specialists generally in short periods of several days or a few weeks each. This is generally appropriate for specialists involved in institutional strengthening activities. Based on previous experience, the review team concludes that applying the same approach to the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot and associated activities may have slowed the necessary momentum there, and while the Lagoon Pilot has required a team approach, the Pilot may have proceeded better if LI had appointed one consultant and MMR had appointed one counterpart to direct CIMRIS activities in the Pilot and to become the public face and contact point of the Pilot amongst local stakeholders. LI has noted in their reports the success of that type of approach in their management training approach, where the Team Leader has coordinated and participated in each training session and program.

Early LI project documents speak of a robust monitoring and evaluation program, but the review team did not see much evidence of such a program other than a broad baseline survey of stakeholder attitudes that the Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist carried out early in the project as part of the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot. LI advised after the review mission that all training courses have evaluations completed, but the review team did not know of this and so did not see any of the evaluations.

b. With respect to management of the project by NZAID?

NZAID has adapted to the requirements of a complex and flexible project work plan and budget, but the adjustment process has been slow and sometimes difficult.

The seven-month delay in the start of field activities did not appreciably help the project.

The lack of fit between the NZAID three-year project contract period and the explicit assumption of a five-year project implementation cycle has led to confusion amongst major stakeholders. The lack of fit between the contract amount of \$4.2 million and the nominal project cost of \$5 million has also led to confusion. The informal NZAID directive to budget roughly \$1 million per year does not fit either scenario.

The LI contract and other communications from NZAID made it clear that LI was not to assume that either the project or the LI contract would necessarily be extended from three years to five. In response, LI quite reasonably planned to expend the \$4.2 million budget and associated inputs within a three-year implementation period when a four or five-year period would probably have been more appropriate overall and would probably have provided better results in some components.

Without prejudice to the LI proposal for a project extension (summarized below), the review team believes that any additional amount that might now be necessary to gain and sustain the intended project benefits would likely have been smaller if the original contract had covered the expected five years rather than three. In other words, providing a three-year contract for a five-year project is not likely to provide the most benefit to the Cook Islands or the best value for money to NZAID. The project might instead have been contracted in two phases over five years with a trigger clause at three years to start the second phase.

CIMRIS is a relatively large and complex project in a field (institutional strengthening) with which NZAID has little experience. CIMRIS is also a 'design and implement' project, which means that the contractor designs the components as it goes, which in turn means that the designs have not been peer reviewed prior to implementation as is the case in other projects. That was the intended role of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) as presented in the Project Design Document.

NZAID financial monitoring is very thorough. NZAID relies on the PCC and NZAID Post to provide project monitoring overall as well as specific approval of implementation designs and changes in scope, but this does not take up the full role of a Technical Advisory Group (TAG). The original project design included a TAG to provide more detailed monitoring and evaluation by experienced professionals, but the TAG was dropped in order to save money. Instituting some level of TAG or TAG-like monitoring and evaluation would help reduce project risks.

c. With respect to governance structures?

The review team has not identified significant issues with governance structures in the current implementation of CIMRIS. The team has, however, identified significant issues with governance structures in regard to the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits. These issues are addressed in the following sub-section.

- d. *What has the CIMRIS Programme achieved during the post-inception period (expected/unexpected; positive/negative) in terms of the sustainable management of the Cook Islands' marine resources and how consistent are these activities with the original goals and objectives?*

Project monthly, quarterly, and annual reports list achievements during each period. See those reports for itemized lists of achievements.

More generally, the main achievement to date has been a substantial improvement in the management of MMR and to a lesser but still significant extent in the management of NES, NEA, PSC, and Public Health. Technical capacity of those agencies has also been improved along with technical capacity of some private stakeholders. Those local agencies and private stakeholders have also received other technical training and support during the period of the project from other regional and bilateral agencies, and private stakeholders have also received technical training and other support from MMR that is unrelated to CIMRIS. It has not been possible during the brief review mission to determine the relative benefits of CIMRIS training and other support compared to the benefits derived from those other sources. In some cases, CIMRIS has funded technical support sourced directly from existing international or bilateral agencies, which is generally appropriate. The review team did not find evidence that the contractor is evaluating the effectiveness of their technical training. Such evaluations would be an appropriate part of their monitoring and evaluation program (see also Section 4.3, sub-section 'a', above).

CIMRIS activities to date also have increased somewhat the level of communication and cooperation among Cook Islands government ministries and agencies in matters relating to marine resource management. CIMRIS has also increased somewhat the level of communication and cooperation between private stakeholders and Cook Islands government ministries and agencies in matters relating to marine resource management.

CIMRIS activities have also helped somewhat in themselves and through enhanced MMR planning to make contacts with and coordinate and in some cases enhance local benefits from marine resource management activities carried out by regional and bilateral agencies. Neither appears to have been a serious problem before CIMRIS.

Joint training and capacity building exercises through CIMRIS have been effective in developing collaborative ecosystem management, providing an opportunity for different agencies to work together and 'speak the same language'. This increased collaboration has helped to highlight some duplication and overlapping of responsibility, notably in water testing and reporting, which could be a topic for attention either inside or outside of CIMRIS.

CIMRIS work in policy and regulatory improvement has also been gratefully received by the different agencies in filling a critical need with policy and legislative deficiencies hindering efforts to impose measures to improve the environmental conditions. The contractor's main activity in this regard was reviewing and making technical suggestions on the draft environmental and sanitation regulations that had been prepared earlier under ADB assistance. There still remains much work to do improving policies and regulations in the next phase that may centre around understanding and better implementing mechanisms to ensure that regulation and laws are in place to support sustainable management practices.

The project activities mentioned above are all consistent with the original project goals and objectives.

Project documents state that the “goal of the project is to enhance the management and sustainable use of marine resources for the benefit of all Cook Islanders”. Improvements in “management” are already apparent, but those improvements are an end in themselves, but a means by which to enhance the “sustainable use of marine resources for the benefit of all Cook Islanders”. It is still too early to expect much in the way of tangible improvement in that regard—such as more fish in the boat and in the lagoon, a cleaner lagoon, and more income from pearl and aquaculture farming. Tangible outcomes should be a primary focus of subsequent project reviews, which could be carried out either as part of somewhat broader TAG activities or as separate project reviews carried out yearly or half yearly from now through the end of the project.

All project achievements to date are consistent with the original project goals and objectives. All or almost all project activities are also consistent with the original project goals and objectives. A minor exception may be the plan to carry out an economic analysis of pig farming to determine whether a half-dozen pig farmers can afford new technology to manage pig waste. The review team is unsure whether that activity is still planned to proceed, but it is beyond the scope or intent of the project. Similarly, the plan for CIMRIS to design and monitor a trial of sewage treatment options, which would be a large undertaking, appears to stretch the scope of the project excessively (even though it is, in itself, a good thing to do).

If institutions have enforcement responsibilities, and an institutional strengthening project is to strengthen those institutions, then the project should address and strengthen those enforcement responsibilities. CIMRIS has not yet achieved much success or perhaps even the promise of much success in addressing issues of enforcement, which are generally the most difficult and delicate issues to deal with in institutional strengthening projects. Without better and more even enforcement by those institutions, the project goal will be hard to achieve and the benefits will be harder to sustain and less equitable. Enforcement issues are generally approached best at both the top and at the grassroots levels simultaneously.

- e. *What is the CIMRIS Programme likely to achieve a) during the remainder of the current contract project assuming it continues its present course as approved by the PCC, and b) in the anticipated second two-year phase/ (i.e. within anticipated five-year implementation period)?*

Component 1: Institutional Strengthening

Institutional strengthening of MMR and related agencies has been both timely and needed. The primary target institution, MMR, has struggled with planning, budgeting, and other fundamental management issues. Staff at MMR, PSC, and Public Health commented very favourably on the improvements that CIMRIS has facilitated in those areas.

CIMRIS is likely to achieve most or substantially all of its original and expanded objectives in Component 1 by June 2009, which will provide enough time for the agencies to complete two more planning and budget cycles under CIMRIS supervision.

CIMRIS has extended their institutional strengthening activities to associated agencies, which also have significant need for management, planning, budgeting,

and technical strengthening. The sustainability of CIMRIS achievements in those agencies is more tenuous because they have been targeted in a more limited fashion for participation only in certain institutional strengthening activities and generally only at the level of those divisions or sections that are related to marine resource management. CIMRIS itself has noted the risk of trying to change management and operating practices in one part of an agency but not in the agency as a whole. The review team notes that higher level management has agreed to current project interventions in each case, but the review has not had the opportunity to check directly with some of those senior managers.

CIMRIS clearly does not have the resources or the mandate to undertake wholesale institutional strengthening of PSC, REA, NES, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Works, and CIPA. Such a program would also imply a need to strengthen OPM, MFEM and probably HRD and Audit. This highlights the difficulty of carrying out an institutional strengthening project focused of necessity on a single sector or perhaps even on a single agency. The problem is that they all operate as parts of a larger, inter-dependent system, with each part providing support for and often acting as a check and balance against other parts.

Across-the-board change should not be attempted all at once even in a relatively small country like the Cook Islands. The best solution, therefore, is probably to approach institutional strengthening with a fairly broad, sector-wide brush—just as CIMRIS is doing—and then to follow up fairly quickly with a similar approach in other institutions and other sectors. All institutions are not of equal importance, however. The most important are the higher level planning and accountability institutions together with the broadest grassroots institution, which is the ‘body politic’ itself.

The review team expects that CIMRIS will only be partially successful in strengthening CIES and NEA by June 2009 or even by June 2010 without progress in filling vacant positions and without significant improvements in governance—many of which lie above and outside the immediate scope of CIMRIS.

Not all improvements in governance necessarily lie at higher levels, however. Governance might also be strengthened by a range of simple procedural or regulatory changes such as requiring developers to post on a property to be developed public notice of intent to build and then public notice of permission to build. Such measures would greatly enhance the ability of CIES and members of the public to detect violations and hold both developers and CIES itself accountable. Similarly, PSC could create ‘steps’ for promotion within designated employment ‘bands’ and allow HOMs to promote or demote employees from one step to another according to employee performance. This would allow HOMs to present to their employees a set of graded performance incentives rather than HOMs just wielding the solitary and rather blunt tool of dismissal. The review team raised these issues and options with CIES and PSC and both agreed that tools of those sorts would be useful to them. The review team also discussed with Health and with Works the issue of public transparency regarding data they are meant to collect.

CIMRIS might also help to facilitate improvements in governance by taking a more direct and perhaps more public and formal approach to stakeholder awareness and enforcement issues that arise in relation to Component 4: Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management (see also below). CIMRIS might, for example, help bring together, analyse, and report water quality test data that is adequate to identify primary and secondary point sources of lagoon pollution on Rarotonga. This effort

could include strengthening MPW in carrying out its institutional mandate to sample and test groundwater from the bore holes that were installed at the new landfill and sewage treatment ponds for that purpose and then to facilitate public disclosure and discussion of the results as part of CIMRIS activities under Component 4: sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management.

The institutional strengthening that does result from CIMRIS activities is likely to be eroded fairly quickly unless governance mechanisms are strengthened and in some cases reformed to increase checks and balances and thus to increase transparency and accountability in government operations. The central governance mechanisms related to CIMRIS institutional strengthening are PSC, NES, REA, CIPA, Public Health, and Works (and formerly the Vaka Council). The new draft regulations for Public Health and CIES may be important, but the team has not reviewed those draft regulations.

The review team notes that LI program to strengthen MMR, NES, CIPA, and related agencies has included reviewing their current structures. As a result, the structure of MMR changed after the development of their three-year corporate plan. Functions were reviewed and non-core functions identified, and two new divisions were formed. Greater emphasis on private sector involvement has resulted. Similar processes were followed at CIES and Public Health, with new functions identified and old functions disestablished.

Component 2: Pearl Industry Recovery

The review team finds that Component 2 activities are generally going as planned. Some of the business management training provided to pearl farmers may have been over the heads of many farmers, however.

The immediate viability of the local pearl industry is at risk from very basic causes whereas much of the CIMRIS program in Component 2 addresses higher level, longer range, and more sophisticated issues that will not have immediate payoff—such as efforts to establish market branding and research and selection to develop genetically improved pearl oysters and different coloured pearls.

Better hygiene and husbandry practices are needed now, and one goal of the pearl benchmarking work carried out by CIMRIS was to quantify the benefits that farmers could receive if they improved their husbandry practices. The review team does not know whether that outcome has been achieved or is in progress.

A successful outcome for Pearl Industry Recovery appears to depend as much on lower level technical training, financing, marketing, cooperation among individual farmers and related activities that are being carried on outside of CIMRIS than on the mostly higher level planning, research, analysis, policy, and market-branding activities being carried out by CIMRIS. That does not mean that CIMRIS activities are not important, just that most will take longer to bear fruit and that there are also more immediate needs.

Activities outside of CIMRIS that may promise more immediate benefits to pearl farmers include direct efforts to improve local farm management, efforts to enforce lagoon farming regimes and pearl industry hygiene in order to reduce disease and mortality of pearl oysters. Other promising activities outside CIMRIS include local efforts to break foreign control over pearl farming technology and financing and the resulting foreign control over the pearl harvest and associated pearl sales. The

latter efforts would also likely result in less under-reporting of both the quantity and value of pearl harvests as well as less avoidance of VAT on the sale of pearls.

Options that could prove useful include development of local pearl auctions such as the one completed very successfully last week in Tahiti (*Pacific Island Development Report*, 31 November, 2007) and an apprenticeship program for newly trained pearl technicians, who find it very difficult to secure employment as unproven novices.

The local pearl industry has been in desperate need of both technical and strategic assistance after having undergone a period of consolidation and a dramatic fall in both production and revenue due to the oyster disease outbreak and the price shocks that occurred earlier in the decade (MFEM Half Year Fiscal Updates 2003/2004). The upside remains enormous, however, and the review team thus recommends that all appropriate assistance be provided to the local pearl industry.

The forming of CIPA two years ago has provided a focal point for CIMRIS assistance to the industry, but CIPA itself is not yet proven. The review team is not aware of specific CIMRIS institutional strengthening activities with CIPA.

CIMRIS should help strengthen MMR capacity to provide pearl farmers with information and planning advice related to climate change and sea level rise. The most direct and immediate effect may be an increase of lagoon temperatures such that average conditions may come to resemble present-day El Niño conditions.

Component 3: Commercial Inshore Fishery and Aquaculture Development

The review conclusions for Component 3 generally mirror those for Component 2 with the exception that CIMRIS is carrying on fewer activities in Component 3. MMR and private stakeholders are probably receiving more technical and financial support for commercial inshore fisheries and aquaculture development from other agencies than from CIMRIS. In addition, the review finds that the CIMRIS Annual Report 2006-2007 (pp. 34-36) exaggerates the significance of CIMRIS and MMR activities and achievements over the previous year listed for Component 3. The activities listed would take only a matter of hours or days or at most a few weeks for a full-time staff of 20 plus consultants. In particular, CIMRIS highlights in the Annual Report and elsewhere its achievement in developing an “ecosystems based management plan for parrotfish on Palmerston” that it claims is a model for the Pacific, but closer examination finds only two reports detailing background research and discussions, but not yet an agreement or even a plan.

Component 4: Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management

Progress has been made in some areas of Component 4—perhaps most importantly in the belated collection and analysis of data on groundwater pollution in the area of Takitumu lagoon (see Richards, no date)—but Component 4 has not progressed well overall. Little progress has been made in mobilising the community or other major stakeholders in cleaning up the lagoon. At present there is little promise of either outcome arising from project activities.

In the view of the review team, one problem is the CIMRIS decision to implement public awareness and remediation activities in the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot without having adequate data showing the current status and point-source causes of lagoon pollution. The CIMRIS team did carefully consider its approach and decided to pursue it on the reasonable grounds that people were tired of mere studies, but it

appears that more and better action would have resulted if CIMRIS, counterpart agencies, and the public knew the real status and exact causes of the problem first.

Facilitating greater transparency first would also have highlighted and helped to correct the general failure of government monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at MMR, NES, Public Works, and Public Health and their parallel failure to make available to the public data that they have collected.

It is important in this regard to note also that inadequate or imprecise data may direct responsibility and corrective action at low priority or even false targets. Public Works suggests that this may have happened already in pointing the finger at the new aquaculture ponds (Richards, no date), which the review team found to be a matter of talk among stakeholders at the time of the review, rather than at the old and inadequate sewage system of the adjacent government school.

Another problem arises from CIMRIS choosing to implement Component 4 through a local community program, the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot, which CIMRIS helped revitalize and formalize from earlier beginnings. CIMRIS has helped develop a lagoon management plan for the community. The management plan seems relatively superficial in the actions it endorses and the implementation and enforcement measures it proposes. Direct project intervention to date has focused on half a dozen piggeries in the area. Several knowledgeable stakeholders interviewed by the review team believe, however, that the larger cause of lagoon pollution is sewage from residential, commercial, government, and tourist properties and from the Public Works landfill and sewage ponds. The review team's observations during site visits tend to support that assessment. The team does note that the CIMRIS survey reports that the more common belief among the general public is that piggeries are a bigger problem. The review team also notes that current data is not adequate to determine the point sources of pollution, but the team also agrees with stakeholder opinions that the necessary data is not being collected, collated, analyzed, and reported partly in order to avoid coming to a conclusion on such matters.

Implementation of the Takitumu plan rests with the Titikaveka Vaka Council, which did not at the time and does not now have the ability or other resources to fulfil that responsibility. The council apparently arranged for CIMRIS funding to hire three local consultants to carry out the necessary work on behalf of the council, but the review team does not know whether the funding was made available or whether the work ever actually began. It is hard to see how such an arrangement would be sustainable in any case.

Various collateral activities carried out or facilitated by CIMRIS are intended to support the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot by reducing pollution flowing into the Takitumu lagoon. The hope was that the other two Rarotonga *vaka* would adopt the same lagoon management plan so that it would become a *de facto* island-wide plan.

No significant implementation of the current plan has occurred, however, and the Vaka Council itself is about to be dissolved. Most direct CIMRIS activities in support of the pilot have been suspended pending the appearance of an institution to take over the role of the Vaka Council in implementing the lagoon management plan.

It is unlikely that the Pilot would have been successful in any case. Two closely related problems are paramount. Firstly, the Pilot assumes that lagoon pollution is a local problem that can be solved by the local Titikaveka 'community'. Secondly, the Pilot assumes that the Titikaveka 'community' itself is a tight-knit and cohesive

group that can harmonize major conflicts of financial and others interests through voluntary and informal social pressure. Neither assumption appears correct based on stakeholder interviews and direct observation during the review mission and based on the review team's previous experience with such matters in the Cook Islands and elsewhere in the Pacific. The two members of the review team participated in the recent International Waters Project watershed management pilot on Rarotonga and in several other countries, respectively, and the general failure of those community pilots might have provided a warning for CIMRIS.

Several conditions suggest that the project should instead address lagoon pollution on Rarotonga as a national or at least a Rarotonga problem rather than as a series of community problems.

Firstly, lagoon pollution is caused by and in turn directly affects the great majority of Cook Islanders.

Secondly, pollution even in one part of the Rarotonga lagoon directly threatens the entire tourism industry, which is by far the largest employer, the largest asset base, and the largest income and tax generator in the national economy. The review team finds it surprising that CIMRIS and the Takitumu Lagoon Pilot appear not to have approached the \$150 million hotel and the tourism industry directly (as opposed to indirectly through the Tourism Corporation and the Tourism Authority) in this matter even though the owners, managers, and local staff would appear to have by far the largest stake in and the most muscle to apply to solving the problem.

Thirdly, the national government itself is very likely one of the main polluters—both directly from its schools, offices, and solid waste landfill and sewage ponds as well as indirectly from lax enforcement of current monitoring, reporting, and enforcement regimes. In regard to the latter point, the review team finds that on the basis of available data and existing regulations, Public Health very likely could—and perhaps should—close Rarotonga beaches to swimming on public health grounds. Public Health did not disagree with that conclusion. The review team recognizes that this matter requires delicacy because of the short-term economic implications.

Fourthly, informal social controls are unlikely to gain much ground (or as much ground as they could) without corresponding formal enforcement measures at the national level.

Fifthly, local fixes that aim to reduce pollution from a few point sources in one pilot area (or even more generally from all major point sources in one pilot area) necessarily impose costs on those polluters that are not borne by their competitors who also pollute but are not required to reduce, and people will find moral justification in resisting solutions that impose heavy costs on themselves but not on their competitors.

Sixthly, informal social cohesion and social control in Titikaveka and other *vaka* is not strong enough in the 21st century to tackle such big-money problems on its own.

In short, the problem of lagoon pollution on Rarotonga does not lend itself well to being solved by one or more local pilot projects.

Component 5: Offshore Fisheries Development

MMR and members of the offshore fishing industry are generally pleased with the support provided by CIMRIS. Like Components 2 and 3, Component 5 is directed

primarily at high level planning, policy, and marketing initiatives that are useful but have not yet put more fish in the boats or in local processing facilities or put more license revenue in government coffers. In the medium to long term, the main issue for development of the offshore fisheries appears to be lack of fish.

Industry knowledge of Component 5 activities appears to consist and be due mainly to the participation of a few industry members in overseas study tours, which appear to have been successful in the sense that private stakeholders found the technical information interesting and thought provoking. MMR and private stakeholders are probably receiving more technical support for offshore fisheries development from other agencies than from CIMRIS. In some cases CIMRIS has funded that other technical support.

- f. *What are some possible options or scenarios to ensure the achievements are sustainable? In considering this question the reviewers should consider timeframe, scope, project structure, project management (including the roles of NZAID, AMD, agency counterparts to the programme advisers, governance, and the MSC), resourcing, partnerships and other relevant factors. e.g.:*
- g. *Narrow, broaden or retain the original scope?*

The scope of CIMRIS has already been broadened significantly at the instigation of the contractor. The review finds the current scope to be appropriate and commends the contractor for that move.

The review team supports the prior conclusion of several stakeholders, including AMD, PSC, and LI, that the most important measures to help ensure that project benefits are sustainable are the reform of relevant governance institutions to strengthen checks and balances and improve transparency and accountability—notably including enforcement.

As the review has already noted, some lower level but nevertheless important governance reforms could and should be facilitated by CIMRIS during the remainder of the project. Such improvements would legitimately fall under the current (somewhat expanded) CIMRIS mandate to strengthen MMR, NES, Public Health, CIPA, MPW, and PSC in matters relating to marine resource management. More fundamental and more extensive reforms would require attention at higher levels and of broader scope than CIMRIS can or should address.

Thus, the review team recommends that the scope of CIMRIS not be expanded further in an attempt to address governance reforms (which in regard to CIMRIS would primarily involve public service reforms) at higher levels and of broader scope. Instead, the team recommends that CIGov pursue any request for technical assistance in public service reform separately with NZAID or other donors.

Governance reforms would need to occur fairly quickly in order to enhance CIMRIS benefits and their sustainability. The normal project pipeline can take two years or more, which is too long to be of much relevance to the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits. The review team thus recommends that faster options be pursued in addition to any requests that might be made for project assistance.

One option would be to use the Public Service Technical Assistance Facility (PSTAF) to support a coordinated program of civil service reform. NZAID, AusAID, and ADB might even top up PSTAF over the short term with additional funds to support governance reforms as a means to help ensure sustainability of CIMRIS

benefits and to achieve wider goals. The obvious place to start is with PSC itself, which controls PSTAF and which has been direct and candid in its support for governance reform beginning with PSC itself.

CIGov is reportedly considering a major structural change to bring PSC, Crown agencies, and SOEs under a single umbrella of a 'State Services Commission'. Developing and assessing such a proposal would provide a good opportunity to consider other governance reforms in addition to any such structural change, but this is obviously outside of the scope of CIMRIS.

h. Retain focus on Fisheries/MMR or expand work to incorporate more agencies?

The focus of CIMRIS has already been expanded to include all CIGov agencies whose work relates to marine resource management.

The most successful CIMRIS activities to date are probably the planning and management training part of the institutional strengthening component. PSC has requested similar training for all government agencies—a view that is supported by many other stakeholders who have been involved in the CIMRIS planning and management training to date. The review team supports such a request in principle, but also recognizes that it is clearly outside the scope of CIMRIS even though such a uniform approach to public sector management would likely provide some lateral support for changes already made under CIMRIS.

The review team sees no reason to look beyond the current contractor if CIGov wants to pursue such planning and management training for other agencies. If such an approach is taken, the review team recommends that it be coupled with program audits of individual agencies and of public services more generally rather than embarking on programs to strengthen planning and other management of individual agencies as they now operate.

The best mechanism for providing such support is again likely to be PSTAF (or something similar) because of its speed and flexibility and because PSC controls the fund. The current level of PSTAF funding may be adequate to support a modest program of institutional audit followed by restructuring, if necessary, and then by planning and management training if such a program were stretched out over two or three years, which may also be realistic in other respects. Such a program would necessarily restrict PSTAF funding for other purposes, however, notably including funding for outer island projects. That effect could be mitigated somewhat by including Internal Affairs in the first round of program audit and planning and management training. More realistically, such a program funded through PSTAF would likely require additional funds and might only be expected to run until dedicated project funding came on line.

i. Limit to existing resources and timeframe or increase funding and length of engagement (e.g. to 5 yrs, as allowed in the contract).

This item of the TOR raises only two options, but three should be considered:

Option A: Status Quo

Complete the contract and project as currently scheduled at the end of June 2009.

Option B: Project Design Document (PDD)

Stretch out the current \$4.2 million funding and inputs to extend beyond the present contract end date of June 2009—say, to June 2010 or to some earlier time if the natural progression of contracted activities comes to an end somewhat sooner. This option is essentially the PDD, which was upset by an internal NZAID requirement to limit the project contract to three years rather than five years as proposed in the PDD.

Option C: LI Proposal of December 2007

Add more funds and more inputs in a contract variation to extend the project under its current scope to a later date—say, to June 2010. This is, in effect, the draft proposal LI has made now at the request of the review team, but the exact amount and duration of any extension and addition of funds would be determined later rather than sticking necessarily to the terms of the draft proposal.

Option A is feasible, but the review team agrees with the original PDD and with the contractor (as stated in their draft proposal of December 2007) that institutional strengthening of the depth and scope attempted under CIMRIS generally takes more time than three years. According to MMR and LI, the major casualty of Option A would appear to be the proposed research and trials in the pearl industry, which would take at least 18 months from start to finish for just one round.

The review team sees no advantage to Option A. The project has not been enhanced by trying to squeeze the five-year project design into the three-year contract timeframe and sees no benefit now from attempting to do so. Based on project history to date, there will probably be a significant amount of project inputs that remain unexpended by June 2009 even if there is an attempt to implement Option A (an accounting of those inputs and funds is the subject of Item 4.5, below). The review team does not see that slow expenditure as a problem, however, but rather commends the contractor for coordinating, planning, and implementing the project on a realistic and practical timeline that fits local needs and conditions.

Option B, which would allow the currently contracted inputs and funds to expand over a somewhat longer time period (roughly through June 2010 as proposed by LI for Option C), is therefore to be preferred over Option A because of its greater flexibility, practicality, and responsiveness to local needs and conditions. LI has stated repeatedly that it recommends a project implementation period of longer than three years. A close review and prioritization of remaining project inputs is likely to reveal some potential savings that could be shifted to support later project inputs that are determined to be more important for ensuring the sustainability of core CIMRIS benefits. Option B would provide more time to design and implement such a shift. Component 4 would be a candidate for re-structuring if afforded a longer timeline.

Deciding between Option B and Option C depends on what in detail is proposed for Option C. Such a proposal should come from LI and its counterpart institutions rather than from the review team.

In response to a request from the review team, LI quickly prepared a preliminary draft proposal to extend project implementation to the end of June 2010 at an additional cost of \$1.7 million (see document reference in Appendix 3). The

proposed end date and cost estimate both come from LI. The main justification for the proposal is the argument that institutional strengthening cannot likely be done well and cannot ensure sustainable benefits in just three years of project implementation.

The draft proposal itself provides a general listing of activities that LI proposes to carry out during the 12 months from July 2009 through June 2010. The total proposed additional cost of the project is \$1.7 million, which would include \$0.7m for activities to be carried out in the 12 months through June 2010.

LI and its counterpart institutions should now develop details of the proposed or suggested activities and corresponding indicative work plan together with brief justifications for each and a breakdown of individual costs. The resulting proposal would be similar to what would normally be required in tendering for a \$1.7 million project. NZAID, CIGov, and the review team should then review that more detailed proposal. LI notes in its preliminary proposal that its listing of proposed inputs and activities should be taken as a menu from which items could be chosen or not chosen as determined by a detailed assessment. The review team supports that approach.

Special note should be made of one aspect of the LI proposal. LI suggests that the proposed \$0.7 million of inputs over the final year (July 2009 through June 2010) be funded through a competitive 'facility' that would be similar to PSTAF except the additional CIMRIS activities would presumably be delivered by LI.

4.4 How sustainable are the CIMRIS programme's achievements likely to be under the various scenarios taking into consideration possible changes to the methodology at strategic, operational and administrative levels?

The answer to that question depends largely on:

- Near-term reform of PSC.
- Broader governance reforms.
- Whether CIMRIS itself now takes on a responsibility for improving transparency and accountability as part of its institutional strengthening program.

The sustainable success of CIMRIS and of any institutional strengthening program depends heavily on the wider institutional framework and climate in which it operates. The capacity building that CIMRIS has achieved at the individual and institutional levels must be supported by both formal and informal accountability mechanisms to raise standards of expected performance.

The CIMRIS project has enhanced MMR management capability beyond that of most other agencies. Additionally, the central agencies in government have limited capacity to monitor and enforce performance standards. Over the near to medium term, this imbalance is likely to undermine the achievement of tangible MMR outcomes and either drag MMR performance down or allow it to settle back at a lower level.

Another factor that affects the sustainable performance of MMR and initiatives from the CIMRIS project is the continual exodus of population and skilled workers from the Cook Islands. There is always the risk that capable staff will leave the country after the end or even before the completion of CIMRIS. Thus, institutional knowledge and training gained during the project can be lost. Additionally, with a small local labour market, HOMs are reluctant to terminate non-performing staff due to the difficulty of replacing

them, which contributes to acceptance of underperformance. One way to address this problem is to strengthen recruiting processes—particularly by web-based job advertising directed at Cook Islanders living overseas. LI and MMR both appreciate the significance of these matters, but LI has not yet included recruiting processes in its institutional strengthening program.

4.5 What has been the expenditure of the CIMRIS programme to date in each component area and how does this compare to the expected achievements and benefits?

LI has not been able to supply the required information during the term of the review. This item of the TOR should be taken up once LI supplies the information.

4.6 What are the strengths, weaknesses and costs of each scenario in terms of achieving the CIMRIS programme goal of sustainable management of the Cook Islands marine resources, and the various components of the Project Design Document?

This question is similar to the question posed in Subsection 4.3 *i*, above. Considering Option C in general, and before details of the proposal are known and assessed, it seems to the review team that \$5.9 million (\$4.2 current + \$1.7 additional proposed) would be a lot to spend in one go to strengthen the marine sector in the Cook Islands. This view was expressed by AMD. A more direct and detailed answer to the question depends on three things:

- The content of a detailed proposal from LI and its local counterparts for extending the project timeline and increasing its inputs.
- A decision by CIGov to pursue broader and more fundamental governance reforms.
- CIMRIS pursuing more directly the issues of transparency and accountability— notably including enforcement—as part of its institutional strengthening program.

The question should be revisited once these matters are better known.

In any case, Component 2: Pearl Industry Recovery should receive continued and, depending on details of the LI proposal, perhaps expanded support because of the very large potential upside for the industry. Component 4: Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management requires overhaul under any of the three options.

4.7 What evidence and factors should the CI Government take into consideration when allocating development assistance for the CIMRIS Programme in the context of competing priorities for the Cook Islands Government when it allocates ODA?

According to the LI proposal, the purpose of extending CIMRIS would be to help ensure the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits rather than to add new benefits. Some stakeholders are understandably concerned that further NZAID and AusAID support for an extension of CIMRIS with additional funding would take resources away from what might be considered a higher priority need for governance reform.

The review team concludes that higher level and broader governance reforms that would have to be pursued outside of CIMRIS itself are not so much an alternative as the primary means to help ensure the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits. Thus, adding

substantially more funds to extend CIMRIS activities might end up undermining the sustainability of CIMRIS benefits if those funds were to come at the expense of assisting governance reforms.

If appropriate assistance for governance reforms can be found elsewhere, as the review team expects, then moderate additional NZAID and AusAID funding for an extension of CIMRIS would not likely have much if any effect on the availability of assistance for governance reforms. A notable exception might be if CIGov were to request additional NZAID and AusAID funding to support PSTAF or a similar 'facility' to act as a flexible and rapid-response mechanism for support of governance reforms during the period when a larger project might be developed.

4.8 What is the wider learning for NZAID and CIGov from the implementation of a sector-based ISP in the Cook Islands?

- a. *What have the CIMRIS programme partners learned about addressing wider institutional issues while trying to maintain programme focus?*

The main lesson as reported by LI is that the success of sector-based institutional strengthening projects depends on governance mechanisms operating in diverse institutions at both higher and lower levels of government. The experience of the review team supports that conclusion and also highlights the fundamental importance of strengthening governance mechanisms that operate by making government operations transparent to the public.

- b. *What have the CIMRIS partners learned about communications and institutional relationships?*

Transparency with stakeholders, consultation with stakeholders, and participation of stakeholders leads to better, more constructive relationships and to better outcomes.

In developing an institutional strengthening project, there is particular need for clear communication between partner agencies about their needs and their levels of commitment in time and budget and in political capital.

A sector approach requires communication among agencies at the top level. CIMRIS activities across ministries have necessarily (by project design) been focused mainly at lower levels. This raises concerns held by LI and by the review team that the management training and other initiatives outside MMR and PSC will not be sustainable due to a lack of firm support at the top level. For sustainable change, there needs to be agreement and support at the top level to ensure that changes made in one agency are matched and supported by partnering agencies across the sector in a collaborative and coordinated approach to institutional change.

- c. *What has been learned about the incentive environment for individuals?*

Governance is good when incentive environments induce individuals to serve the public good whether they act altruistically or pursue their own personal interests.

In addition to individual motives, the incentive environment for public sector employees depends on:

- Institutional support.
- Accountability measures.
- Political support from higher levels of government and from the public.

Institutional support provides individual employees the knowledge, tools, resources, planning, and coordination they need to meet their job responsibilities. It also provides a career path and other incentives to help individuals achieve both organisational and personal goals. CIMRIS has been effective in helping MMR in each of these areas. CIMRIS has helped institute a performance appraisal system in MMR, and this system has been taken up by PSC. CIMRIS otherwise has generally not addressed accountability measures or political support from higher levels of government or from the public. It is generally outside the CIMRIS mandate to address fundamental governance issues and public service reform at higher levels of government and from the public (except in the case where CIMRIS has been or can be involved in the review of sanitation, environmental, and marine resource regulations).

It is within the CIMRIS mandate, however, to help its counterpart agencies and other stakeholders develop political support from higher levels of government and from non-government stakeholder groups for the cleanup of Rarotonga lagoons (whether through the Takitumu pilot or some broader mechanism). It is within the CIMRIS mandate to help strengthen the transparency mechanisms and accountability measures that should be operating in MMR, Public Health, NES, and Public Works to help keep the lagoons clean. It is within the CIMRIS mandate to facilitate greater public awareness in order to help develop political support within and outside of government for those reforms. And it is within the CIMRIS mandate to strengthen formal and informal governance mechanisms operating among pearl farmers and between MMR and pearl farmers in Manihiki that appear now to slow or block improvements to lagoon growing conditions, pearl industry hygiene, and perhaps market reforms. CIMRIS appears to be doing these things indirectly or tangentially.

- d. *What has been learned with respect to the importance of formal and informal rules, norms and behaviours in the wider enabling environment?*

Formal and informal rules and norms all require effective sanctions—both positive and negative—in order to be effective in shaping individual behaviour for the common good. These issues are particularly important in the Takitumu pilot, in preparing and implementing a fishery management plan on Palmerston, and in improving local conditions in the pearl industry in Manihiki.

- e. *What has NZAID learned about supporting an institutional strengthening programme in partnership with the Cook Islands?*

Institutional strengthening programmes need to be adaptable and responsive to local needs, priorities, work plans, and absorptive capacity, and the adaptability and responsiveness of the programme in turn needs project oversight and accounting mechanisms that are equally adaptable and responsive.

A common problem with aid projects is the lengthy time lag between recognizing a need and actually receiving project assistance to help address it. Conditions change during that time lag, and local initiative slows while waiting for the project to intervene. Both problems afflicted CIMRIS at the outset.

In the case of an institutional strengthening project, it is especially critical that senior management support the project. In the particular case of CIMRIS, the normal (i.e., very slow) pipeline was apparently further lengthened by bureaucratic delays within NZAID. The end result was that valuable time and momentum had been lost and the top management of the executing agency had changed. According to the new HOM, he had not requested CIMRIS and initially did not understand or want CIMRIS except that it raised the promise of getting a new building to house MMR.

Much of the current success of CIMRIS with MMR can be attributed to luck in getting a good contractor to implement the project and getting a good HOM to act as counterpart. Neither is guaranteed, and the odds of getting both in one project is not high. The contractor was successful in overcoming initial resistance and getting buy-in and support from the new HOM (who was not the HOM who requested the project) and from many of the Directors—not just in principal, but also understanding the rationale of organisational changes and management initiatives and proactively working with and even directing the process the contractor had initiated.

Lessons for NZAID include the importance of speeding up the project cycle once the necessary support is confirmed and the importance of emphasizing the quality of technical proposals in tendering in order to raise the odds of getting a good contractor rather than just a cheap contractor.

CIMRIS and other institutional strengthening projects must necessarily take in a broader scope than a single institution, however, just because institutions must work cooperatively. This multiplies the risk of projects working with managers who are not so capable and not so agreeable to institutional changes that will demand more of them and their staff. This in turn multiplies the importance of ensuring political support for institutional strengthening from higher levels of government and from the public. It is difficult to strengthen institutions whose managers and staff are not held accountable for their performance, and even newly strengthened institutions tend not to remain strong for long if they are not held accountable by higher level institutions and by the public.

The main lesson for NZAID, therefore, is that the success of institutional strengthening projects rests heavily not only on the willingness and capability of the contractor and of the head of the main counterpart agency, as noted in the PDD, but perhaps more importantly on support from higher levels of government and from the public they represent.

NZAID will not likely find much success in pursuing institutional strengthening projects piecemeal without effective demand for such reforms from CIGov and the public it represents and without addressing fundamental governance issues first. In the short to medium term, therefore, NZAID efforts may be most successful by responding first to any CIGov request to assist the 'central agencies'—namely PSC, Crown Law, OPM, and MFEM—and to help increase government transparency to the public in order to enhance public support for reform.

The issue of governance and the need for public sector reform is the major issue that the CIGov and NZAID face in progressing any institutional reforms. Any ISP, no matter how well designed and implemented, is unlikely to lead to real long term outcomes without public sector reform to improve governance and to lay the foundation for sustainable policy initiatives.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMD	Aid Management Division, MFEM
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CIGov	Cook Islands Government
CIES	Cook Islands Environment Service
CIMRIS	Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening
CIPA	Cook Islands Pearl Authority
FFA	Forum Fisheries Agency
Public Health	Public Health Division of the Ministry of Health
HOM	Head of Ministry
HRD	Human Resource Department
ISP	Institutional Strengthening Project
LI	Lincoln International (1995) Ltd
MFEM	Ministry of Finance and Economic Management
MFish	Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand
MMR	Ministry of Marine Resources
NES	National Environment Service
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NIWA	National Institute of Water and Atmosphere, New Zealand
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PCC	Project Coordinating Committee
PDD	Project Design Document
PID	Project Implementation Document
PSTAF	Public Service Technical Assistance Facility
PSC	Public Service Commission
REA	Rarotonga Environment Authority
SPC	Secretariat for the Pacific Community
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TA	Technical Assistance
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
TOR	Terms of Reference
VAT	Value Added Tax

Appendix 2: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference: Team Leader

Review of the Cook Islands Marine Institutional Strengthening (CIMRIS) Programme

Background

The 2001 – 2007 Cook Islands Country Strategy identified the marine sector as having high potential for economic development but also in need of specific management, technical and training support. The New Zealand government, through its Agency for International Development (NZAID), agreed to assist the Cook Islands Government (CIGov), through the Ministry of Marine Resources (MMR), National Environment Service and other government agencies, with a programme to strengthen the Cook Islands marine sector. The process to develop a project began in November 2003 with a mission to identify areas for support. Extensive consultations were undertaken with industry, NGOs, CIG agencies and other stakeholders. A Scoping Mission Report formed the foundation for the project, followed by the Project Design Document (PDD) in 2004, developed through an intensive workshop approach with staff from MMR and Cook Islands Environment Service (CINES), the two main agencies involved in the project.

CIMRIS Programme Description

The **goal** of the project is to enhance the management and sustainable use of marine resources for the benefit of all Cook Islanders.

The **purpose** of the project is to build the capacity of Ministry of Marine Resources (MMR) and related agencies to ensure that Cook Islands marine resources are sustainably managed.

There are five components (plus a management component):

- a. Institutional strengthening for MMR;
- b. Pearl Industry Recovery, including work with the Cook Islands Pearl Authority (CIPA);
- c. Commercial Inshore Fishery and Aquaculture Development ;
- d. Sustainable Inshore Ecosystem Management, including assistance to strengthen the capacity of Cook Islands National Environment Service' (NES) and Ministry of Health (MoH) in integrated coastal management and environmental impact assessments; and
- e. Offshore (long line) Fisheries Development, including work with the Tuna Association.

The PDD planned for the continuing evaluation of priorities for activities to ensure that the MMR and the Cook Islands marine resources industries receive the maximum benefits from the project. It was noted in the Scoping Study and PDD that these priorities will change with time and that there was a need to ensure that the project design is flexible enough to cater for changing circumstances over the life of the project.

The goals and objectives mesh with the Policy Objectives Matrix of the Cook Islands Sustainable Development Strategy Plan (NSDP). The NSDP forms the basis of the NZAID/AusAID Cook Islands Country Strategy 2008-2018 currently under development.

The purpose of the CIMRIS Programme is primarily to strengthen the capacity of MMR to plan and manage its functions more efficiently and effectively. As part of the process, MMR

will also be receiving additional technical assistance aimed at strengthening specific functions within the Ministry. Associated agencies will be strengthened in a more limited way in some areas of their management and technical functions.

Implementation

Implementation of CIMRIS was contracted to Lincoln International (1995) Ltd (now LI (2006) Ltd) for the period December 2005 to June 2009 and began with an inception mission to develop a Project Implementation Document (PID), which was presented to the NZAID in February 2006. This was finalised and agreed between Cook Islands government (CIGov) and NZAID at the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC)¹ meeting in May 2006. Implementation began in March 2006.

LI manages a programme team of multidisciplinary specialists, including those with expertise in the areas of organisational change and management, fisheries management, marine resources, the environment and community development, is implementing the programme, using counterparts in MMR, CIES and Public Health, as well as in several industry groups and community groups. Local consultants are used wherever possible.

Project implementation was slow in 2006 but picked up in 2007 as the partners gained a greater appreciation of the CIMRIS Programme's achievements and potential and requested assistance in the preparation of their respective 2007/8 work plans. During 2006/07 the CIMRIS team expanded the institutional strengthening component of the project to include NES, Ministry of Health, the Takitumu Vaka Council, CIPA and Tuna Industry Association of the Cook Islands. The PCC have endorsed the inclusive approach and consider it to be essential to the long term sustainability of the programme.

The programme is anticipated to run for approximately five years, which a maximum contracting period of three years at a time (to fit with NZAID's three-funding cycle). A mid-term review was scheduled to take place 30 months into the programme to provide guidance for the direction and implementation methodology for the second half of the programme. The current contract with LI (the management services consultant, MSC) is for \$4.2m for the period December 2005 to June 2009 (longer than the normal three years to account for the delayed start date).

Decisions on design and implementation methodology for the second phase of the implementation will be based on evidence collected and analysed by the mid-term review, by the Programme Coordinating Committee and NZAID in partnership. The primary purpose of the mid-term review is therefore to support the evidence-based consideration of options of what comes next in the CIMRIS Programme.

CIMRIS Programme Partners

The partners in the CIMRIS programme are NZAID/AusAID and CIGov Ministry of Finance and Economic Management (through the Aid Management Division, AMD) and Ministry of Marine Resources). Other key stakeholders to be closely involved in the review are NES, MoH, CIPA, Tuna Industry Association of the CI, Takitumu Vaka Council and associated community groups involved in the Takitumu Lagoon Project.

CIMRIS Programme Management Structure

There are three layers to the project management:

¹ The PCC represents all sectors related to marine resources, drawn from government agencies, industry bodies, NGOs, traditional leaders, and vaka (local) councils. NZAID is also represented. See section on CIMRIS Programme Partners below for full list.

- a. The PCC provides high level guidance to the operation of the project. It approves the PID and the annual work plans. The PCC is responsible for ensuring the environment is conducive to the project's success.
- b. The Steering Committee is responsible for developing annual work plans and overseeing the operational management of the project. It is made up of MMR, Health, Environment, NZAID, and the MSC. The Steering Committee meets twice a year.
- c. Contract Review – The MSC, NZAID, MMR and AMD meet once a year to review the performance of the contract over the previous period, discuss the provision of ongoing services and any additional service requirements, and discuss the work plan for the coming year. This meeting occurs around the same time as the PCC.

Since the contract was signed NZAID has devolved management of the CIMRIS Programme, to the Post. The Post is able to make decisions at the same level as the DPM in Wellington.

Purpose of the Review

The next step in the CIMRIS programme is for the NZAID and the Cook Islands to make evidence-based decisions on where to next. The purpose of the review is to provide the necessary evidence, together with options that will meet the overall goal of sustainable management of the Cook Islands marine resources, based on good development practice².

The review will describe what the CIMRIS programme has achieved to date, what it is likely to achieve and how sustainable the results are likely to be (based on various scenarios set out below). Taking this as the starting point the review will then identify options for enhancing the impact and sustainability of the programme and analyse these in terms of which stakeholders they will involve, what results they can expect to achieve, what resources they will require as well as stakeholders views and preferences.

The review will identify and compare the strengths, weaknesses and costs of possible implementation scenarios, based on the empirical evidence and drawing on experience to date about the implementation of the CIMRIS Project. The findings of the review will inform decision-making by the Cook Islands Government PCC and NZAID about the most appropriate way forward for the CIMRIS Programme. As a starting point for developing these scenarios, the review will consider:

- a. Changes in the implementation context as the programme has developed.
- b. The continued relevance of planned outcomes and objectives (PID).
- c. The achievements of the CIMRIS programme during the post inception period.
- d. The likelihood that programmed activities will lead to the expected outcomes.
- e. The resources required to support those activities.

The review will survey the views of MMR, CIES and other CI partners represented on the PCC about ways forward for CIMRIS.. It will also include a review of the current administrative and operational context and practice and make recommendations to NZAID and LI on improvements, if any.

The final report will make recommendations to the CIGov and NZAID/AusAID, through the PCC, to enable them to decide on the way forward in terms of Cook Islands development priorities and programme design and methodology. This will provide the basis from which

² See Paris Declaration – aid effectiveness principles.

NZAID will negotiate any amendments to the project design and implementation with LI, if the review recommends continuation past 30 June 2009.

Scope of the Review

The review covers the entire post-inception phase of the project and all components contained within focusing on all geographical areas of the Cook Islands with active project components.

Objectives of the Review

The review will address the following questions:

1. What changes have occurred in the implementing environment, including risks, scope and the approach used by LI?
2. How relevant are the CIMRIS programme's agreed objectives and implementation plans in the current context?
3. What has gone well and less well in the implementation of CIMRIS?
 - a. With respect to management of the project by LI?
 - b. With respect to management of the project by NZAID?
 - c. With respect to governance structures?
 - d. What has the CIMRIS Programme achieved during the post-inception period (expected/unexpected; positive/negative), in terms of the sustainable management of the Cook Islands' marine resources and how consistent are these activities with the original goals and objectives?
 - e. What is the CIMRIS Programme likely to achieve a) during the remainder of the current contract project assuming it continues its present course as approved by the PCC, and b) in the anticipated second two-year phase/ (i.e. within anticipated five-year implementation period)?
 - f. What are some possible options or scenarios to ensure the achievements are sustainable? In considering this question the reviewers should consider timeframe, scope, project structure, project management (including the roles of NZAID, AMD, agency counterparts to the programme advisers, governance, and the MSC), resourcing, partnerships and other relevant factors. E.g.:
 - g. Narrow, broaden or retain the original scope?
 - h. Retain focus on Fisheries/MMR or expand work to incorporate more agencies?
 - i. Limit to existing resources and timeframe or increase funding and length of engagement (e.g. to 5 yrs, as allowed in the contract].

4. How sustainable are the CIMRIS programme's achievements likely to be under the various scenarios, taking into consideration possible changes to the methodology at strategic, operational and administrative levels?
5. What has been the expenditure of the CIMRIS programme to date in each component area and how does this compare to the expected achievements and benefits?
6. What are the strengths, weaknesses and costs of each scenario in terms of achieving the CIMRIS programme goal of sustainable management of the Cook Islands marine resources, and the various components of the Project Design Document?
7. What evidence and factors should the CI Government take into consideration when allocating development assistance for the CIMRIS Programme in the context of competing priorities for the Cook Islands Government when it allocates ODA?
8. What is the wider learning for NZAID and CIGov from the implementation of a sector-based ISP in the Cook Islands?
 - a. What have the CIMRIS programme partners learned about addressing wider institutional issues while trying to maintaining programme focus?
 - b. What have the CIMRIS partners learned about communications and institutional relationships?
 - c. What has been learned about the incentive environment for individuals?
 - d. What has been learned with respect to the importance of formal and informal rules, norms and behaviours in the wider enabling environment?
 - e. What has NZAID learned about supporting an institutional strengthening programme in partnership with the Cook Islands?

Methodology

The review will be conducted by a team of two or more persons selected by CIGov (AMD) and NZAID, based on a participatory methodology. Specifically this will include a pre-review briefing with stakeholders (in this case PCC members) and an end of visit debriefing to check that the draft findings and recommendations are representative of the stakeholder views.

The team leader will develop a draft design and plan for the review based on the briefing with CIMRIS Programme Steering Committee in Rarotonga and in consultation with the team member(s) (by telephone and/or email if necessary) of which the Steering Committee will have the opportunity to review prior to finalisation.

The approach taken should ensure that the views of all PCC members are heard and incorporated into the findings or the review. It will specify the roles and responsibilities of each team member. The draft design and timeframe for the review will be submitted to the Steering Committee and refined as necessary.

It is not anticipated that a visit to the outer Cook Islands will be feasible within the timeframe. Pearl farmers (from Manihiki) and other people involved in the marine sector in the outer islands and other leading sector members may be contacted by telephone and email. Industry representatives are mostly based in Rarotonga

In Cook Islands the review team will:

- a. Attend an in-country briefing with NZAID and the Steering Committee
- b. Conduct the review
- c. Present a draft summary of findings at the end of the in-country mission in the form of a short briefing paper and to a workshop with MMR and other stakeholders.

Management of the Review

The review team will be selected by CIGov and NZAID and consist of local and international consultants, independent of the MSC. The team will work in close consultation with the Steering Committee, but will be self-reliant in conducting work necessary to complete the review.

Timeline

This review should take place in October or November 2007, with the final report ready for Project Coordinating Committee consideration by mid-November 2007.

Reporting

The review team will provide a draft summary of findings and conduct an in-country workshop with stakeholders as described in the methodology.

The review team will then submit a draft report to CIGov and NZAID, and the Team Leader will discuss the draft report with NZAID at a debriefing session in Rarotonga. The review should be conducted in accordance with the DAC Quality Standards for Evaluation. The report will conform to NZAID's guidelines on the structure of evaluation and review reports, which will be provided to the team.

The review team will prepare a final report taking into account feedback from NZAID, CIGov and stakeholders.

Qualifications and Skills required of the review team

Collectively, the team will possess qualifications, skills and/or experience in:

- a. marine sector development in the Pacific (inshore and offshore preferably)
- b. programme/project review and/or evaluation
- c. participatory methodologies
- d. institutional strengthening of government
- e. change management
- f. Working in the Pacific.

In addition, the Team Leader will have expertise in leading reviews and evaluations.

Dissemination and Use of the Review

The Review will be primarily for the benefit and consumption of CIMRIS stakeholders (i.e. the PCC), and will be presented at the next CIMRIS PCC (scheduled or especially convened).

The Review will also be promulgated to the wider NZAID agency via the NZAID Evaluation Committee.

Key Documents

- a. CIMRIS Annual (2006 and 2007), Quarterly Progress Reports and related documents
- b. Scoping Mission Report, Project Design Document and Project Implementation Document
- c. MMR Business Plan (and others as necessary)
- d. Joint Country Strategy (current and next – in draft)
- e. Review of Samoa ISPs (not sure of correct title), by AusAID
- f. NSDP
- g. NZAID related reports on the CIMRIS programme and PCC meetings.

Definitions

NZAID distinguishes between capacity building and institutional strengthening. While not being tied to the language and descriptions, it will be important for the review team to determine what was expected by each stakeholder at the beginning of CIMRIS and now.

Institutional strengthening:

Institutions govern individual and collective behaviour. They may be formal – legal systems, property rights, enforcement mechanisms; or informal – customs, traditions. They may operate at different levels –international (e.g. WTO rules), national (e.g. laws, constitutions), social (e.g. norms of conduct, status of women), family (e.g. inheritance rules). They may nest within larger institutions – e.g. village-based collective institutions nested within the policy institutions of government. Organisations are ways of structuring society to achieve certain purposes/goals. Institutional Strengthening is therefore the development of formal and informal processes that guide people's behaviour and interaction, both within/between organizations and in the wider society, in order to achieve their purposes/goals

Capacity and Capability Building:

“Capacity” is the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully: for example to deliver basic goods and services, and provide a suitable policy and regulatory environment for development to take place. “Capacity development” is the process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.

This can be distinguished from “Capability”, which can be defined as an aspect of capacity, usually in relation to technical skills, that on its own does not guarantee capacity. “Capability” Building pertains to the process whereby the technical skills of individuals and organisations are strengthened.

Appendix 3: List of Data Sources

Year	Month	Alphabetical by Author	Title
No Date		CIMRIS	Draft Fisheries Plan for the Marine Resources of Palmerston
No Date		CIMRIS	Project Coordinating Committee Meeting: 9am Monday 27 November 2007 [sic] DRAFT
2007	Nov	CIMRIS	CIMRIS Project – Possible Exit Strategies
2007	Oct	CIMRIS	Quarterly Report: First Quarter 2007-2008
2007	Sep	CIMRIS	End of Mission Report: Erosion and Sediment Control Workshop
2007	Sep	CIMRIS	Fisheries Training Specialist: End of Mission Report
2007	Aug	CIMRIS	August 2007 Project Status Report
2007	Jul	CIMRIS	July Project Status Report
2007	Jul	CIMRIS	Annual Report 2006-2007 (Main Report)
2007	Jul	CIMRIS	Annual Report 2006-2007 (Supplementary Appendices): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working Together – Industry Preparedness Report, Marketing Strategy Development, Cook Islands Pearl Industry • Training Plan for MMR Fishery and Assistant Fishery Officers • Takitumu Lagoon Pilot Program: Community Input, and Monitoring and Evaluation • Takitumu Lagoon Management Plan, 2007 to 2008, Takitumu Vaka Council • Report on the Tuna Industry Association of the Cook Islands study tour of the French Polynesian long line industry, MMR
2007	Jun	CIMRIS	Annual Work Plan – 2007/08
2007	Jun	CIMRIS	Annual Work Plan – 2007/08 (Budget)
2007	Apr	CIMRIS	Progress Report to AMD and NZAID Steering Committee
2007	Jan	CIMRIS	Aquaculture Report No. 1
2006	Nov	CIMRIS	Takitumu Lagoon Project: Concepts: communications strategy and activities
2006	Feb	CIMRIS	Project Implementation Document and Appendices
2005	May	CIMRIS	Minutes of [PCC] Meeting 25 May 2005
No Date		Cook Islands	<i>Te Kaveinga Nui</i> : Pathway for Sustainable Development in the Cook Islands: Immediate Implementation Plan of Action 2007 – 2010
2007	Jan	Cook Islands	<i>Te Kaveinga Nui</i> (Pathway for Sustainable Development in the Cook Islands) Living the Cook Islands Vision – A 2020 Challenge, National Sustainable Development Plan (2007 –

			2010)
No Date		Cook Islands Government, NZAID, AusAID	Cook Islands Joint Country Strategy 2008 – 2017
No Date		Cook Islands Government, NZAID, AusAID	Cook Islands Programme 5 Year Strategy: July 2001 – June 2006
2007	Sep	<i>Cook Islands Times</i>	“MMR visits Palmerston, the domain of the Marsters family,” 10 Sep, pp. 6-7.
No Date		MMR	Cook Islands Public Sector Strategy and Business Plan July 2007 – June 2008
2007	Jul	MMR	Staff Work Plan for 2008, Station Manager, Manihiki
2006	Aug	MMR	Administration Policy Manual
No Date		MoH	Cook Islands Public Sector Business Plan
No Date		MoH	Job Description: Charge Health Inspector
2007	Nov	MoH Public Health	CIMRIS Assistance to the Ministry of Health: Work Completed to Date
2006	Nov	MoH Public Health	Job Description: Sanitary Engineering Specialist
2007	May	NZ	Letter from John Bryan, NZ High Commissioner to the Cook Islands, to Ian Bertram, Secretary, Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources RE: NZ Pacific Fisheries Strategy and MMR Engagement With NZ Mfish
No Date		NZAID	NZAID: Cook Islands: Government Plans to Enhance Planning and Budget Process with PFTAC Assistance
No Date		NZAID	CIMRIS Contract Meeting with LI, AMD
No Date		NZAID	NZAID: Cook Islands: Report on Meeting with CIMRIS MSC
2007		NZAID	Cook Islands: Sea Change, <i>Currents</i> , pp. 8-13
2007	Oct	NZAID	Institutional Strengthening – Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources: Letter of Variation No. Five
2007	Jun	NZAID	[CIMRIS] Contract Review Meeting, 12 June 2007
2007	May	NZAID	NZAID: Cook Islands: Marine Resource Institutional Strengthening Programme Meeting June [sic] 07
2007	May	NZAID	NZAID: Cook Islands: RE (C07000079-WLN): NZ Pacific Fisheries Strategy and Engagement
2007	Mar	NZAID	NZAID: Cook Islands: Report on Meeting with CIMRIS MSC
2007	Feb	NZAID	Institutional Strengthening – Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources: Letter of Variation No. Four

2006	Sep	NZAID	Institutional Strengthening – Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources: Letter of Variation No. Three
2006	Sep	NZAID	Institutional Strengthening – Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources: Letter of Variation No. Two
2006	Jun	NZAID	NZAID (C07001175-WLN)ID: Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening Project (CIMRIS) – RE
2006	Jun	NZAID	Institutional Strengthening – Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources: Letter of Variation No. One
2005	Dec	NZAID	Management Services Contract between New Zealand Agency for International Development and Lincoln International (1995) Limited: Institutional Strengthening Cook Islands Ministry of Marine Resources 2005–2009 Contract No. COM/59/8
2004	Nov	NZAID	Project Design Document: Cook Islands marine resources institutional strengthening project
2003	Dec	NZAID	A report scoping a project proposal for the marine resources sector in the Cook Islands
No Date		Richards, Jayne	End of Project Report: Takitumu Groundwater Study

Appendix 4: People Interviewed

Cook Islands Government

Ian Bertram	Secretary, MMR
George Matutu	Director, Corporate Services, MMR
Peter Graham	Director, Policy and Legal Division, MMR
Josh Mitchell	Director, Offshore Fishing Division, MMR
Kori Raumea	Acting Director, Inshore and Aquaculture Fisheries, MMR
Sonny Tatuava	Senior Fisheries Officer, Extension, MMR
Richard Story	Hatchery Manager, Aitutaki, MMR
Tonumaivao Navy Epati	Public Service Commissioner, PSC Part owner, long line fishing boats
Carmen Temata	Senior Performance Analyst
Dorothy Pokura	Performance Analyst, PSC
Vavia Vavia Jr.	Acting Manager, Operations Division, Compliance and Advisory Service, NES
Keri Herman	Education and Information Officer, NES
Garth Henderson	Director, Aid Management Division, MFEM
Paul Lynch	Senior Crown Council, Crown Law
George Ellis	Chief Executive Officer, CIPA
Tekao Herrmann	Director, Waste Management Division, MPW
Jacqui Evans	Planner (Sanitation), MoH
Teariki Matenga	Mayor, Takitumu Vaka Council
Jeane Matenga	CEO, Elijah communications, Rarotonga
Vincent Peters	News Director, CITV
Carley Hemopo	News Producer, CI News

Cook Islands Private Sector and NGOs

Tap Pryor	Aquaculture farm
Ian Karika	President, Ipokarea Society, Inc. Chair, National Environment Authority
Vereara Maeva-Taripo	President, CIANGO
Bill Doherty	Owner, Ocean Fresh
Sam Karaponga	Owner, Klassic Pearls
Greg Stanaway	CEO, Group General Manager, Pacific Resort

Thomas Koteka	General Manager, Sales and Marketing, Pacific Resort
Jack Cooper	Owner, Blue Pacific Foods
Alistair Macquarie	Environmental activist & volunteer, Takitumu Lagoon Pilot
Temu Okotai	Pearl industry

CIMRIS Management Services Contractor

Geoff Mavromatis	Project Manager
Geoff Dews	Capacity Building Adviser
Jo Akroyd	Fisheries Policy Adviser
Miranda Cahn	Monitoring & Evaluation Adviser

NZAID

Dr. Stephenie Knight	NZAID Manager, NZ High Commission, Cook Islands
Tom Lee	Programme Officer, Samoa & Cook Islands, NZAID
Cameron Cowan	Institutional Strengthening Advisor, NZAID