



# **COP27**

**UNFCCC COP 27, CMP 17, CMA 4,  
SBSTA 57, SBI 57**

**OFFICIALS' BRIEF**

## Contents

---

Contents .....	2
Delegation responsibilities .....	7
Overview.....	9
COP27 .....	14
Agenda item 4: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.....	15
Agenda item 5: Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention .....	16
Agenda item 6: Matters relating to adaptation .....	17
Agenda item 7: Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts .....	18
Agenda item 8: Matters relating to finance .....	20
Agenda item 9: Development and transfer of technologies: joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network.....	33
Agenda item 10: Capacity-building under the Convention .....	34
Agenda item 11: Matters relating to least developed countries .....	36
Agenda item 12: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.....	38
Agenda item 13: Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it.....	39
Agenda item 14: Gender and climate change.....	40
Agenda item 15: Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15 .....	41
Agenda item 16: Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention .	44
Agenda item 17: Equitable geographical representation in constituted bodies under the Convention .....	45
Agenda item 18: Administrative, financial and institutional matters .....	46
CMP 17 .....	49
Agenda item 4: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I .....	50
Agenda item 5: Matters relating to the clean development mechanism .....	51
Agenda item 6: Matters relating to joint implementation.....	53
Agenda item 7: Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund.....	54
Agenda item 8: Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.....	55
Agenda item 9: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.....	56
Agenda item 10: Report of the Compliance Committee .....	57
Agenda item 11: Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments .....	58

Agenda item 12: Administrative, financial and institutional matters .....	59
SBI 57 .....	61
Agenda item 2: Organizational matters .....	62
Agenda item 3: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention .....	68
Agenda item 4: Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention .....	71
Agenda item 5: Matters relating to the clean development mechanism registry referred to in paragraph 75(b) of the annex to decision 3/CMA.3 .....	73
Agenda item 6: Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol .....	75
Agenda item 7: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3 .....	76
Agenda item 8: Matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement .....	79
Agenda item 9: Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it .....	82
Agenda item 10: Koronivia joint work on agriculture .....	84
Agenda item 11: Report of the Adaptation Committee .....	86
Agenda item 12: Matters relating to least developed countries .....	87
Agenda item 13: National adaptation plans .....	88
Agenda item 14: Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3 .....	90
Agenda item 15: Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts .....	92
Agenda item 16: Matters relating to the Santiago network under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts .....	93
Agenda item 17: Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism .....	98
Agenda item 18: Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund .....	102
Agenda item 19: Matters relating to capacity-building .....	105
Agenda item 20: Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement .....	106
Agenda item 21: Gender and climate change .....	109
Agenda item 22: Action for Climate Empowerment .....	114
Agenda item 23: Administrative, financial and institutional matters .....	117
SBSTA 57 .....	119
Agenda item 3: Report of the Adaptation Committee .....	120

Agenda item 4: Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3 .....	121
Agenda item 5: Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.....	122
Agenda item 6: Matters relating to the Santiago network under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.....	123
Agenda item 7: Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.....	124
Agenda item 8: Koronivia joint work on agriculture .....	128
Agenda item 9: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3. ....	129
Agenda item 10: Matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement.....	130
Agenda item 11: Matters related to science and review .....	131
Agenda item 12: Development and transfer of technologies: joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network.....	132
Agenda item 13: Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement .....	133
Agenda item 14: Methodological issues under the Convention .....	134
Agenda item 15: Matters relating to reporting and review under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: options for conducting reviews on a voluntary basis of the information reported pursuant to chapter IV of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, and respective training courses needed to facilitate these voluntary reviews.....	141
Agenda item 16: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement and in decision 2/CMA.3 .....	143
Agenda item 17: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement.....	146
Agenda item 18: Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement .....	149
Agenda item 19: Annual reports on technical reviews .....	151
CMA 4 .....	153
Agenda item 4: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3. ....	154
Agenda item 5: Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement .....	155
Agenda item 6: Matters relating to adaptation .....	156
Agenda item 7: Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts .....	157
Agenda item 8: Matters relating to finance .....	158
Agenda item 9: Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.....	161

Agenda item 10: Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism .....	163
Agenda item 11: Capacity-building under the Paris Agreement.....	164
Agenda item 12: Matters relating to least developed countries .....	165
Agenda item 13: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.....	166
Agenda item 14: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement.....	167
Agenda item 15: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement.....	168
Agenda item 16: Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement .....	169
Agenda item 17: Report of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement .....	170
Agenda item 18: Consideration of special needs and special circumstances of Parties.....	171
Agenda item 19: Administrative, financial and institutional matters .....	174
EVENT BRIEFS .....	176
4th Workshop under the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation	177
High-level Ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambition .....	179
High-level Ministerial dialogue on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance .....	181
Fifth biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance.....	183
THEMATIC BRIEFS .....	187
Adaptation .....	188
Agriculture .....	190
Ambition .....	194
Ambition .....	194
Climate Change and Oceans.....	197
Domestic policy update .....	200
Finance .....	203
Forests, land use, and sustainable supply chains .....	206
Human rights and climate change.....	208
IPCC 6th Assessment reports.....	212
Loss and Damage.....	217
Nature-based Solutions .....	219
Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform .....	221
Pacific Climate Change Priorities.....	224

ANNEX ..... 227

    Useful links ..... 228

    New Zealand’s emissions profile ..... 229

    Negotiation language ..... 231

    s6(a) ..... 239

    s6(a) ..... 243

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Delegation responsibilities

Name	Responsibility	Contact information
Alison Carlin MFAT	Climate finance, Adaptation Fund	<a href="mailto:Alison.Carlin@mfat.govt.nz">Alison.Carlin@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Andrea Brandon MfE	Science, FSV, Adaptation, NAPs	<a href="mailto:Andrea.Brandon1@mfe.govt.nz">Andrea.Brandon1@mfe.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Anna Broadhurst MFAT	Loss and Damage (including WIM), Bilateral international carbon markets	<a href="mailto:Anna.Broadhurst@mfat.govt.nz">Anna.Broadhurst@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Ashraf Rizk Asad Cairo Embassy	Driver	s9(2)(a)
Ben Abraham MFAT	Climate finance, Adaptation Fund, NZGIF liaison	<a href="mailto:Ben.Abraham@mfat.govt.nz">Ben.Abraham@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Callum Hames MFAT	Ministerial programme, Delegation support	<a href="mailto:Callum.Hames@mfat.govt.nz">Callum.Hames@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Emily Mathias MPI	Agriculture (Koronivia lead), Forestry	<a href="mailto:Emily.Mathias@mpi.govt.nz">Emily.Mathias@mpi.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Georgina Halstead MFAT	Delegation Coordinator, Response Measures, Technology, Just Transition, Formal Reporting, Climate Change Ambassadors' Programme.	<a href="mailto:Georgina.Halstead@mfat.govt.nz">Georgina.Halstead@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Helen Plume MfE	Deputy Head of Delegation, Reporting (Annex 1 and non-Annex 1), Methodological Issues, Technical Reviews	<a href="mailto:Helen.Plume@mfe.govt.nz">Helen.Plume@mfe.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Jacqueline Ruesga MfE	Article 6 (carbon markets), Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism), CarbonClick liaison	<a href="mailto:Jacqueline.Ruesga@mfe.govt.nz">Jacqueline.Ruesga@mfe.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Kay Harrison MFAT	Head of Delegation, Climate Change Ambassador	<a href="mailto:Kay.Harrison@mfat.govt.nz">Kay.Harrison@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Lindy Fursman MfE	High-level technical advice, Negotiations support, Climate Change Commission liaison	<a href="mailto:Lindy.Fursman@mfe.govt.nz">Lindy.Fursman@mfe.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Lou Hunt MPI	Agriculture, Forestry	<a href="mailto:Lou.Hunt@mpi.govt.nz">Lou.Hunt@mpi.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Tiana Carter MFAT	LCIPP, Human rights and gender, ACE, Iwi Māori liaison	<a href="mailto:Tiana.Carter@mfat.govt.nz">Tiana.Carter@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)
Todd Croad MFAT	Mitigation, GST, Bilateral international carbon markets, Opposition spokespersons liaison	<a href="mailto:Todd.Croad@mfat.govt.nz">Todd.Croad@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)

Romero Viane Tokelau	Representative of Tokelau	<a href="mailto:Romeroviane@gmail.com">Romeroviane@gmail.com</a> s9(2)(a)
Sally Forrest MFAT	Project manager, Healthy and safety officer, Logistics support	<a href="mailto:Sally.Forrest@mfat.govt.nz">Sally.Forrest@mfat.govt.nz</a> s9(2)(a)

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



## Overview

---

### Background

1. COP26 saw a renewed sense of optimism with the adoption of the Glasgow Climate Pact and completion of the Paris Agreement 'rulebook'. The Pact attempts to turn the 2020s into a decade of climate action and support – responding to evidence that previous efforts were not going far enough, fast enough. The rulebook saw the finalisation of out-standing rules regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement – including on transparency (the means to hold Parties to account), and market and non-market cooperation.
2. COP26 saw substantial progress towards closing the global ambition gap, on both climate finance and mitigation. It did not, however, deliver either the US\$100 billion per annum climate finance goal, or enough emissions reductions (or pledges) to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees.
3. There is work to do. COP26 faced substantial challenges to build momentum, host, and deliver a successful outcome in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic and travel restrictions. COP27, however, will face a new context and new set of challenges.

### An urgent climate crisis amongst multiple concurrent crises

4. The Sixth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released over 2021/22 includes findings that:

- **Emissions continue to rise**, across all sectors, globally.<sup>1</sup>
- Emissions from implementing the Nationally Determined Contributions announced prior to COP26 would make it **likely that warming will exceed 1.5 degrees**.<sup>2</sup>
- Modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5 degrees, with limited or no overshoot, **require peaking global GHG emissions before 2025, and global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the early 2050s**.<sup>3</sup>
- All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5 degrees, with no or limited overshoot, and those that limit warming to 2°C (>67 per cent) involve **rapid, deep and in most cases immediate GHG emission reductions in all sectors**.<sup>4</sup>
- Vulnerability to the impacts of climate change vary substantially. However, a high proportion of species are vulnerable to climate change; and **over 3 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change**.<sup>5</sup>
- If global warming transiently **exceeds 1.5 degrees** in the coming decades or later (overshoot), then **many human and natural systems will face additional severe risks**, compared to remaining below 1.5 degrees. Depending on the magnitude and duration of overshoot, some impacts will cause release of additional greenhouse gases and **some will be irreversible**, even if global warming is reduced.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> WGIII B.1 & B.2.

<sup>2</sup> WGIII B.6

<sup>3</sup> WGIII C.1 & C.2.

<sup>4</sup> WGIII C.3

<sup>5</sup> WGII B.2

<sup>6</sup> WGII B.6

- With **increasing global warming, losses and damages will increase** and additional human and natural systems will **reach adaptation limits**.<sup>7</sup>

5. An effective global response is New Zealand's, and our Pacific neighbours', first best option. Limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees requires urgent, collective, global, transformational action, **now**.

6. At the time when greater ambition and action on the climate crisis is most needed, COP27 sits alongside multiple concurrent crises and stressors, including: the Russian invasion of Ukraine; energy/food/inflation crises;<sup>s6(a)</sup> ; the COVID pandemic and recovery; and efforts to split global unity. Each of these may reduce pressure for action by, for example, diverting attention from climate action, reducing the ability for ambitious multilateral efforts, or creating a sense that climate action is less urgent. Ahead of COP27, progressive countries like New Zealand are **concerned about the real potential for backtracking on commitments**, which must be guarded against. It is critical for New Zealand to advocate for others to also stay on course and work to deliver 1.5.

#### A shift from rules to implementation

7. The substantive completion of the outstanding chapters of the Paris Agreement 'rulebook' at COP26 marks a potentially significant inflection point for the UN climate process. The process of creating the Paris Agreement architecture – negotiating the Agreement itself, and subsequently the rules and implementation guidelines to give it effect – began at COP17 in 2011. Negotiations will be an ever present feature of the process; however, **the onus must now move from the setting of rules to implementation**. COP27 will hopefully mark the beginning of this.

8. A process focused on effective implementation will require recalibrating thinking at multiple levels (system, delegations, individuals). This may mean norms, modalities, and tactics (particularly those that have served some Parties or Groups well in the rules-focused phase e.g. the linking of rooms, recourse to omnibus decisions, insistence upon identical processes) may need to be re-thought.

9. Key questions for New Zealand in navigating this new context will remain – what are the behaviours it models; how does it push for ambition, action, and accountability while being a constructive multilateral actor; and how does it combine multi- pluri- and bilateral efforts to push for and deliver action?

10. For example – How and under what circumstances might New Zealand use the Enhanced Transparency Framework or other means, to shine a spotlight on inaction or low ambition? How will New Zealand be both constructive and facilitate continuous improvement, and push for accountability regarding pursuing efforts aligned with 1.5 degrees?

#### The issues that will dominate COP27

11. **Loss and damage** - Loss and damage is expected to be a headline issue at COP27. Recognition for loss and damage as the "fourth pillar" of the UNFCCC has consolidated in the run up to Sharm el-Sheikh. For New Zealand the urgency of addressing loss and damage is clear. In our region, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is a present day reality and existential threat. Pacific Forum Leaders, including our Prime Minister, have called for meaningful progress on loss and damage at COP27.

12. New Zealand seeks that **arrangements to address loss and damage are sustainable and deliver for our region**. It is not opposed to a facility as part of a comprehensive UNFCCC solution, but it will be important to get the leg work right to ensure the above. Our climate finance

<sup>7</sup> WGII C.3

strategy anticipates New Zealand will continue to provide finance for action on loss and damage bilaterally and it is important to us that we can continue to do this. It is also a priority for New Zealand that we operationalise the Santiago Network, and make full use of the Glasgow Dialogue and Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM).

13. **Mitigation** – Parties have not yet succeeded in limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees – doing so requires action now. At COP26 the Glasgow Climate Pact established elements that, if set up right, can serve to increase ambition and action. Across items including the **mitigation work programme**, Ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambition, global stocktake, and cover decision; New Zealand is seeking outcomes that will meaningfully contribute to limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees. For example - references to major emitters and peaking of emissions by 2025, as well as tangible implementation work in the mitigation work programme (e.g. on sectors, or areas of the Glasgow Climate Pact).

14. **Climate finance** – is a key pillar of the Paris Agreement that enables implementation but also serves as a symbol of trust and collaboration between developed and developing countries. Climate finance will continue to be a major topic at COP 27 with pressure rising due to the failure of developed countries to meet the US\$100 billion goal by 2020 at COP 26. Key negotiations will include:

- Deliberations on the new collective quantified goal – with consideration including quantum, balance, donor base, and private finance mobilisation.
- Funding arrangements for loss and damage. For New Zealand there is no question that finance should be available to avert, minimise and address all forms of loss and damage.
- Article 2.1(c) – an agenda item on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement has been proposed. 2.1(c) commits all Parties to “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” For New Zealand, a better global understanding of how to accomplish this, is a key enabler of the transformative change we need to address the climate crisis. Just one example of this existing misalignment is that globally fossil fuel subsidies total around US\$500 billion a year, five times the current US\$100bn goal. Not only could this be redirected in support of climate action, this finance currently pulls against decarbonisation.

15. **Adaptation** – alongside finance for adaptation (addressed above), further work will be done at this COP relating to the global goal on adaptation. Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes the *global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate response in the context of the temperature goal.*

16. The two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal will help Parties to establish a collective understanding on progress on adaptation, sharing of lessons learned and good practice, and identifying gaps. This work programme, along with the Global Stocktake will give an opportunity to focus attention and accelerate action on adaptation.

The Egyptian Presidency

17. The Egyptian government has advised its priorities for COP27 are climate finance including loss and damage, adaptation, mitigation, and implementation, billing COP27 an ‘African COP.’ The Presidency has advised of a number of initiatives outside of the formal process that seek to advance climate and sustainable development outcomes for Africa.

## New Zealand's priorities for COP27

18. New Zealand's priorities for international engagement on climate change are set out in the International Engagement Plan. There are ten priorities clustered into three groups – relating to ambition, Pacific resilience, and New Zealand's transition and NDC. All of these are priorities for New Zealand – but, the COP context is more suited for pursuing some of these. As such the first order priorities for New Zealand at the COP relate to:

- **Contribute to, and foster effective global ambition** – including contributing to negotiations relating to ambition (such as the global goal on adaptation, the mitigation work programme, and transparency); and initiatives aimed at strengthening ambition, such as the High Ambition Coalition.
- **Enhance the mobilisation of climate finance** – including contributing to deliberations on the next quantitative climate finance goal; sharing our experiences of Climate Risk Disclosure; and showcasing our climate finance strategy.
- **Support a resilient and empowered Pacific transition** – including supporting Pacific interests in negotiations (including on loss and damage and climate finance); co-location with Pacific delegations; supporting the Pacific Pavilion, to profile issues of regional importance; and the hosting the annual New Zealand – Pacific Ministerial policy roundtable.
- **Cooperate to reduce emissions in other countries to contribute to New Zealand's Nationally Determined Contribution** – taking opportunities to progress our international carbon markets strategy through: a series of bilateral meetings with potential partners; taking part in initiatives or events to promote high-integrity in carbon markets; and being active in Article 6 technical negotiations and in our role on the supervisory body for Article 6.4 (the central mechanism).

19. Other international engagement priorities relate to the SDGs, agriculture, climate change and trade, and New Zealand's transition – and as resources permit, biodiversity and nature-based solutions, and climate change and security.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**COP27**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 4: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 3(a) and (b).

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 5: Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 4(a) and 4(b).

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



## Agenda item 6: Matters relating to adaptation

---

### (a) Report of the Adaptation Committee

See SBI 57 agenda item 11.

### (b): Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee

#### Issues/background

1. COP 26 recalled that the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee will be reviewed at COP 27 with a view to it adopting a decision on the outcome of the review. COP 26 also recalled the invitation to Parties to submit their views thereon to inform the process.
2. Eight submissions have been received on this topic from Senegal (LDCs), Bhutan (LDCs), Norway, Antigua, and Barbuda (AOSIS), US, Japan, Peru (AILAC) and the EU. Senegal's submission was made in 2022; all other submissions were made in 2021.
3. Many submissions suggested that the functions of the Adaptation Committee as set out in Cancun Adaptation Framework (decision 1/CP.16) should form the basis of the review. Parties generally continue to see the Adaptation Committee as a central technical element of the adaptation framework, including its role in promoting the implementation of enhanced actions in a coherent manner under the COP and the CMA. In summary all submissions support the work of the Adaptation Committee, seeing it as useful, well undertaken, having delivered high-quality reports, provided technical support and guidance to Parties and organized valuable meeting-places and workshops, in addition to sharing a wealth of information on experiences and good practices. Parties generally agree that the Adaptation Committee continues to work to its mandates from the COP and CMA, and delivers on its workplans, and that this is a sign of its progress, effectiveness and performance.
4. All submissions also recognise that there are areas for improvement, including enhancing the visibility of the work of the Adaptation Committee with better dissemination and increased uptake of knowledge products, and avoiding duplication between the work of the Adaptation Committee with the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the Standing Committee on Finance.
5. The COP will be invited to refer the consideration of the review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee to the SBSTA and the SBI and to take any action it deems appropriate on the basis of their recommendations.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 7: Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts**

---

### Objectives

- Support the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), amongst other things to reinforce the perspective that the UNFCCC response to loss and damage requires a multitrack approach, in which technical and policy support is valued alongside provision of finance.

### Key messages

- For Aotearoa New Zealand the urgency of addressing loss and damage is clear. In our region, the Pacific, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is already a present day reality and existential threat. New Zealand supports the WIM's work to enhance understanding, action and support on areas of cooperation identified in the Paris Agreement.
- New Zealand welcomes the WIM report and the work undertaken over the past year by the WIM to advance our understanding of ways to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.
- We have been pleased to have a New Zealand participant contribute to the work of the expert group on slow onset events.
- We welcome the contribution the WIM has made to the information basis for the technical assessment component of the Global Stocktake.
- We welcome the engagement of the WIM Executive Committee with representatives of the constituted bodies as members of its thematic expert groups, which increases the accessibility of information on loss and damage, and facilitates coherence of action and support under the UNFCCC relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.
- We welcome the efforts the Executive Committee has made to begin to strengthen collaboration with the GCF and the Global Environment Facility; and to support the Santiago Network workshop and Glasgow Dialogue.
- Early warning systems, emergency preparedness and response, resilient communities, sustainable livelihoods, and building the resilience of communities and ecosystems are all loss and damage related activities New Zealand is currently supporting in our region.

### Background

1. The Executive Committee of the WIM will report to the COP through the SBSTA and SBI. The COP, by decision 2/CP.19, established the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM). The Warsaw decision requested the Executive Committee (Excom) of the WIM to report annually to the COP through the SBSTA and SBI and to make recommendations as appropriate.
2. Some progress has been made under the WIM. A clearinghouse for information on risk transfer (the Fiji Clearinghouse) has been established as a repository for information on insurance

and risk transfer. The WIM has three experts groups - on slow onset events, non-economic losses, and action and support – a technical expert group on comprehensive risk management and a task force on displacement.

3. New Zealand has funded an expert (Penehuro Lefale) to participate in the Executive Committee and slow onset events expert group.

4. Some countries may 'note' rather than 'welcome' the report of the WIM. There has been consistent dissatisfaction with the scope of WIM activity in the context of urgent unaddressed loss and damage needs (see finance and loss and damage briefing).

*Report of the WIM*

5. The WIM report covers the work of the WIM from November 2021 – July 2022. It contains information on organisational and procedural matters including meetings and events.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 8: Matters relating to finance

---

- (a) Long-term climate finance;
- (b) Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance;
- (c) Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund;
- (d) Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility;
- (e) Seventh review of the Financial Mechanism;
- (f) Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing loss and damage.

### (a) Long-term climate finance

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand seeks to build and maintain a constructive dynamic in finance discussions focused on progress made and removing bifurcation where possible.
- Profile New Zealand's climate finance support to the Pacific where appropriate (see Annex on New Zealand's climate-related support to Pacific Island countries in 2021, including adaptation support).
- The long-term finance (LTF) agenda item has been extended until 2027 and should be closed thereafter. It should not be further extended or become a hybrid CMA/COP item.
- Parties must find appropriate material for the extended LTF agenda item to cover and not duplicate discussions that are already taking place elsewhere, such as on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) that now has its own agenda item and mandated events.

#### Key messages

- Aotearoa New Zealand remains committed, along with all other donor countries, to meeting the US\$100bn finance goal as soon as possible.
- We welcome the report by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) on progress towards achieving the US \$100bn climate finance goal and thank the SCF for their efforts to produce it.
- Aotearoa New Zealand recognises the urgent need to scale up adaptation finance to achieve a balance with mitigation finance, including by doubling global adaptation finance by 2025 as urged at COP 26.
- Aotearoa New Zealand has committed NZ\$1.3 billion in climate finance for 2022-25. This represents a four-fold increase of our 2019-22 commitment. At least 50 per cent will go to the Pacific and at least 50 per cent to adaptation. All of it will be grant-based support.
- Now that the LTF agenda item will conclude in 2027, we must determine its appropriate focus and ensure we do not create duplication by focusing on issues that are being specifically addressed elsewhere.

## Issues/background

1. It is not clear exactly what will be covered in this agenda item. It was due to be closed at COP 26 but extended until 2027. Some SCF reports were commissioned and high-level events mandated. These may be discussed here, or in the SCF agenda item, or in specific agenda items on the topics to which they pertain.

### *History of the LTF agenda*

2. Until COP 26, the Long-Term Finance (LTF) agenda item was a time bound agenda item until 2020. After its genesis during 2011-2013, Decision 3/CP.19 in 2013:

- *Decides* to continue deliberations on long-term finance and requests the secretariat to organize in-session workshops on, inter alia, strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance referred to in paragraph 10, cooperation on enhanced enabling environments and support for readiness activities, and on needs for support to developing countries, from 2014 to 2020.
- *Decides* to convene a biennial high level ministerial dialogue on climate finance starting in 2014 and ending in 2020

3. 12/CMA.1 (COP24) on Paris Agreement Article 9.5 communications replicated the work programme of the LTF (developed country biennial reports, workshops and biennial ministerial dialogues) starting in 2020 and 2021, with the understanding that this would replace the LTF work programme and bring the discussions under the Paris Agreement framework.

4. Developed countries, including Aotearoa New Zealand, pushed to close the LTF agenda item at COP 26 to focus finance implementation conversations in the CMA (this is important for expanding the donor base) but were ultimately unsuccessful. Developing countries pushed for the LTF item to stay open to focus on assessing delivery of the US \$100bn climate finance goal.

5. In its final decision (decision 4/CP.26) at COP 26 the COP:

- a. Requested the SCF to continue its work on definitions of climate finance, taking into account the submissions received from parties, to provide input for consideration by COP 27;
- b. Requested the SCF to undertake further work on mapping the available information relevant to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, including its reference to Article 9 (finance), with a view to providing input for consideration by COP 27;
- c. Decided that continued discussions on long-term climate finance will conclude in 2027;
- d. Requested the SCF to prepare a report in 2022 on progress towards achieving the US \$100bn climate finance goal
- e. Decided to convene biennial high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in 2022, 2024 and 2026 and invited the COP 27 Presidency to host the 2022 dialogue on progress and fulfilment of the US\$100bn goal

## **(b) Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance**

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Confirm that the SCF is the finance body for climate finance discussions to avoid other bodies taking on finance issues. Reinforce it is a technical body, not political.

- Support using the SCF's resources wisely and avoiding duplication in reports. This includes using the Biennial Assessment report to cover most issues.

- s9(2)(j)

- Support clear coordination that avoids duplication regarding under which agenda items the various reports produced by the SCF will be primarily discussed.

### Key messages

- We support the work of SCF and thank them for their efforts in producing such a large volume of work this year.
- Welcome the Fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, which makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the climate finance landscape.
- We support the topic of the next SCF Forum of 'Financing Just Transition' and hope it can be organised to include diverse communities and perspectives of those who will be disproportionately affected by the transition to low emissions, including youth, women and gender minorities, indigenous peoples, and people with disabilities.

### Issues/background

1. The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) is comprised of representatives of 10 developing and 10 developed countries and was created to enable technical experts to put forward solutions to a range of issues. The SCF is mandated to take on particular projects and report to the COP on actions taken and plans in place for forthcoming periods.
2. The SCF has four specific functions in supporting and assisting the COP (2/CP.17 p121):
  - a. Improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing;
  - b. The mobilization of financial resources for climate financing;
  - c. Rationalization of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC;
  - d. The measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties.
3. The SCF is also tasked to:
  - Organize an annual forum on climate finance;
  - Provide the COP with draft guidance for the operating entities of the financial mechanism (GCF and GEF);
  - Provide expert input into the conduct of the periodic reviews of the financial mechanism;
  - Prepare a biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows; and
  - Prepare a quadrennial Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties

4. Furthermore, the SCF is designed to improve the linkages and to promote the coordination with climate finance related actors and initiatives both within and outside of the Convention. At the Paris Conference in 2015, Parties decided that the SCF shall also serve the Paris Agreement.

5. The SCF met for its 29th meeting in Cairns, Australia in September 2022 and finalised reports on six issues for COP 27:

- a) Fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows;
- b) Definitions of climate finance;
- c) The second part of the SCF Forum on finance for nature-based solutions;
- d) Progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation;
- e) Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement (one report mapping information available and one report synthesising views on achieving it);
- f) Guidance to the operating entities of the financial mechanism (GCF and GEF)

6. These reports and topics may arise at different points and under different agenda items at COP 27. This brief covers the first three reports, while the last three reports are covered in separate briefs for agenda items on those topics.

#### *Fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows*

7. The Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows is the SCF's flagship product. SCF 29 agreed upon a 170-page technical report and a 15-page summary and recommendations report.

8. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

9. We should welcome the report and support it to be the central piece of work to understand climate finance flows. Requests for separate reports on elements of climate finance flows such as progress towards the US\$100 billion goal or Article 2.1c and can create duplication of work.

10. Key findings from the report include:

- Reporting of climate finance flows is improving, but all Parties and climate finance providers and recipients need to continue improving data, methodologies, and granularity of reporting.
- Global climate finance flows were 12 per cent higher in 2019-2020 than in 2017-2018, to reach an annual average of USD 803 billion. This was driven by increasing mitigation actions in building and infrastructure, sustainable transport and by growth in adaptation finance.
  - Adaptation finance increased by 68 per cent in 2019-2020 to reach an annual average of USD 49 billion compared to USD 30 billion in 2017-2018
- Public climate finance from developed to developing countries increased between 6 per cent and 17 per cent from different sources in 2019-2020 compared to 2017-2018.
- Reflecting their geographical and population sizes, the Asia and African regions receive the largest total amounts of public climate finance. Support to LDCs and SIDS as a proportion of overall public climate finance flows remained relatively stable compared to previous years.

11. <sup>s6(a)</sup> discussion of the report will provide an opportunity to advance our general positions on climate finance. This can include support for the report's recommendations on:

- Reporting climate finance flows in detail through the BTRs;
- Enhancing reporting on elements relevant to Article 2.1c;
- Continuing to enhance country ownership and consider policies to improve the balance between support for mitigation and adaptation;
- Encourage climate finance providers to enhance access and increase climate finance for LDCs and SIDS;
- Improving the tracking of gender-related aspects of climate finance.

*Definitions of climate finance*

12. For several years, developing countries have pushed to develop a multilaterally agreed, top-down definition of climate finance. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

13. The final report is based on Party and non-Party stakeholders and shows that there are multiple climate finance definitions in use, with some Parties seeing this in a negative light, and others stressing the importance of maintaining different definitions consistent with the bottom up principle of the Paris Agreement.

14. In submissions considered by the report, the need for a common definition was expressed by AGN, AILAC, AOSIS, India, Kenya, LDCs, LMDCs, and Vanuatu. It was opposed by Canada, EIG, EU, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Philippines, and USA.

15. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

Despite being isolated in its views, some references of fossil fuel financing were watered down, and removed to the annex – to the expressed disappointment of the AOSIS member.

16. There is no clear path forward to an effective, globally agreeable top-down definition of climate finance. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

*The second part of the SCF Forum on finance for nature-based solutions*

17. The SCF was mandated to host Forums at COP 17 to support the communication and exchange of information among all actors dealing with climate finance to promote linkages and coherence.

18. Disrupted due to COVID, the 2021-22 Forum was held in two parts on the topic of "Financing nature-based solutions". Members approved a high level summary of the Forum, noting that a longer outcomes report will be produced ahead of COP27.

19. Members agreed to hold the 2023 forum on the topic of 'financing just transition' with sub-themes will be agreed at SCF 30 in March 2023.

20. We were pleased to see a UNFCCC event held in Oceania and noted important topics being raised such as the critical issue of access to finance and the value of indigenous and traditional knowledge.



**(c) Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund**

## Objectives/New Zealand's position

- Ensure the Green Climate Fund is a fit for purpose organization.
- Seek outcomes that improve Pacific access to the Green Climate Fund.
- Take the opportunity to articulate New Zealand views on the future of the GCF.

## Key messages

- With an increasingly crowded and complex climate finance landscape it is important for the GCF to elaborate its comparative advantage and point of difference.
- All those involved with the Fund need to see the Fund as an effective, efficient, predictable and accessible financing partner that understands and can respond to context-specific needs and priorities, at pace and with a focus on results and impact.
- The GCF has a number of unique features, the full potential of which remains untapped. For example the GCF has a significant role to play in de-risking private investment but needs to make better use of all the financing modalities at its disposal in order to do so and ensure the Fund's potential (including for innovation and increased risk) will not be reached.
- Accelerated access is critical. While the GCF has taken some important steps in simplifying access to the Fund such as the updated Simplified Approvals Process, New Zealand requests further improvements. This includes a nuanced and flexible approach to country support that responds to specific country context and capacity and avoiding a "one-size-fits-all" approach.
- We consider programmatic approaches, underpinned by predictable, long term finance and based on well-developed NAPs, NDCs and investment pipelines (supported by the RPSP) as an essential tool for building paradigm shift at a country level.
- We support a review of the GCF policy framework to support a more streamlined approach to the development and implementation of policies, standards and guidelines (ultimately reducing bottlenecks and improving performance and access to the Fund).
- Monitoring and reporting results is critically important to ensuring the best use of GCF resources and building and retaining confidence in the Fund. The GCF has taken important steps to improve measuring, monitoring and reporting of progress including through the development of the Integrated Results Management Framework but further efforts are required.
- New Zealand would welcome further emphasis in the next replenishment period on the following:
  - Biodiversity, oceans and nature and the use of nature-based solutions to underpin long-term resilience, including that building on indigenous knowledge and science (noting that nature-based solutions are at the mercy of climate change impacts and their longevity may be limited);
  - Mobilizing private finance, in particular seeking innovative solutions to crowd in private finance for adaptation;

- Increased support to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage caused by the impacts of climate change including identifying and piloting innovative insurance solutions;
- Actively seek innovative solutions to climate change problems and accepting the risks that come with these innovative solutions.

## Background

1. The GCF's Governing Instrument stipulates that the GCF is accountable to and functions under the guidance of the COP. As a result, every year the GCF Board submits a report to the COP for its consideration (including on how it has implemented previous guidance from the COP) and to receive further guidance – including on matters related to policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria.
2. The SCF was mandated by COP17 to provide draft guidance to the GCF (and the GEF) for consideration by the COP. For COP27 the SCF agreed draft guidance at its meeting in Cairns in late September.
3. Most of the draft decision text is uncontroversial (albeit much is wordy and could be streamlined). Key issues that could elicit debate include:
  - A proposal for regional offices. We can support the proposal for a regional presence without presupposing that this will take the form of a physical regional office.
  - Calls for more attention to loss and damage. We are sympathetic to calls for more funding for addressing loss and damage – this is underfunded.
  - Calls for the Board to formalize a fund-wide policy framework to establish clear policy classifications, relationships between policy instruments and associated roles and responsibilities for approval and updates. We support this opportunity to clarify roles and responsibilities between Board and Secretariat.
  - Calls for the Board to closely monitor the implementation of Gender Action Plan that was adopted in 2019 and to enhance its ambition in its next version. We support this.
  - Calls for the Board to promote the use of programmatic approaches, including national, regional, global, and cross-sectoral programs and to develop a programmatic approach modality to enable programme development. We strongly support this. It improves the predictability of finance and helps embed systemic and transformative change.
  - Calls for developed country Parties, in order to show ambition and progression, to double the overall quantum from the first replenishment period of the Fund; We do not support a specific call for “doubling”. Would prefer calls for “ambitious” replenishment without reference to doubling.

## **(d) Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility**

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Ensure guidance provided by the COP to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is not overly prescriptive, and does not duplicate or conflict with guidance to other funds.
- Support ways for the GEF to be able to better support PICs, including lowering barriers to accessing funds.

- The Standing Committee on Finance has provided the zero draft text. As it stands there is nothing problematic in the draft text.

### Key messages

- Welcome the replenishment of the GEF (GEF-8). If appropriate, note New Zealand's increased support (from NZ\$12m to NZ\$23.5m) as signal of our confidence in the GEF and our acknowledgement of the urgency of action needed to reverse biodiversity loss.
- Welcome the GEF's continued support through the GEF-8 period (2022-2026) for climate change adaptation and mitigation projects, and its complementarity with the Green Climate Fund. Support to achieve global environmental goals is crucial at this time.
- Encourage guidance provided by the COP to be clear, to avoid duplicating or conflicting with guidance to other funds, and to prompt the GEF to become more efficient and effective in implementation.

### Issues/background

1. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has a formal mandate as a financing mechanism for a number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It provides financial resources for developing countries and countries with economies in transition to implement their obligations under these MEAs, including, under the UNFCCC, mitigation and adaptation projects.
2. Since its inception in 1992, the GEF has provided more than US\$22 billion in grants and blended finance and mobilized an additional US\$120 billion in co-financing for more than 5,000 projects in 170 countries.
3. In the seventh replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund (GEF-7) period 2018-2022, the GEF supported 131 projects in developing countries with \$590 million from the climate change mitigation (CCM) focal area.

#### *COP guidance to the GEF*

4. Under the UNFCCC, the GEF is to function "under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria". COPs are therefore the opportunity for UNFCCC Parties to update their guidance to the GEF on policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria as they relate to the agreement. This guidance will be reflected in a decision by the COP. A zero draft has been provided by the Standing Committee on Finance.
5. New Zealand's interest in this agenda item is in ensuring that guidance provided by the COP to the GEF is not overly prescriptive, and does not duplicate or conflict with guidance to other funds. We also want to ensure that the Fund works for, and is easily accessed by, Pacific Island countries.
6. The GEF report to COP27 covers the reporting period from July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022. The reports outline in detail the GEF responses to previous COP guidance, which it has incorporated into its strategies and policies.

#### *Replenishment*

7. The GEF is replenished every four years. The GEF-8 replenishment was concluded in April 2022. Twenty-nine donor governments pledged \$5.33 billion to the Global Environment Facility for GEF-8 (2022-2025), an increase of more than 30 percent from its last operating period. This included New Zealand's contribution of NZ\$23.5m.

8. As a part of the replenishment process, donor countries determine how GEF funding will be distributed across the GEF's five focal areas: climate change, biodiversity, land degradation, chemicals and waste, and international waters. The UNFCCC Secretariat is consulted as a part of determining the programming and policy directions and desired environmental outcomes for the funding cycle.

9. GEF-8's climate change focal area strategy is complementary to GCF programming. Developing a 'Long Term Vision' for complementarity is an ongoing piece of collaborative work by the GEF and GCF Secretariats aimed at strengthening collaboration and shared support for major initiatives and further promoting joint efforts on communication, outreach and sharing of lessons learned during the implementation of the respective portfolios.

#### **(e) Seventh review of the Financial Mechanism**

##### Purpose of the Item

- The COP will be invited to agree on the guidelines for the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism taking into account the guidelines contained in the annex to decision 12/CP.22.

##### Objectives/New Zealand's position

- Agree to Terms of Reference for the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism as efficiently as possible. Make only necessary surgical changes.
- ToRs should reflect that the Financial Mechanism now also serves the Paris Agreement, so needs to reflect the Article 2 long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Get a joint COP/CMA decision on the review.
- Continue to push for more effectiveness within the implementation of the Mechanism.
- s9(2)(j)

##### Key messages

###### *Terms of Reference for the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism*

- Acknowledge the importance of Financial Mechanism to the goals of both Convention and Paris.
- Given this is the seventh review the previous Terms of Reference remain largely fit for purpose and only necessary changes should be made.
- We see a specific role for the CMA in this process and want the review to reflect that the Financial Mechanism now also serves the Paris Agreement. Therefore, we should not only consider how the Financial Mechanism responds to the Convention, but also how it responds to the long term goals of the Paris Agreement. The CMA should therefore be able to also respond to the outcomes of the review.
- We suggest the SCF provide its technical report and that, as part of the decision on this agenda item, the UNFCCC invite technical inputs from Parties and stakeholders by early 2023 with a view to finalise the review at COP28.

##### Issues/background

1. The Convention, under Article 11, established a Financial Mechanism to provide funds to developing country Parties along with the provision of financial resources through bilateral, regionals and multilateral channels.
2. The operation of the Financial Mechanism is entrusted to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (COP17). The Financial Mechanism is accountable to the COP, which decides on its climate change policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria for funding.
3. COP4 decided to review the Financial Mechanism every four years. The guidelines for the 7th Review were NOT agreed at COP26. One important change since the last review (COP22-23) is that the Paris Agreement is now in force. Decision 1/CP.21 para 58 decides that the GEF, GCF (the Financial Mechanism's two entities) "shall serve the Paris Agreement".
4. COP 26 was intended to initiate the 7th review of the Financial Mechanism. However, agreement was not reached on finalised Guidelines for the Review. Nor could agreement be reached on the relative relationship between COP and CMA vis-a-vis the Review (i.e. whether the Review should be considered jointly by COP/CMA or whether CMA was subsidiary to COP). Further consideration of the item was deferred to COP27 under Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure.

**(f) Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing loss and damage.**

Objective/New Zealand's position

- Amplify the Pacific voice on their unique experience of loss and damage and financing challenges.
- Be forward leaning on the COP taking tangible steps that will help meet the needs and priorities of the Pacific when it comes to financing arrangements.
- Support an agenda item on loss and damage finance, and encourage an open framing that allows consideration of multiple potential outcomes.<sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>
- Support consideration of a range of financial arrangements, including but not limited to a UNFCCC facility, to ensure the best possible outcome.
- Support due consideration of technical challenges of delivering effective loss and damage finance, including access, eligibility, maximising the donor base, and avoiding duplication, but without undue delay.
- Remain open on the "sequencing" i.e. whether discussions on details are had before or after a decision on establishing finance arrangements, but ensure they will occur.

Key messages

- For Aotearoa New Zealand the urgency of the issue is clear. In our region, the Pacific, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is a present day reality and existential threat.
- There should be no question that finance should be available to address all forms of loss and damage. Unfortunately, we understand that for some there are real challenges to securing this support.

- We accept there is a funding deficit. And we acknowledge it's been this way for a long time, and some countries are feeling it very acutely. We also know that where finance is available there are challenges of eligibility, access, predictability and timeliness.
- We want to find solutions, and to take tangible steps towards these at this COP. We expect this will include dedicated funding in some form.
- We do not oppose a facility. But we also don't think there is a single solution that will scale up action to address loss and damage. Nor that a single solution is what we should be looking for. Loss and damage arises from the impacts of climate change in multiple ways and there are multiple institutions and processes with equities in solving this. We need a multifaceted and multi-track solution to scale up responses.
- So far, proposals for a global facility within the UNFCCC don't contain enough information to show us what kind of impact it would have. There are unanswered questions about how a facility would compare with other funding options, such as bilateral and regional arrangements or amending the global facilities already in place. While we want to move to close the funding gap swiftly, it is important not to close the door on other potential arrangements that could be beneficial.
- Whatever funding arrangements we land on, we need to do the leg work to get them right. This is not a ploy to delay COP decision-making, but a frank recognition that not all the elements of our loss and damage response are currently ripe for approval.
- Issues it is worth spending time on include: how funding arrangements can meet the different needs of different countries and regions, how to generate additional resources and not detract from funding to existing institutions, how to avoid duplication with existing arrangements, how to maximise the contributor base, and how to define eligibility.

## Issues/background

### *Agenda item*

1. Developing countries have pushed for an agenda item on loss and damage finance for many years as they seek recognition of loss and damage a "fourth pillar" of the UNFCCC alongside mitigation, adaptation, and finance. This would be the first time it has an agenda item.
2. Since the G77+China's strong but ultimately unsuccessful push for a loss and damage finance facility at COP 26, the momentum for loss and damage finance has continued to build. It is now shaping as one of if not the key issue at COP 27<sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>
3. Through various pre-COP meetings there has been "goodwill" on the topic and there is now widespread and openly expressed (e.g. by EU) support for an agenda item on loss and damage financing. We also support an agenda item.
4. <sup>s6(a), s6(b)(i)</sup>
5. Egypt has appointed Germany and Chile (Morgan and Rojas) to progress this issue immediately and at the COP. The main outstanding issues to resolve are the meeting under which there will be an agenda item and its wording.

6. Some developed countries, particularly the USA, have pushed for the agenda item to be solely under the CMA in order to keep a strong link to the rejection of compensation or liability and the possibility of broadening the donor base. Developing countries have pushed for it being under COP, with Brazil noting they wanted to have full CBDR, and differentiation between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. Other groups (e.g. EIG and EU) have expressed flexibility on whether it is under COP or CMA. We would also be flexible but prefer it to be under CMA or both COP and CMA, <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

7. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

8. On the wording of the agenda item, there is debate about whether the headline text should refer to "addressing" or "avert, minimise, and address" loss and damage. For some averting and minimising loss and damage are synonymous with mitigation and adaptation, which are covered elsewhere on the agenda, including PSIDs who argue the gap is on addressing. There is also debate on annotations to the title, particularly whether/how it should refer to any outcomes. <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(j)</sup>

9. We are flexible on most of the agenda item wording, but prefer any reference to outcomes to be "arrangements" (plural). This is to keep the conversation open to a range of range of financing options for loss and damage rather than narrowed to a single facility exclusively.

*Substance of loss and damage finance*

10. Finance for Loss and Damage was a critical issue in the lead up to and at COP26. A push by developing countries to establish a Loss and Damage Facility resulted in the Glasgow Dialogue, with countries agreeing "to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage" alongside the June SBI meeting each year until June 2024.

11. Developing countries remain unsatisfied with the open-ended nature of the Glasgow Dialogue and want to cement an outcome of funding arrangements for loss and damage. A significant push for this is expected at COP 27.

12. As mentioned above in relation to the agenda item, goodwill on this topic has grown and developed countries are increasingly open to discussing finance for loss and damage. There is now a widespread feeling that agreement on a decision to establish financing "arrangements" for loss and damage is likely at COP 27.

13. The most prominent proposal from developing countries is for a loss and damage finance "facility". AOSIS has championed a version of this, which will essentially be another multilateral climate fund dedicated to loss and damage – although many details remain unclear.

14. We are not opposed to a global loss and damage finance facility but are not yet convinced it is the first best option, particularly for the Pacific. Effectively addressing the multiple forms of loss and damage will require multiple solutions and likely multiple sources of funding.

15. <sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

These include timely dispersal of finance and how extremely difficult small countries such as PSIDs find it to access. <sup>s6(a), s6(b)(i)</sup>

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

16. As momentum builds for finance arrangement for loss and damage (which we support), we want to focus on ensuring a range of approaches is supported and that due consideration is given to the practical, and technical challenges of addressing loss and damage so that finance can be effective and accessible. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

17. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

18. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

19. Some countries, including in the Pacific, have raised the possibility of innovative ways to raise loss and damage finance, including global taxes on fossil fuel companies or aviation. These will face an uphill political battle to gain significant support from Parties.

*Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**Agenda item 9: Development and transfer of technologies:  
joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee  
and the Climate Technology Centre and Network**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 17.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 10: Capacity-building under the Convention

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Constructively engage on how the capacity-building measures can be enhanced.
- Support the coordination of information on related capacity-building activities to avoid fragmented data, and ensure information is readily available across sectors and thematic areas.
- Provide constructive feedback to strengthen the implementation of the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) work plan for 2021-2024 ensuring it is efficient, effective, supports the needs of Pacific Island countries (PICs) and doesn't duplicate work being done elsewhere.
- Support, in good company, any decision on enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity-building and carefully safeguard against new UNFCCC mechanisms/bodies being established and calls for new finance windows.
- [Note: Given that the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol has concluded, and that there is no third commitment period, this agenda item would seem to have passed its "use-by" date and as such there seems no utility in enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity building under the Kyoto Protocol]
- Where appropriate, register the capacity building support New Zealand provides - bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally.

### Key messages

- New Zealand recognises the importance of capacity building to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement.
- We recognise that capacity building needs are changing over time, particularly with the finalisation of the Paris Rulebook. Countries need support to align activities with the requirements of Article 6.
- A significant amount of support for capacity building is being provided to ensure recipient country Parties have the ability to deliver on their commitments.
- New Zealand is actively engaged and willing to support Pacific Island countries to help address their capacity building needs. Our capacity-building support in the context of climate change includes a range of thematic areas, and our International Climate Finance Strategy, currently being developed to guide the allocation of our NZD 1.3bn climate finance contribution announced ahead of COP26, highlights our intention to scale up support for capacity building efforts.
- Through the Global Research Alliance, New Zealand has been instrumental in delivering capability building activities to improve livestock greenhouse gas measurement and reporting by developing countries.
- We have noted the priority areas outlined in the synthesis report on capacity-building needs prepared by the Secretariat related to improving the national GHG inventory, establishing institutional arrangements and meeting reporting requirements under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, particularly in the context of the Enhanced Transparency Framework,

as well as cross- and multisectoral capacity-building needs in relation to improving climate governance, finance readiness and mobilization, and climate-related education.

## Issues/background

1. Capacity building matters feature across a range of COP items and committees. Capacity building is integral to the Paris Agreement; developing countries see it as a quid pro quo for an applicable-to-all regime. For many, capacity constraints are a genuine barrier to their implementation of the obligations, particularly reporting obligations under the Paris Agreement.
2. Capacity-building was one of the least contentious and most constructive negotiations at COP26. Decisions were made relatively swiftly on capacity-building under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement. The decisions are largely high level, welcoming progress to date and encouraging further coordination, engagement, and information sharing/best practice to address ongoing gaps and needs.
3. For New Zealand, we support our Pacific Island partners' international engagement in climate-related forums, such as the COP, to raise the profile of Pacific climate issues internationally and help the region to contribute to a global response to climate change.
4. For SB56, two synthesis reports were prepared by the Secretariat:
  - Implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries;
  - Capacity-building work of bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. Compilation and synthesis report by the secretariat
5. The PCCB held its 6th meeting at SBI56 with a focus on matters relating to the implementation of its workplan for 2021–2024. The 11th Durban Forum on capacity-building was also held in conjunction with SBI56.
6. COP 24 requested the SBI to thematically align meetings of the Durban Forum with the annual focus area of the PCCB, which for 2022 is building capacity to facilitate coherent implementation of nationally determined contributions in the context of national development plans and sustainable recovery. The PCCB prepared an annual technical progress report on its work in 2022<sup>8</sup>.
7. The SBI will be invited to consider the annual technical progress report of the PCCB for 2022 and to recommend a draft decision to COP 27 and CMA 4.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

---

<sup>8</sup> FCCC/SBI/2022/14

## **Agenda item 11: Matters relating to least developed countries**

### Objectives/New Zealand's position

- Demonstrate New Zealand's willingness to support the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), particularly in relation to least developed countries' (LDCs)<sup>9</sup> accessing Green Climate Fund (GCF) readiness funding.
- Encourage Parties to recognise the efforts to assist with accessing finance as part of a broader global, regional and bilateral effort on access by a range of actors (New Zealand's Technical Assistance for Pacific Access (TAPA)).

### Key messages

- New Zealand welcomes the LEG's work as a useful input to better understanding and communicating the adaptation needs of developing countries, and facilitating finance flows in support of them.
- It is clear from New Zealand's work with LDCs in our region that finance best flows in support of clearly articulated country-driven priorities.
- We acknowledge the important role the LEG plays in supporting LDC access to the GCF and we encourage the GCF to continue its work to improve country readiness and simplify access to the Fund for those countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including LDCs.

### Background

The LEG was established in 2001 to provide technical support and advice to LDCs on national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) and the LDC work programme, and technical guidance and support to the national adaptation plan (NAP) process.

2. The LEG meets twice a year and supports LDCs through, *inter alia*, training workshops, NAP Expos, the development of guides, tools, technical papers, publications and databases, and the review of draft NAPAs. The LEG is also mandated to provide technical guidance and advice on accessing funding from the GCF for the process to formulate and implement NAPs, in collaboration with the GCF Secretariat.

3. The LEG is mandated to develop a two-year rolling programme of work for consideration by the SBI at its first sessional meeting of each year and to report on its work to the SBI at each of its sessions. The 37th meeting of the LEG was held from 6 to 8 February 2020 in Antananarivo, Madagascar. The [38<sup>th</sup>, 39<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> meetings of the LEG](#) were held virtually. The 41<sup>st</sup> meeting of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group took place in Nairobi from 21 to 23 March 2022.

4. At COP26, the SBI was invited to consider the documents for the review of the LEG with a view to recommending a draft decision.

---

<sup>9</sup> As at November 2021: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia.

5. The SBI noted:
- the progress made by the LEG in its technical work and products relating to NAPs and the Paris Agreement, and invited Parties to make use of LEG technical work and products, where relevant; and
  - the ongoing collaboration of the LEG with the Adaptation Committee, other constituted bodies under the Convention, partners of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change and a wide range of relevant organizations, agencies and regional centres and networks, and encouraged the continuation of this collaboration.
6. Further detail on the decisions and recommendations is available on page 15, [FCCC/SBI/2019/9](#).
7. The SBI recommended:
- a. That in its decision on guidance to the GEF, COP 25 request the GEF, in administering the LDCF, to continue facilitating the smooth transition of countries graduating from LDC status by continuing to provide approved funding through the LDCF until the completion of projects approved by the LDCF Council prior to those countries' graduation from LDC status.
  - b. To the COP to extend the LDC-specific financial provisions, with a view to including this matter in the deliberations on the programme budget for the biennium 2022–2023.
8. COP26 extended the mandate of the LEG under its current terms of reference and requested the LEG to develop, taking account its current practices and its terms of reference, its draft rules of procedure, for consideration and adoption at COP 27 and CMA 4. The LEG is mandated to develop a two-year rolling programme of work for consideration by the SBI at its first session of each year and to report on its work to the SBI at each of its sessions.
9. The most recent NAP Expo was held in Botswana from 22 to 26 August 2022. SBI 56 requested the LEG to continue to take advantage of the NAP Expos as a platform for mobilizing a wide range of agencies and organizations, as well as UNFCCC constituted bodies, including those involved in relevant programmes and networks, to undertake activities to address priority needs of the least developed countries. The 42<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the LEG was held back-to-back with NAP Expo, from 29 to 31 August 2022, in Gaborone, Botswana.
10. SBI56 noted the progress of the LEG in drafting its rules of procedure.

*Climate Change Division and Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 12: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 20.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 13: Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 9.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 14: Gender and climate change**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 21.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



## **Agenda item 15: Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15**

---

**(a) Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f) of the Convention;**

**(b) Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention**

**(a) Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f) of the Convention;**

Objective/New Zealand's position

- s6(a)

Key messages [if required]

- Aotearoa New Zealand condemns, unequivocally, the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russia on Ukraine.
- The actions of President Putin are a grave breach of international rules; the use of force to change borders is strictly prohibited under international law, as is targeting of civilians.
- Aotearoa New Zealand stands in solidarity with Ukraine and the international community to take united and coordinated measures against Russia. We have made our position known widely and repeatedly, including in official statements, to our international partners, and in multilateral fora.
- s6(a)

Background

1. Russia proposes to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f) of the UNFCCC to provide for periodic review of the parties listed in Annexes I and II of the Convention. This is an ongoing proposal (since Durban) which is unlikely to be decided at COP27.
2. Annexes to the UNFCCC are considered integral parts of the Convention. Annex I contains the category of developed countries and countries with economies in transition. Annex II to the Convention includes only the category of developed countries. In 1992, the member States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were taken as the basis for these Annexes. Annexes I and II to the Convention were designed to reflect the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" and to take into account the specificities and the potential of the respective Parties to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.
3. The Convention provides for the possibility of introducing amendments to the Convention and its Annexes. Specifically, Article 4(2)(f), establishes that "the Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998, available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party concerned".

4. Russia's proposal is to insert following the words "with the approval of the Party concerned", the sentence "A further review of amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II shall be conducted on a periodic basis, as determined by the Conference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention has been achieved."

5. According to Russia, periodic review and, where appropriate, the updating of lists of countries contained in the Annexes would ensure the fair allocation of burden among the Parties and would provide for a more efficient and prompt delivery of the Convention objectives.

#### **(b) Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention**

##### Objective/New Zealand's position

- To engage constructively on PNG and Mexico's proposal to amend the Convention to allow for decision-making by a three-quarters majority rather than the current consensus procedure, with a view to improving decision making in the UNFCCC.

##### Key messages

- New Zealand supports the underlying objective of this proposal – to improve the decision-making process of the UNFCCC – through constructive and forward looking engagement by all Parties.
- We would welcome further clarity on how this proposal would work in practice, if Parties to the amendment were able to take decisions by voting, while Parties who had not accepted the amendment continued to take decisions by consensus.

##### Background

2. Mexico and PNG have jointly proposed amendments to Article 7 and 18 of the UNFCCC. The proposed amendments establish voting procedures under the Convention and would replace draft Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure. This is an ongoing proposal since Durban.

3. The proposed amendments set out Parties' obligation to "make every effort to reach agreement on all matters by consensus", but where such efforts have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, Parties will be able to adopt a decision by a three-quarters majority vote. This would apply to "all matters" except where financial rules are being decided upon, where decisions are being made about the "provision of new and additional financial resources" or in relation to financial mechanisms. In these instances, consensus decision making would apply.

4. <sup>s6(a)</sup> in that amendments only apply to those countries that have deposited instruments of acceptance, and only after the threshold of acceptances set out in Article 15 has been reached (three-quarters of Parties having deposited their instruments). This means that even if the amendments were adopted, such a voting procedure could only be applied to the Parties which had accepted the amendment, all other Parties likely being still subject to the status quo. This would set up an <sup>s6(a)</sup> decision-making process whereby those Parties who had deposited instruments of acceptance of could take decisions by voting, while the other Parties (which had not adopted the amendment) would require consensus decision making.

5. s9(2)(j)

6. The general view of Parties has been that consensus decision-making has served Parties well.

**Position of key countries**

7. s9(2)(j)

*Legal Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 16: Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention**

---

Item held in abeyance.

### Background

2. Article 4, paragraph 2(d), of the Convention provides that a second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), shall take place no later than 31 December 1998. The COP4 President informed Parties that it had proven impossible to reach any agreed conclusions or decisions on the matter. This item has been held in abeyance for many years and no change is expected this session.
3. During the consideration of the provisional agenda for COP5, the Group of 77 and China proposed amending the title of the item to read "Review of the adequacy of implementation of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention". There was no agreement on this and the COP adopted the agenda for that session with the item held in abeyance. The item was included on the provisional agendas for COP6 up to and including COP12, with a footnote reflecting the amendment proposed by the Group of 77 and China.
4. COP13, acting on a proposal by the President, decided to invite the Executive Secretary to reflect on the situation in the light of developments at that session and come forward with proposals to be considered at SBI 28. On a proposal by the President, and on the basis of the recommendation of the SBI, it was decided at COP 14 to defer consideration of the item to COP16, which, acting on a proposal by the President, deferred consideration of the item, pursuant to rule 13 of the draft rules of procedure being applied, to COP17.
5. At COP17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 the agenda was adopted with the item held in abeyance and the President undertook consultations on the matter and reported back to Parties on the outcome of the consultations. In accordance with rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure being applied, this item has been included on the provisional agenda for this session.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

**Agenda item 17: Equitable geographical representation in constituted bodies under the Convention**

---

No briefing required.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 18: Administrative, financial and institutional matters

---

- (a) **Audit report and financial statements for 2021;**
- (b) **Budget performance for the biennium 2020–2021;**
- (c) **Decision-making in the UNFCCC process**

Objective/New Zealand's position

- Engage constructively and encourage careful management of the Secretariat's resources. Observe any issues raised by other Parties.

### (a) **Audit report and financial statements for 2021**

No briefing required.

### (b) **Budget performance for the biennium 2020 –2021**

Issues/background

1. SBI updates on budget performance for the biennium 2020-2021 as at 31 December 2021 (FCCC/SBI/2020/3) and its addendum note by the Executive Secretary, and provides details of the outputs generated by the Secretariat.
2. The budget performance document discusses the activities and achievements of the Secretariat over the past year, including associated income and expenditure and results tracked against expectations and key performance criteria. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly affected the UNFCCC schedule of meetings, but the Conference in Glasgow, the first to be held in person since the start of the pandemic, saw the adoption of the Glasgow Climate Pact and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement rule book.
3. Key findings for biennium 2020-2021 (as at 31 December 2021<sup>10</sup>):
  - a. Total expenditure amounted to EUR 126 million, representing 74 per cent of the total integrated budget for 2020-2021 while core budget expenditure was 88 per cent;
  - b. Implementation rates under the core budget (88 per cent), supplementary budget (54 per cent), ITL budget (53 per cent) and budget for the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process (34 per cent) were significantly affected by the postponement of the sessions of the governing and subsidiary bodies, and by other meetings, workshops and events being held mostly virtually. As a result of the travel restrictions in place in the context of the pandemic, only one third of the core budget planned for travel was spent; and
  - c. A high level of late and outstanding core budget contributions continued to negatively affect core budget implementation in 2020–2021. Only 81 per cent of core budget contributions for 2020–2021 had been received as at 31 December 2021.

---

<sup>10</sup> No further updates.

4. For COP27, several documents will be prepared and the SBI will be invited to take note of the information and recommend a draft decision for COP27 and CMA4. These are:

- Financial report and audited financial statements for 2021 and report of the United Nations Board of Auditors. Note by the secretariat: FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.10
- Financial report and audited financial statements for 2021 and report of the United Nations Board of Auditors. Note by the secretariat. Addendum. Comments by the secretariat: FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.10/Add.1
- Work programme of the secretariat for the biennium 2022–2023: update as at 1 July 2022. Note by the secretariat: FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.11
- Status of contributions and fees as at 21 October 2022. Note by the secretariat: FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.16

**(c) Decision-making in the UNFCCC process**

5. COP 26 could not conclude consideration of this matter. In accordance with rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure being applied, this matter has been included in the provisional agenda for this session.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**CMP 17**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 4: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I

---

(a) National communications;

(b) Annual compilation and accounting report for the second commitment period for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (for 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022);

(c) Date of completion of the expert review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period.

(a) National communications

See SBI 57 agenda item 3 (a), (b) and (c).

(b) Annual compilation and accounting report for the second commitment period for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (for 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022)

Issues/background

1. CMP 1 requested the secretariat to publish an annual compilation and accounting report and to forward it to the CMP, the Compliance Committee and each Party concerned.
2. The CMP will be invited to take note of the information contained in the reports for 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022.

(c) Date of completion of the expert review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period.

Issues/background

1. For the purpose of fulfilling commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol, a Party may, until the hundredth day after the date set by the CMP for the completion of the expert review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the last year of the commitment period (true-up period), continue to acquire, and other Parties may transfer to such a Party, emission reduction units under Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol from the preceding commitment period, provided that the eligibility of any such Party has not been suspended. CMP16 referred consideration of this matter to SBI56.
2. SBI 56 concluded its discussions on setting the date and recommended a draft decision on the matter for consideration at CMP 17. The CMP will be invited to consider the recommended draft decision<sup>11</sup> for adoption.
3. In terms of the date, in the recommended draft decision the CMP *decides* that the expert review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the final year of the second commitment period shall be completed by **1 June 2023** subject to the availability of resources and *also decides that*, if the expert review process is not completed by that date, it shall continue, and the date of completion shall be the date of publication of the final inventory review report for the final year of the second commitment period.

---

<sup>11</sup> For the text of the draft decision, see document FCCC/SBI/2022/10/Add.1.

## Agenda item 5: Matters relating to the clean development mechanism

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Support New Zealand's Article 6 implementation efforts and ensure a clean break between the Kyoto Protocol (including the CDM) and the Paris Agreement (including the Article 6.4 mechanism).
- Accept the Annual Report.
- Exercise caution in relation to the election of members to the CDM Executive Board and protect against attempts to continue the CDM which could undermine Article 6 operationalisation.

### Key messages

- The CDM was a useful mechanism to support Host Parties through the benefits of carbon markets, including in finance, technology transfer, capacity building and sustainable development.
- Through the CDM, the international community learned lessons and gained experience which will be invaluable for the development of cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement, including through the Article 6.4 mechanism.
- While the CDM brought benefits, it also has substantial flaws, causing adverse outcomes (such as questionable additionality and no requirement for Host Party accounting, meaning no real emissions reduction; and, serious breaches of human and indigenous peoples' rights). These flaws mean the CDM projects are inappropriate to advance Parties towards the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- [if raised] New Zealand supports the conclusion of the CDM and welcomes discussions on the appropriate arrangements for this. This would include an invitation to CDM project developers to register projects under the Article 6.4 mechanism as appropriate, provided they meet the eligibility criteria outlines in Decisions 3 CMA.3.
- Ensuring environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement must be the foremost consideration for any transition of CDM projects to the Article 6.4 mechanism. This includes ensuring robust accounting, and ambitious baselines, additionality, and crediting periods in line with the Article 6 guidance.

### Issues/background

1. The CDM Executive Board submits an annual report on its activities to the CMP. CMP 16 requested the SBI to consider measures for implementing aspects relating to the CDM registry in decision 3/CMA.3 and to develop recommendations for consideration at CMP 17.
2. The CMP will be invited to consider the annual report of the Executive Board and to provide guidance relating to the CDM. The CMP will also be invited to take any action it deems appropriate

on the basis of the recommendations of the SBI. The CMP will further be invited to elect members and alternate members of the CDM Executive Board.

3. New Zealand's primary concern is to ensure the Article 6.4 mechanism has environmental integrity. It is important that any outcome on this issue does not compromise the integrity of the Article 6.4 mechanism.

4. The agreement on Article 6.4 at COP26 included a transition of projects from the CDM, including the use of CERs towards the first or first updated NDC. New Zealand must ensure the delivery of the transition in line with ambitious technical requirements for the new mechanism to accommodate the CDM projects. It must also be cautious of any decisions relating to the Executive Board given the potential to undermine the Article 6.4 mechanism implementation.

5. New Zealand had minimal involvement in the CDM, although from 2011 until 2015 NZ ETS participants were permitted to purchase CDM units and use them for compliance. Large volumes of these units were used by participants to meet their ETS obligations, until the NZ ETS closed to international units in 2015 in light of environmental integrity concerns and the price impact on the NZ ETS. Environmental integrity concerns of the CDM relate particularly to the baselines and additionality.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 6: Matters relating to joint implementation**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand is willing to accept the Annual Report.
- Support New Zealand's Article 6 efforts to ensure a clean break between the Kyoto Protocol (including JI) and the Paris Agreement (including the Article 6.4 mechanism).

### Issues/background

1. The JISC submits an annual report on its activities to the CMP.
2. The CMP will be invited to consider the annual report of the JISC and to provide guidance relating to joint implementation. The CMP will also be invited to elect members and alternate members of the JISC.
3. JI activity virtually ceased after the end of the first commitment period. This agenda item should be non-contentious.
4. New Zealand had a small role hosting 8 projects under Track 1 Joint Implementation (host country approved). These were four windfarm projects, three landfill gas projects, and one geothermal project. These were collectively responsible for 4.5Mt of verified emissions reductions over the period 2008-2012.
5. NZ ETS participants could purchase JI units and use these for compliance in the scheme, like that of the CDM units. Large volumes of these units were used for compliance by participants from 2011 until 2015, when the scheme was closed to international units.
6. Subsequently real concerns have been raised about the environmental integrity of many JI units, particularly relating to baselines and additionality, retrospective crediting, and oversight. New Zealand has cancelled an amount of units held by the Government equivalent to the amount of those which raised environmental integrity concerns that were used towards our 2013 target. All remaining units held by the Government are AAUs from New Zealand's original assigned amount about which there are no questions of integrity.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 7: Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 18.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 8: Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 10.

### Background

1. CMP 1 established the annual monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries established by decision 2/CP.7 under the Kyoto Protocol. Matters relating to capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol are considered under the SBI.
2. The CMP will be invited to take any action it deems appropriate on the basis of the recommendations of the SBI.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 9: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 20.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



## Agenda item 10: Report of the Compliance Committee

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Support the work of the Compliance Committee.

### Key messages

- New Zealand thanks the Compliance Committee for the work it has done over the last year and supports its work as a critical element of the Kyoto Protocol.

### Background

1. The CMP will be invited to consider the seventeenth annual report of the Compliance Committee, which cover activities undertaken from 10 September 2021-7 July 2022.
2. The 2022 report includes reports on meetings held in 2022, an overview of its discussions on the Doha Amendment and its entry into force. The Committee also reaffirmed its commitment to working steadily to support Parties to meet their Kyoto mitigation targets and to ensure compliance with relevant implementation rules.
3. In the report, the Committee requests that CMP set a date for the completion of the expert review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol. It also seeks guidance from CMP on the continued operation of the compliance mechanism of the Protocol, including on modalities and procedures.
4. In the reporting period, the enforcement branch considered questions of implementation with respect to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, in accordance with paragraph 26(b) of the preliminary finding annexed to the final decision of the enforcement branch, was to develop a plan, as referred to in the procedures and mechanisms, which it submitted on 14 January 2020. The enforcement branch noted with appreciation the progress of Kazakhstan presented in its fourth progress report and the comprehensive presentation made by its representatives at the meeting. The branch noted that it looks forward to receiving more information from Kazakhstan, to be submitted in subsequent progress reports for consideration at the 38th meeting of the branch.

*Legal Division*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

*October 2022*

## **Agenda item 11: Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments**

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Support the conclusion of this agenda item.
- Support New Zealand's Article 6 implementation efforts and ensure a clean break between the Kyoto Protocol (including the CDM) and the Paris Agreement (including the Article 6.4 mechanism).

### Issues/background

1. CMP 8 adopted the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, establishing a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. A high-level ministerial round table was held on 5 June 2014, at which information was considered on the intention of Parties included in Annex I with commitments in the second commitment period to increase the ambition of their mitigation commitments.
2. A report on the round table was prepared for consideration at CMP 10. CMP 10 to 16 could not complete consideration of this matter. Pursuant to rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure being applied, the matter was included in the agenda for CMP 17.
3. The CMP will be invited to conclude consideration of this matter and to take any action it deems appropriate.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 12: Administrative, financial and institutional matters**

---

- (a) Audit report and financial statements for 2021;**
- (b) Budget performance for the biennium 2020–2021.**

**See COP 27 agenda item 18.**

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**SBI 57**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 2: Organizational matters

---

### (d) Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- To actively participate in and engage with the Facilitative Sharing of Views (FSV). Together with the wider International Assessment and Review (IAR) process, the FSV process promotes transparency and capacity building among developing countries by identifying where capacity building needs are.
- Ensure the FSV does not place undue burden on developing countries, and that it is seen as good way to build capacity and enhance future reporting for these countries.

#### Key messages

- New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to take part in the FSV and thanks the country representatives for their presentations and answers to our written questions.
- It is important that the FSV is a success as such processes (including the Multilateral Assessment) lay the foundation for the facilitative multilateral consideration of progress component of the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

#### Issues/background

1. The FSV is held under the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) process. The objective of the ICA is to enhance the transparency of mitigation actions, and it is also expected to contribute towards the capacity-building of non-Annex I Parties leading to improvement in the quality of Biennial Update Reports (BURs) over time. The ICA process also provides an essential learning opportunity for Parties and stakeholders in the transition to the Paris Agreement.
2. FSV is the developing country equivalent of multilateral assessment for developed countries. Through this process, Parties have the opportunity to ask questions of developing countries based on their submitted reports to the UNFCCC, or the technical analysis summary reports of the BURs that are prepared by expert teams coordinated by the UNFCCC secretariat.
3. Development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) under the Paris Agreement drew from the experience with the MRV arrangements under the Convention such as the FSV process. Successful FSV workshops are helpful in drawing links between existing arrangements under the Convention and the roll out of the facilitative multilateral consideration of progress (FMCP) under the Paris Agreement as these Convention processes lay the foundation for FMCP.
4. New Zealand has actively contributed to the multilateral assessment and FSV of other Parties over the last six years, by asking written and oral questions to these Parties.
5. New Zealand prepared written questions to Parties under this FSV round. At SBI 57, FSV Parties will each give a short presentation about their national circumstances and climate change response, based on their recently submitted BUR and its technical analysis. Following this presentation, there will be an opportunity to ask oral (follow up) questions.
6. The following Parties are part of the FSV round for 2022: Andorra, Armenia, Ghana, Jordan, the Republic of North Macedonia, Paraguay, Togo, Liberia, Morocco, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

7. The table below presents the written questions asked by New Zealand. Once Parties have submitted their written answers, we will prepare oral questions to ask at the session.

Party/submission	Topic	Written Questions – submitted via FSV portal
Andorra (BUR4)	Mitigation actions and their effects	New Zealand notes Andorra's use of imported fossil fuels for energy is the largest contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but it plans to reach national electricity production of 75 per cent by 2050 through renewables. Given the share of renewables currently stands at 20 per cent can Andorra elaborate on how it plans to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels? What are the largest barriers to domestic electricity production using renewable resources?
Armenia (BUR3)	GHG inventory gaps	Armenia has identified a number of gaps or constraints related to preparing GHG inventories as well as associated needs for filling these gaps. Can Armenia provide an update on what it has done to address some of the gaps or constraints classified as 'high priority'?
	Gender aspects of mitigation	New Zealand commends Armenia on analysing the gender aspects of mitigation actions in the energy sector, recognising the benefits women can receive from "'clean' energy consumption and energy efficiency" but also the barriers female-headed households face, such as the affordability of energy efficient heating systems and insulation. Has Armenia considered how specific energy policies e.g. those that encourage energy efficiency, might impact gender? Has Armenia developed, considered or implemented policies – in energy or other sectors – that proactively address gender-specific barriers (e.g. the affordability of energy-efficient heating systems or insulation for female-headed vs. male-headed households)?
	Building Armenia's national transparency framework under Paris Agreement' project update	New Zealand commends Armenia's efforts to build its institutional and technical capacities to meet the enhanced transparency requirements set out by the Paris Agreement and on initiating the 'Building Armenia's national transparency framework under Paris Agreement' project. Could Armenia give an update on the project and progress towards the shift from 'ad hoc reporting' to a continuous Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) process?

Ghana (BUR3)	MRV support functions	<p>New Zealand notes that Ghana's Climate Ambitious Reporting Program (GCARP) is the main MRV mechanism for climate action in Ghana. Additionally, we observe that the GCARP is primarily an online database system. Given the limited internet connectivity and usage in Ghana (about 45 per cent according to DW), what contingency measures does Ghana have in place to ensure that the MRV and support functions that the GCARP performs go on in a consistent and timely manner?</p> <p>What steps is Ghana taking to address the challenges identified in the MRV system, particularly irregular content updates, costly license and maintenance fees, and poor patronage of the portal's contents?</p>
	Capacity development	<p>What are the specific capacity development initiatives undertaken to improve the skills and knowledge in the MRV functions to ensure good quality data.</p>
	International investment into energy efficiency	<p>New Zealand commends Jordan in its efforts to build energy self-sufficiency through both development of local renewable energy resources and in building energy efficiency across sectors. It also notes that Jordan has recognised opportunities to allow for international investment through implementation of Article 6. What are Jordan's capacity building and development needs to support growth in this area?</p>
Jordan (BUR2)	Sustainable transport & urban design	<p>New Zealand notes Jordan's assessment of urban development opportunities through the Amman Resilience Strategy and asks Jordan to elaborate on how this may connect with urban densification and greater sustainable transport modes including walking, cycling and rail.</p>
	Natural forest resilience	<p>Regarding the loss of forest by wildfire as a major source of emissions for the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector, what strategies are in place to encourage regeneration of natural forest and foster its resilience as an ongoing carbon sink, especially as a warmer future climate may result in increasingly intense wildfires?</p>
Republic of North Macedonia (BUR3)	Improving methodologies in AFOLU	<p>Regarding the development of national emissions factors in the land use sector, have factors unique to North Macedonia and necessary for higher-tier</p>



		methodologies been identified, and if so, has progress been made toward implementing them in improved methodologies?
Paraguay (BUR3)	Unaccounted emissions from burning biomass	In its BUR, Paraguay reports unaccounted emissions from burning biomass for the purpose of clearing land for productive uses. What are the barriers and/or technical capabilities needed to fill this information gap and account for those emissions?
	Forest to farmland conversion	Paraguay reported a 48.67% decrease in emissions from forestry to pastures' land use. This is attributed to a reduction in the number of consents given ('habilitaciones'). Is this a result of decreased demand for land conversion permits, or has Paraguay introduced specific regulatory settings/legislation on land conversion?
	Open waste burning	Open domestic solid waste burning is reported to have increased between 1990-2017, contributing 135,63 kt CO <sub>2</sub> eq in 2017. The BUR also mentions a legal ban on open waste burning. Is the legal ban currently being enforced? And are there any alternative waste management solutions offered to those infringing the law?
Togo (BUR2)	Reporting progress	New Zealand noted that Togo reported in its NIR that it is still in the process of moving from ad hoc, consultant-based reporting to more institutionalized reporting. Since the publication of its BUR2/NIR New Zealand would be interested to know if Togo is making further progress on establishing the sustainable institutional arrangements that would allow for the reporting of NCs and BURs (and future BTRs) on a continuous basis.
	Carbon reduction through renewable energy	Does Togo have any information it can share on how it is tracking towards its 2025 and 2030 targets for CO <sub>2</sub> eq emissions reductions through the introduction of renewable energy resources (mitigation action 1)?
	Mitigation actions	New Zealand was interested to read of Togo's mitigation actions relating to forest conservation and restoration. Does Togo have any policies or measures in place that directly address reducing emissions from deforestation?
Liberia (BUR1)	National inventory report data	New Zealand noted in the BUR that Liberia has indicated it used several sources for missing activity data in order to prepare the national

		inventory report, as well as using some default emission factors provided by the IPCC guidelines. New Zealand would be interested to know what actions Liberia is taking to assist the country to have transparent, reliable and verifiable activity data as per the IPCC guidelines in good time for future reporting, as well as any actions being taken to derive country specific emission factors.
	Improving institution arrangements	New Zealand noted that in the BUR, in connection with implementation of climate actions and the presentation of good quality reports, Liberia states that it is facing challenges regarding institutional and human resources, including high staff turnover. New Zealand appreciates this is a significant challenge, and would be interested to hear of any strategies Liberia is putting in place that are likely to contribute to improving institutional arrangements. Does Liberia face specific constraints or challenges in this regard?
	Actions to address deforestation	New Zealand noted in the BUR that Liberia identifies deforestation and forest degradation as both making a significant contribution to emissions from the AFOLU sector. In addition, New Zealand noted that there are some specific policies in place to address these emissions. New Zealand would be interested to know if there are additional actions that Liberia is implementing to address the drivers behind deforestation and forest degradation.
Morocco (BUR3)	Greenhouse gas inventory	New Zealand would be interested to know if Morocco is making progress with the identified needs to strengthen institutional arrangements and filling the data gaps for its greenhouse gas inventory.
	Renewable energy progress	New Zealand has noted the progress reported by Morocco towards its aim to increase the share of renewable energy to 52 per cent of total national production capacity by 2030. Is there further progress to report since publication of BUR2?
	National Energy Strategy	New Zealand would be interested to know about the relationship between NAMAs and the mitigation actions that are part of the National Energy Strategy. Are the NAMAs part of the National Energy Strategy or something separate?
Uzbekistan (BUR1)	MRV system	New Zealand notes one of the priority areas of the Strategy for the Transition of the Republic of Uzbekistan to a "green" economy is the creation

		of a MRV system. New Zealand would be interested to know the progress for the development of the MRV system, and what barriers and constraints there may be for its implementation.
	Mitigation actions and their effects	New Zealand was interested to read about Uzbekistan's strategy for the development of agriculture for 2020 – 2030, with the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of agricultural origin by 50 per cent on 2016 levels. Does Uzbekistan have information it can share on how it is tracking towards this goal?
Viet Nam (BUR3)	Co-benefits of biodiversity and carbon sequestration	Regarding the Project on sustainable forest management and biodiversity to reduce CO <sub>2</sub> emissions: Are monitoring programmes in place to assess the ongoing success of the project, and if so, what results has the project seen thus far for both biodiversity and carbon sequestration?
	AFOLU uncertainty assessment	What are the major factors driving the uncertainty of the AFOLU sector in the National GHG Inventory?

Climate Change Directorate  
 Ministry for the Environment  
 October 2022

## **Agenda item 3: Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

---

- (a) Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;**
- (b) Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;**
- (c) Reports on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.**

### **(a) Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

#### Issues/background

1. COP 17 requested developed country Parties to submit full national communications every four years, and biennial reports starting in 2014 as an annex to the national communications or as a separate report. Accordingly, developed countries were to submit their 7th national communications and 3rd biennial reports by 1 January 2018, and 4<sup>th</sup> biennial reports by 1 January 2020.
2. Document FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.4 (Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports) refer. As at 19 April 2022, (prior to SBI56) the secretariat had received 43 of each of the following: NC7s, BR4s and BR4 common tabular format submissions. The most recent submissions have come from the United States of America: the secretariat received the NC7, BR3, BR4 and corresponding BR3 and BR4 CTF tables of the United States of America on 30 October 2021. The BR4, BR4 CTF tables and NC7 of Ukraine had not yet been submitted at the time the status document was published. In addition, since SBI56 the secretariat has received two BR5s and two NC8s (from Switzerland and the UK) with reviews still to be scheduled. Document FCCC/SBI/2022/INF.14 refers.
3. The planned in-country reviews of the NC7 and BR4 of Belarus and the United States had to be postponed owing to the pandemic and will take place in conjunction with the reviews of their NC8 and BR5, if possible.
4. SBI 57 will be invited to take note of the status of submission and review of NCs and BRs. However, given that SBI 56 deferred its consideration of this agenda item being amongst a few agenda items affected by the territorial dispute between Russia and Ukraine, it is possible that the same approach will be taken at SBI 57.
5. New Zealand is up-to-date with its reporting. New Zealand's 4th biennial report was reviewed in late 2020/early 2021 and preparations are underway for the submission of New Zealand's 8th national communication and 5th (and final) biennial report. These reports are due by 31 December 2022.

**(b) Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

## Objective/New Zealand's position

- Make every effort to conclude on this agenda item as the compilation and synthesis reports are becoming less relevant as time goes by e.g. the compilation and synthesis report of 2nd biennial reports was published in 2016.
- Ensure this exercise is not allowed to fuel assertions that developed countries have reneged on pre-2020 commitments.
- Ensure that if 'facts' are pulled out of these reports, they are representative and consistent with the information presented by the secretariat and avoid non-Annex I Parties 'cherry-picking' data.

## Key messages

- The purpose of the compilation and synthesis reports prepared by the secretariat is to factually summarise the information presented by Annex I Parties to the Convention in their biennial reports.
- The compilation and synthesis reports by the secretariat are by their very nature a summary of the information presented in the second, third and fourth biennial reports of Annex I countries, so there is no need to reflect particular data in SBI conclusions. The purpose of these reports is not to cast political judgement, but to make the information presented in the biennial reports accessible without having to read each individual report. We do not believe that there is any basis for the selective representation or cherry-picking of information from the reports.
- It makes no sense to continue the political point-scoring exchange on the previous compilations and syntheses, particularly as the information in the respective compilations and syntheses is now quite old.
- Conclusion of this agenda item could be done by the SBI simply "taking note" of the content of the two compilation and synthesis reports. A COP decision is not needed.
- Key messages are speaking points that can be used on the floor. They are not a summary of the brief. If needed, background paragraphs should provide support for the key messages.

## Issues/background

1. Consideration of the compilation and synthesis report on the information reported by Annex I Parties in their BR2s was initiated at SBI 45 and continued at subsequent sessions without any conclusions being reached. The secretariat prepared a compilation and synthesis report on the information reported by Annex I Parties in their BR3s and BR4s, including the latest submissions by Parties as at 13 May 2022. SBI 52–55 agreed to defer consideration of this matter to SBI 56, and SBI 56 agreed to defer to SBI 57.

2. The SBI will be invited to conclude its consideration of this matter and to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 27 (November 2022). As with the above sub agenda item, it is possible that this item could again be deferred.

**(c) Reports on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.**

Issues/background

1. The 2018 report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Annex I Parties covers 1990–2016 and was considered at SBI 49, 50 and 51, while the 2019 report covering 1990–2017 was considered at SBI 51. The reports for 2020 and 2021 covering 1990–2018 and 1990–2019, respectively, were available for consideration at SBI 56, where it was agreed to defer consideration of this matter to SBI 57. The report prepared for SBI 57 covers national greenhouse gas inventory data for 1990–2020.

2. The SBI will be invited to take note of the information contained in those reports. As with the above two sub agenda items, it is possible that this item could again be deferred.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 4: Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention

---

### (a) Information contained in national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Given that the enhanced transparency framework is in place, with reporting of first biennial transparency reports due by 31 December 2024, all of which will be reviewed, New Zealand could support closing of this agenda item.

#### Issues/background

1. At SBI 24 some Parties proposed that, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the SBI consider the information communicated by non-Annex I Parties in all their NCs. There was no agreement among Parties at that session, and this agenda sub-item has since been held in abeyance.
2. The SBI will be invited to provide guidance on how to consider the information contained in the NCs of non-Annex I Parties, taking into account decisions 1/CP.21 (the decision that, *inter alia*, adopted the Paris Agreement, 1/CP.24 (on the transition from MRV under the Convention to the enhanced transparency framework under Paris) and 18/CMA.1 (the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement).
3. This agenda item may continue to be held in abeyance, but the SBI Chair is keen to find a solution that would allow this agenda item to close.

### (b) Report of the Consultative Group of Experts

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand supports the CGE to continue to place priority on providing support to developing countries as they prepare their final biennial update reports under the Convention MRV provisions and also prepare their first biennial transparency reports (BTRs) under the Paris Agreement. BTRs are due by 31 December 2024 except for LDCs and SIDS that may submit their BTRs at their discretion.
- New Zealand recognises that submitting a BTR will be a big step up for many developing countries and that capacity building is a crucial element of a fully functional transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

#### Issues/background

1. COP 26 adopted the revised terms of reference of the CGE, based on which, the CGE developed a work programme for 2022–2026 at its 7th meeting, held from 28 February to 1 March 2022. The work programme includes priorities and key activities, and its 2022 workplan. In addition, the CGE revised its vision, mission and metrics to measure the progress as well as strategic priorities for 2020–2026.

2. The SBI will be invited to consider the progress report of the CGE on its work in 2022 and to provide guidance to the CGE as appropriate.

**(c) Provision of financial and technical support**

Objectives/New Zealand's position

- As appropriate, encourage recognition of the support available for non-Annex I Parties.
- Encourage progressive developing countries to share positive stories about support for transparency to counter any negative narrative.
- Encourage the GEF to ensure they have strong outreach to SIDS, and collaborate with other partners working with SIDS on transparency requirements.

Issues/background

1. The SBI has received updates on the support available for non-Annex I Parties to meet reporting requirements at its last few meetings and will be invited to agree on any further actions on these matters, as appropriate.

2. The GEF provides full-cost funding for the preparation of national communications and biennial update reports of developing countries. The GEF has set-aside resources so that each country can access up to \$500,000 for National Communications and \$352,000 for biennial update reports (BURs). In the reporting period, 25 non-Annex I Parties submitted their NCs, and 12 non-Annex I Parties submitted their BURs to the UNFCCC.

3. The GEF will also support developing country Parties to meet enhanced transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement through the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT). Two Pacific countries have applied for (and been approved for) support to prepare their Biennial Transparency Report (Cook Islands, Fiji).

4. New Zealand significantly increased our contribution to the GEF through its eighth replenishment round, with CBIT support a key driver for New Zealand's total contribution of NZ\$23.5 million.

**(d) Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention**

Issues/background

1. Twenty-three rounds of technical analysis covering 143 BURs will have been conducted as at 26 August 2022 (the date that the annotated agenda for SBI 57 was published). The twenty-fourth round was conducted from 29 August to 2 September 2022. The SBI will be invited to take note of the summary reports finalized by 26 August 2022

2. Refer also to the related SBI agenda item 2(d): Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process.

*Climate Change Directorate/Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*



## **Agenda item 5: Matters relating to the clean development mechanism registry referred to in paragraph 75(b) of the annex to decision 3/CMA.3**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand will not use certified emission reductions (CERs) towards our NDC as these represent (at best) emissions reductions prior to 2021. As such, our priority is that all CERs that are transferred into the Article 6.4 central mechanism are clearly labelled as pre-2020 units for ease of identification and to ensure these are avoided by high integrity Parties.

### Key messages

- New Zealand does not support the use of pre-2020 emissions reductions in the Paris era and we will not use CERs towards our NDC.
- The Article 6.4 decision text sets out rules regarding the limited use of CERs. These rules are clearly stipulated, and must be followed, [and we will not support any proposal that expands such use].
- Bringing this limited number of CERs into the A6.4 central mechanism registry must be done in a way that enables Parties and non-Parties to identify them at a glance. They must clearly be labelled, with a separate label to that for A6.4ERs.
- To this end, we seek to ensure that the transition of CERs is done in line with the guidance agreed at Glasgow, where the criteria do not deviate from the agreed text.

### Issues/background

1. CMP 16 requested SBI 56 to consider measures for implementing aspects relating to the CDM registry in decision 3/CMA.3 and to develop recommendations for consideration at CMP 17.
2. SBI 56 initiated its consideration of matters referred to in paragraph 75(b) of the annex to decision 3/CMA.3 with respect to transfers of certified emission reductions from the CDM registry to the registry for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement in accordance with chapter VI of the annex to decision 3/CMA.3.
3. The SBI requested the secretariat to prepare a technical paper with the aim of furthering Parties' understanding of the technical and process-related aspects for transfers of eligible certified emission reductions from the CDM registry to the Article 6, paragraph 4, mechanism registry in accordance with paragraph 75(b) of the annex to decision 3/CMA.3, focusing on the implications for the CDM registry, for consideration at SBI 57.
4. CMA 3 adopted the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, which includes a list of the conditions under which CERs may be used towards achieving a nationally determined contribution, including that these shall be transferred to and held in the mechanism registry and identified as pre-2021 emission reductions.
5. According to the decision, the use of certified emission reductions issued under the CDM may be used towards achievement of an NDC provided the following conditions are met:
  - a) The CDM project activity or programme of activities was registered on or after 1 January 2013;

- b) The CERs shall be transferred to and held in the mechanism registry and identified as pre-2021 emission reductions;
- c) The CERs may be used towards achievement of the first NDC only;
- d) The CDM host Party shall not be required to apply a corresponding adjustment consistently with decision 2/CMA.3 in respect of the CERs and not be subject to the share of FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1 40 proceeds pursuant to chapter VII above (Levy of share of proceeds for adaptation and administrative expenses);
- e) CERs not meeting the conditions referred to in paragraph 75(a-d) above may only be used for achievement of an NDC in accordance with a relevant future decision of the CMA;
- f) Temporary CERs and long-term CERs shall not be used towards NDCs.

6. New Zealand seeks to ensure that these stipulations are carefully followed, and that Parties do not add further exemptions or increase the ease with which CERs are transferred, nor expand their permissible use.

7. New Zealand's top priority is to ensure that CERs are clearly labelled and easily distinguishable from A6.4ERs to ensure high integrity Parties and non-Party stakeholders can easily avoid the use of CERs towards their NDCs.

8. We also seek to guard against any potential impacts of this transition of CDM units and activities to the rest of Article 6. If appropriate, New Zealand can advance the move towards ending the CDM.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 6: Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Support the international transaction log (ITL) report.
- Support efforts to begin decommissioning the ITL, including no additional funding past 2025.

### Key messages

- New Zealand supports the work of the Administrator and notes that a strong, well-run registry is useful infrastructure to support robust markets.
- New Zealand also recognises that new infrastructure will be needed for international carbon markets under Article 6, and the international transaction log is no longer needed in this context.

### Issues/background

1. CMP 1 requested the SBI to consider annual reports of the international transaction log administrator with a view to the SBI requesting the CMP to provide guidance in relation to the operation of registry systems.
2. The SBI will be invited to take note of the 2022 report of the international transaction log administrator.
3. The ITL is likely to be sustainable until mid-2025, after that without significant investment the system would need to be decommissioned. If the system is to remain in place after mid-2025, this would require a decision by the CMP.
4. There does not appear to be much appetite for keeping the system running past 2025. If it is decommissioned Parties will need to decide their own process for disconnecting their registries.
5. Funding of the ITL, without any direction for significant investment in the system, is likely to be covered by the reserves the ITL currently holds. This would need to be agreed by the Parties.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 7: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- A work programme that contributes to limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees, along with other Paris Agreement architecture (e.g. global stocktake, transparency framework) and action by Parties, coalitions, and non-Parties.

### Key messages

- We, collectively, are not on track to meet the temperature goals of the Agreement.
- Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees is vital to New Zealand, to the Pacific, and to the world. Mitigation is necessary to enable us to successfully adapt, and to limit loss and damage.
- This work programme is one tool to help us in our efforts to deliver more mitigation.
- The work programme's work must be implementation not negotiation.
- In this context – what is the work that is valuable for us to do? And how do we do it?
- Not everyone may find all aspects of the work relevant or of interest to them – that should not stop us from doing work that enables us individually or collectively to go further and faster.
- Items of sectoral work will be of use – for example how we can work together to enable the phase-down of coal, or removal of fossil fuel subsidies.
- Cross-sectoral work will also be of use – can the experience of early movers from diverse national contexts, setting up climate change legislation and national systems (what works, what does not, what were unexpected issues etc), enable others to move forward quicker? What sharing of information or building communities of practice, would be useful regarding sustainable systems for transparency, information and modelling to enable national policy making?

### Issues/background

1. The mitigation work programme was established to:

*urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, and requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session, in a manner that complements the global stocktake*

2. New Zealand's mandate contains these principles, directly relevant to this item:

- advocacy to align climate action with the objective of limiting temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels
- resisting any development in implementation that undermines the Agreement's applicability to all
- advocacy for outcomes that support the interests of Pacific island countries to the extent possible, in ways consistent with New Zealand's national interest (noting that on mitigation, this means limiting the temperature increase by as much as possible, including to 1.5 degrees)

*What outcomes are we seeking?*

3. New Zealand wants an outcome that delivers a work programme that helps us stay under 1.5 degrees. As such, the work programme should enable mitigation **ambition and action in the 2020s**. This timeframe means the work programme will be most effective if it does work on **implementation** – not the creation of new negotiating spaces.

4. At a high level, the questions we must answer regarding the design of the work programme are simply 1) what are the topics/areas we want to work on? 2) what are the modalities? Some potential examples are:

- a. We are getting more experience with legal frameworks for climate change action in different national contexts (what works, what does not, what were unexpected issues etc).  
Can the work programme be a vehicle to share this knowledge, springboard efforts, and get more emissions reductions?
- b. All countries are now learning as transparency requirements shift to the Enhanced Transparency Framework. There will be training for reviewers and capacity building for this etc. However, sitting above this, a lot of countries may be trying to move from a series of project- or consultant-based reporting, to having a sustained and sustainable national inventory and reporting system.  
How could the work programme to disseminate knowledge, and experience on establishing these systems (legal, data acquisition, etc)? How could the work programme spur these efforts, and help countries put their information base for policy-making on a firmer footing? What about modelling capacity?
- c. Can the work programme provide a space for greater reach and impact of sectoral efforts? For example, can we use the work programme to enhance the ability of those that want to work together on issues outlined in the Glasgow Climate Pact (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies), or sectors (e.g. energy, transport, agriculture) to do so; and to inform / bring along countries that are not there yet?

5. New Zealand and other countries that are progressive on ambition need to approach this, and other mitigation items, through the lens of what more can be done other within the UNFCCC to generate the kind of movement needed. Broader climate efforts outside the UNFCCC – such as country platforms, plurilateral initiatives and coalitions are likely to be extremely useful in promoting tangible action and could be brought “inside” the process. The current mitigation landscape within the UNFCCC negotiations/process includes the following:

- a. **Global stocktake** – a science-based stocktake of collective progress against the aims of the Paris Agreement, with modalities defined in 19/CMA.1. The outcome of the GST is to inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support. The global stocktake will inform NDC2; but, given the importance of action this decade, and the gap between the completion of GST1 and NDC2 there is no reason why the GST should not also inform consideration of policy in the 2020s.
- b. **Ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambition** – this annual space, agreed as part of the Glasgow Climate Pact, has no pre-determined modalities. As this is the inaugural roundtable, there is the potential to model behaviour to shape this space

to provide ongoing political accountability for prior commitments and alignment with 1.5 degrees.

- c. **Mitigation work programme** – space with the potential to do implementation work to increase mitigation ambition and action.
- d. **Cover decisions** – provide ability to secure new commitments and/or strengthen existing ones.
- e. **Annual updates of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions** under the Paris Agreement, will provide a more rapidly refreshed source of information on commitments than the global stocktake.
- f. **Transparency processes** provide information on individual countries implementation and achievement of NDCs; technical review; and public and peer scrutiny of efforts (e.g. under MA/FSV/FMCP).

6. The mitigation work programme is not the be-all and end-all of mitigation at the COP, and a significant amount of implementation work will occur via national and plurilateral efforts outside the formal process. Within the process New Zealand's desired outcome is a cluster of measures that will further close the gap to 1.5 degrees. One way of doing this, gripping up the elements of the Glasgow Climate Pact, and enabling distinct purposes is the following:

- a. The mitigation work programme focuses on implementation – with a focus on facilitating action
- b. The Ministerial roundtable is political and is used to push for action and accountability from Parties
- c. The cover decision pushes for stronger / new commitments – e.g. the particular importance of 'major emitters', or peaking by mid-decade.

7. s6(b)(i), s9(2)(j)

s9(2)(i)

8. The incoming Presidency has signalled it will place an emphasis on adaptation and finance. This raises the possibility of a relative lack of emphasis on mitigation and this will need to be monitored. New Zealand and like-minded should use opportunities with the Presidency to register

- a. Action on mitigation and the mitigation work programme was a key ask of a number of developing country groups at Glasgow.
- b. New Zealand agrees that COP27 needs to deliver strong action on all areas of ambition.
- c. Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees is vital to New Zealand, to the Pacific, and to the world. The job is not done on 1.5 degrees and the Egyptian COP must deliver.
- d. Critically, as set out in the IPCC's Sixth Assessment report - **mitigation is necessary to enable us to successfully adapt** (and avoid breaching further limits on adaptive capacity), **and to limit loss and damage**.

9. No details on the related pre-session workshop were available at time of writing<sup>12</sup>.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

<sup>12</sup> Submission on this item are available through the UNFCCC submissions portal at: <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>, typing mitigation ambition in the search field.

## Agenda item 8: Matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- A global stocktake that results in a science-based and strong impetus for all Parties to align their efforts (and NDCs) with 1.5 degrees.
- Adaptation and finance outcomes that are evidence-based and that resonate with Pacific priorities.
- An effective, efficient and non-duplicative process.

### Key messages

- We, collectively, are not yet on track to meet the goals of the Agreement.
- The global stocktake will help us achieve our collective goals, by informing our individual efforts. This includes consideration of our next NDCs, but, more urgently, what we are doing this decade.
- However, we do not need the final word from the global stocktake in order to act in the face of a clear and present threat. Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees is vital to New Zealand, to the Pacific, and to the world. Mitigation, now, is necessary to enable us to successfully adapt, and to limit loss and damage.
- It is important that the global stocktake provides high-quality information to inform policy-making. New Zealand supports the focus of the global stocktake on information to inform implementation.

*[Subject matter experts to formulate messages relating to their areas of expertise for roundtable sessions.]*

### Issues/background

1. Article 14 of the Paris Agreement provides that the CMA shall periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess collective progress towards achieving its purpose and long-term goals, referred to as the global stocktake. CMA 3 welcomed the start of the first global stocktake. Modalities for the global stocktake are set out in 19/CMA.1. The global stocktake consists of three components: information collection and preparation, which commenced at SB 52–55; technical assessment, which will start at SB 56 and conclude at SB 58 (June 2023); and consideration of outputs, which will take place at CMA 5 (November 2023).

2. At SB57 the joint contact group will meet again and the second meeting of the technical dialogue will be held. The work of the contact group is supported by the technical dialogue where expert consideration of inputs from the sources identified for the global stocktake will take place. The technical dialogue is to be guided by two co-facilitators, Dr Farhan Akhtar (United States of America) and Harald Winkler (South Africa).

3. The summary report of TD1.1 is available as [GST.TD.2022.SummaryReport.1](#). This summarises inputs received and discussions that occurred across 63 hours of meetings at SB56. Reflections contained in the report address areas the cofacilitators consider 'knowledge gaps'

(where further information is needed to be brought into the process), and 'attention gaps' (where further time for discussion is needed). They consider that addressing both will be required in planning for future TD sessions, in order to be able to address 'substantive gaps' in action and support. These reflections are contained in paras 387-414.

4. At this session TD1.2 will occur. The cofacilitators have issued an information note on this: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GST%20TD1.2%20Information%20Note\\_20221007.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GST%20TD1.2%20Information%20Note_20221007.pdf)

5. TD.1.2 will occur during the first week of COP27 – like TD1.1 it will use plenaries, world cafe sessions and roundtables. It will also include facilitated focused exchanges on intersections, a poster session on GST inputs, and a creative space outside of the TD discussions.

- a. Roundtables will begin with icebreakers by experts, with subsequent small group breakouts (with notetakers and reporting back). Roundtables will be on: 1) Mitigation, including response measures; 2) Adaptation, including loss and damage; 3) Means of implementation and support.
- b. Focused exchanges on intersections will start with a panel of experts, with time for interactive exchanges among Parties, observer organizations and other NPS.

6. The indicative timeline for TD1.2 is below.

Figure 1: Indicative timeline for relevant events

	Monday, 7 Nov	Tuesday, 8 Nov	Wednesday, 9 Nov	Thursday, 10 Nov	Friday, 11 Nov	Saturday, 12 Nov
AM			RT 1.1	RT 1.2		SBI/SBSTA Closing Plenary
	GST TD Opening Plenary		RT 2.1	RT 2.2	GST TD Closing Plenary	
PM			RT 3.1	RT 3.2		
		GST TD World Café	Focused Exchange	Focused Exchange		

7. A senior delegation member should participate in the opening and closing plenaries. New Zealand experts should participate in the roundtable sessions relevant to them. The focus of the three roundtables are:

- a. **Mitigation** – aim is to move from what to how, from models and pledges to implementation and action, taking into account barriers, challenges and opportunities. These discussions should develop findings in response to the SB Chairs' guiding questions – e.g.

*In order to achieve the goals defined in Articles 2.1(a) and 4.1 of the Paris Agreement: a) What further action is required? b) What are the barriers and challenges, and how can they be addressed at national, regional and international*



levels? c) *What are the opportunities, good practices, lessons learned and success stories?*

- b. **Adaptation** – aim is to discuss and assess collective progress on Article 7.14, paragraphs a to c, and loss and damage. As in other roundtable discussions, should move from “what” to “how”, from knowledge generation to implementation, taking into account barriers, challenges and opportunities. Like with mitigation these discussions should develop findings in response to the SB Chairs’ guiding questions.
- c. **Means of implementation and support** – aim is to take stock of implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess collective progress towards making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (Article 2.1 c), as well as how support for developing countries across finance, technology and capacity-building (Articles 9, 10, and 11) has enabled collective progress towards the long-term temperature goal (Article 2.1 a) and increased the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production (Article 2.1 b).

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 9: Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Conclude the review at this COP.
- Work to avoid PR2 products having a privileged status, distinct from other inputs, in GST processes.
- Work to promote 1.5 alignment and messages about the need for mitigation in conclusions of the review.

### Key messages

- The periodic review has produced useful information. It reinforces the need for immediate action.
  - That the world is already experiencing extreme climate change.
  - That climate impacts and risks, including risk of irreversible impacts, increase with every increment of warming.
  - That the world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal.
  - That the window of opportunity to achieve climate-resilient development is rapidly closing.
  - That it is still possible to achieve the long-term global goal with immediate and sustained emission reductions.
- Having undertaken, and now concluding the review – New Zealand is firmly focused on implementation. Adaptation and action to deliver on mitigation, adaptation, and financial flows.

### Issues/background

1. The ultimate objective of the Convention is the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

2. COP25 decided (5/CP.25) that the second periodic review should in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Convention and on the basis of the best available science, enhance Parties' understanding of:

- The long-term global goal and scenarios towards achieving it in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention;
- Progress made in relation to addressing information and knowledge gaps, including with regard to scenarios to achieve the long-term global goal and the range of associated impacts, since the completion of the 2013–2015 review;
- Challenges and opportunities for achieving the long-term global goal with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the Convention;
- Assess the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by Parties in order to achieve the long-term global goal in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention;

3. This has followed (mutatis mutandis) the modalities set out in paragraphs 80-90 of 1/CP.18 including a structured expert dialogue.

4. It is clear that pre-2020 implementation and equity are and will remain prominent pressure points <sup>s6(a)</sup> Avoiding importation of bifurcation into Paris Agreement processes remains important.

5. In support of global ambition, it will be most helpful if the message reinforces the need for all countries (particularly large emitters) to take ambitious action (across mitigation, adaptation, and financial flows) – rather than focusing on blame. Most developed country parties desire to take an approach that is forward looking, and recognise the need for ambition and action now – i.e. the onus is on action and each country contributing its highest possible ambition.

6. The key messages from the synthesis report (FCCC/SB/2022/3) from the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) process, conducted as part of PR2, are as follows:

- i. At 1.1 °C warming, the world is already experiencing extreme climate change
- ii. Knowledge has improved significantly since the first periodic review but important gaps remain
- iii. Climate impacts and risks, including risk of irreversible impacts, increase with every increment of warming
- iv. It is still possible to achieve the long-term global goal with immediate and sustained emission reductions
- v. The window of opportunity to achieve climate-resilient development is rapidly closing
- vi. The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal
- vii. Despite some progress on mitigation and adaptation, more efforts are needed
- viii. Equity is key to achieving the long-term global goal
- ix. Key enablers of climate action are not aligned with the urgency of a rapid and equitable low-carbon transition
- x. Knowledge, technology and resources are needed to transform global systems in line with low-emission pathways and climate-resilient development

7. <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

do not currently have details to comment on the veracity of this inaccuracy.

We

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## Agenda item 10: Koronivia joint work on agriculture

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Promote a decision that enables enhanced agricultural climate action globally by facilitating cooperation and utilising the organisations and funding mechanisms already available for agriculture.
- Ensure all decisions and recommendations take an outcomes-based approach, avoiding prescribed approaches which may not be appropriate for all circumstances.

### Key messages

- New Zealand recognises the important role agriculture must play in the global response to climate change. We want a decision that supports Parties cooperating on action towards low emission-climate resilient agriculture, supporting food security.
- We consider the best way to do this is by drawing connections between the various bodies, platforms, and dialogues working in across this topic area. This could include the following six recommendations:
  - Parties explore agricultural cooperation opportunities under the auspices of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement).
  - The UNFCCC's constituted finance bodies to include in their annual reports finance provided towards agriculture and land-use sectors.
  - The SBSTA Chair to report the finance committed to agricultural climate action from both the constituted finance bodies and Parties;
  - The Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change collaborate with experts and institutes undertaking agricultural and land-based climate action to explore opportunities for new adaptation actions, or for the sector to scale up existing actions at a transformative level.
  - The Glasgow-Sharm El-Sheik Work Programme on the Global Goal for Adaptation include agriculture and land-based climate action as a topic for discussion for its workshops on an ongoing basis.
  - The UNFCCC Secretariat to consider how agricultural and land-based climate action are being incorporated into the agenda for consideration of the Work Programme.
- We hear calls from many to continue the KJWA or establish a new system of workshops within the UNFCCC system moving forward.
- New Zealand has actively engaged in the KJWA from the start and considered the workshops a valuable platform for countries to come together and discuss low-emission, climate resilient agricultural approaches. That said, we also recognised the limitations of the KJWA. In our view, the design of the KJWA item to deliver negotiated conclusions was detrimental to the free flow of information and collaborative knowledge sharing discussion.
- Considering this limitation and our collective urgent need to scale up transformative climate action in the agriculture sector, we do not believe continuing the KJWA is the most useful way to advance agricultural climate action.

- If we are to continue an item under the SBSTA or SBI to share information on agriculture related issues, we want this informed by our learnings from KJWA. This includes:
  - Designing the item to support collaborative and free flowing discussion. This means focusing purely on information sharing and connecting rather than negotiating outcomes. If we want our discussions captured, we could request the secretariat to produce reports.
  - Establishing this item under the CMA to enable the Parties to the Paris Agreement to usefully discuss agriculture related challenges in implementing climate plans under the auspices of the Paris Agreement.

## Issues/background

1. KJWA is mandated under decision 4/CP.23 to the SBI and SBSTA jointly. The item comprised of six workshops (plus an intersessional) focused on agricultural climate action which parties delivered conclusions on through a negotiated process.
2. New Zealand jointly with Ireland made a voluntary contribution to the UNFCCC for an additional intersessional workshop as part of the KJWA. This is widely known as the 'New Zealand workshop'.
3. At COP27 Parties will be presenting a negotiated report to the COP on the intersessional workshop and the KJWA process as a whole, and have been tasked with concluding consideration of issues related to agriculture through the KJWA and recommending a decision to the COP for adoption. Many Parties want to see the KJWA continue, or a new agenda item be established to address issues related to agriculture, as above.
4. Some parties from within the G77+China are calling for a dedicated finance mechanism focused on agriculture. New Zealand opposes this suggestion given it would not address the underlying barriers to agricultural climate action and potentially divert resources from effective, well-established finance mechanisms. Additionally, we want to protect against agriculture being siloed by specific bodies and institutions given its cross-cutting relevance and importance.
5. Negotiations in KJWA are closely related to other agriculture and trade discussions across the multilateral system. This is both useful (in terms of driving holistic and consistent outcomes), and detrimental, as issues and politics of related fora often leak into the KJWA discussions. In particular, we often see FAO text on related matters posed in KJWA. This text should be approached with caution as it may have been accepted by New Zealand within the FAO based on broader compromise arrangements.
6. This KJWA decision at COP27 should be process focused. If substantial issues related to agricultural climate action are raised, refer to the agriculture thematic brief for New Zealand's positioning.
7. In September 2022 New Zealand made a voluntary submission on 'How to enhance land-based climate action through existing UNFCCC programmes and activities'. The ideas put forward in this submission correspond to the outcome New Zealand wants from this year's decision on KJWA.

*International Environment  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
October 2022*

## Agenda item 11: Report of the Adaptation Committee

---

### (a) Report of the Adaptation Committee

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand can support the recommendations to the COP and CMA contained in the report of the Adaptation Committee. The recommendations are in paragraphs 71 to 74 of document FCCC/SB/2022/5.

#### Issues/background

1. COP 17 requested the Adaptation Committee to report annually to the COP through the subsidiary bodies. CMA 1 decided that the Adaptation Committee shall serve the Paris Agreement.
2. The 21st regular meeting of the Adaptation Committee took place from 28 to 31 March 2022 and the 22nd from 6 to 9 September, both in Bonn. The 2022 report of the Adaptation Committee reflects the outcomes of those meetings and of intersessional work of the AC as per its flexible workplan for 2022–2024.
3. CMA 1 requested the Adaptation Committee to develop, with the engagement of IPCC Working Group II, using relevant existing guidance as a starting point, as appropriate, by June 2022, draft supplementary guidance for voluntary use by Parties in communicating information in accordance with the elements for adaptation communications contained in the annex to decision 9/CMA.1 for consideration at SB 57 in the context of consideration of the AC report. The draft supplementary guidance (in document FCCC/SB/2022/5/Add.1) is lengthy. Nevertheless, for Parties struggling to find their way through the various guidelines relevant to communicating information on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation it could help with understanding the different vehicles that are/will be used for communicating this information and avoid duplication of effort.
4. CMA 1 also requested the Adaptation Committee, with the engagement of IPCC Working Group II, as appropriate, to prepare, drawing on the inventory and submissions referred to in decision 11/CMA.1, a technical paper on methodologies for assessing adaptation needs and their application, as well as on the related gaps, good practices, lessons learned and guidelines, for consideration and further guidance at SBSTA 57 in the context of its consideration of the Adaptation Committee report. The technical paper is contained in document FCCC/SB/2022/5/Add.2 but had not been published at the time this brief was prepared.
5. The SBI and the SBSTA will be invited to consider the 2022 report of the Adaptation Committee and to recommend draft conclusions and/or a draft decision resulting from the implementation of the workplan of the Adaptation Committee in 2022 for consideration and adoption at COP 27 and CMA 4.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

**Agenda item 12: Matters relating to least developed countries**

See COP 27 agenda item 11.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 13: National adaptation plans

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Convey support for the work of the LEG, Adaptation Committee, GCF and the GEF in supporting LDCs to prepare and implement their National Adaptation Plans and for the useful technical guidance provided to Parties.
- Encourage these bodies to do even more to support LDCs – the LEG report notes that LDCs are facing difficulties in some key areas of the process despite the targeted support that is available to them, and that progress has stalled.
- Highlight New Zealand's increased climate finance commitment which provides for at least 50 percent being for adaptation and our support for helping Pacific Island countries access climate finance.
- Recognise efforts to assist with accessing finance as part of a broader set of global, regional and bilateral efforts on access from a range of actors.
- Convey that New Zealand is ramping up domestic adaptation planning and has recently released its National Adaption Plan.

### Key messages

- New Zealand welcomes the 42<sup>nd</sup> report of the LEG and work under way by a range of actors to support the development and implementation of National Adaptation Plans.
- We note that progress in many LDCs has stalled – only 16 of 46 LDCs have formulated their first NAP. We encourage all relevant bodies (LEG, AC, GCF, GEF etc) to take appropriate actions to support LDCs in this regard.
- We welcome the updated Vision of the LEG and efforts to improve formulation and implementation of robust and good quality NAPS and implementation of priority adaptation needs.
- New Zealand last year announced its new climate finance commitment of NZD 1.3bn grant based finance of which at least 50 per cent will be spent on adaptation initiatives. We are also supporting the work of the Pacific NDC Hub which is providing practical help to Pacific Small Island Developing States to develop their NAPs.
- At home, New Zealand is ramping up its own adaptation planning. The Government has recently released its National Adaption Plan setting out system wide actions that will:
  - reform institutions to be fit for a changing climate
  - provide data, information, tools and guidance to allow everyone to assess and reduce their own climate risks, and
  - embed climate resilience across government strategies and policies.

### Issues/background

1. Parties formulate and implement National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) to identify their medium and long-term adaptation needs and to develop and implement strategies.
2. COP 25 requested the SBI to discuss information from the reports of the Adaptation Committee and the LEG, including on gaps and needs and the implementation of national adaptation plans, and to take further action, as appropriate. SBI 52–55 initiated consideration of



such information and it was decided to continue consideration at SBI 56 on the basis of the draft text elements prepared by the co-facilitators for this agenda item with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 27.

*Key findings in the 4th report of the LEG (FCCC/SBI/2022/18)*

3. The 42nd meeting of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group took place in Gaborone from 29-31 August 2022. The LEG discussed a range of matters including progress in implementing its activities for 2022–2023; draft rules of procedure of the LEG; and LDC's needs and discussions with the Chair of the LDCs Group on those countries' priorities and needs for support.
4. The LEG noted that only 16 of 46 LDCs had formulated their first NAP. Of those, 14 had collectively submitted 24 proposals (individual and multi-country) for accessing funding from the GCF for implementing priority actions identified in their NAPs.
5. Priority activities under the LEG's 2022–2023 work programme include:
  - a. Continuing to support LDCs in formulating their first NAP in 2022-2023;
  - b. Continuing to support the development of methodologies for reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support;
  - c. Supporting the LDCs to implement NAPs including through GCF country programmes.
  - d. Preparing a synthesis report on the efforts of the LDCs in implementing adaptation actions in the context of the recognition of adaptation efforts of the developing country Parties

*New Zealand's national adaptation planning*

6. The New Zealand Government has recently published its first national adaptation plan.
7. The NAP sets out system wide actions that ensure governance frameworks are fit for purpose and provide data, information, and guidance for assessing risk and developing adaptation action. It also contains actions to specifically address New Zealand's climate risks across five areas - natural environment; homes, buildings and places; infrastructure; communities; and the economy and financial system. Collectively, the actions will:
  - i. reform institutions to be fit for a changing climate
  - ii. provide data, information, tools and guidance to allow everyone to assess and reduce their own climate risks, and
  - iii. embed climate resilience across government strategies and policies.
8. More information on New Zealand's national adaptation plan can be found in the thematic brief on domestic action.

*Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## Agenda item 14: Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand is committed to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change through action at home and globally, particularly in the Pacific.
- Guided by the IPCC's AR6 reports, our collective adaptation work should be transformational, advancing from current incremental efforts to drive well-planned and systemic approaches that address the multiple climate change risks. Our work should also consider sustainable development and mitigation synergies and co-benefits. We should seek to be inclusive, and inspire collaboration across constituencies on achieving the global goal on adaptation (GGA), including through the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh two-year work programme.
- New Zealand considers this work programme important in helping Parties to establish a collective understanding of progress on adaptation through shared lessons learned and good practice, including by identifying the gaps in capacity, finance and data on which progress has been limited to date.
- This work programme should actively encourage nationally determined, local context-based relevance and flexible ways for countries to contribute to the GGA in their national and local contexts.
  - <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>
  - New Zealand's view is that while recognising the increasing need for adaptation finance, any defined goal for this should be taken up in the appropriate forum (i.e. in discussion on the new quantified goal for climate finance)
- New Zealand welcomes the exchange of information that has taken place under the first workshops under the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme and looks forward to this continued exchange at workshops prior to and at the Sharm el-Sheikh COP.
- Together, the Glasgow Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme, along with the first Global Stocktake, create a crucial opportunity to focus attention and accelerate action on adaptation. There will likely be pressure from some Parties at COP27 to negotiate substantive conclusions on the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme. Our preference would be to use the limited time at COP to continue with a constructive information exchange. We can note that there has been progress and recognise the need to do more, while avoiding spending excessive time on negotiating substantive conclusions for a work programme that still has a year to run.

## Issues/background

1. CMA 3 established and launched the comprehensive two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, to be carried out jointly by the SBSTA and the SBI.
2. The SBSTA and the SBI welcomed the events convened at SB 56 under the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, and invited Parties and observers to submit views on the subsequent workshops, including on general considerations, the topics for discussion under the themes identified in the compilation and synthesis of submissions, areas of work, expected outcomes, examples, case studies and modalities, for each workshop to be conducted in 2022, at least three weeks in advance of the workshop.
3. The SBSTA and SBI Chairs prepare a concept note and guiding questions relating to the theme and areas of work of each workshop and on the basis of the received submissions. These, along with logistical information on the workshops, are/will be available on the work programme web page.
4. By the time SBSTA 57 and SBI 57 convene in Sharm el-Sheikh three workshops will have been held, with the third scheduled only three weeks in advance of the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, and the 4<sup>th</sup> workshop to be held in-session during SB57. The topics of the workshops in 2022 cover:
  - Enhancing understanding of the global goal on adaptation and reviewing progress towards it (8-9 June)
  - Enhancing action and support (30-31 August)
  - Methodologies, indicators, data and metrics, monitoring and evaluation (17-18 October)
  - Communicating and reporting on adaptation priorities (5 November)
5. In the context of preparing a single annual report to be considered at SB 57, the secretariat will prepare under the guidance of the Chairs a summary of each workshop to capture progress made and inform subsequent consideration by Parties under the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme. The summaries will also be available on the work programme web page.
6. The SBSTA and the SBI will be invited to consider the annual report on this matter with a view to reporting to CMA 4 on progress in implementing the work programme.
7. See also the mandated events brief on the 4<sup>th</sup> workshop under the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation being held on 5 November 2022 on the topic: Communicating and reporting on adaptation priorities.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

**Agenda item 15: Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 16: Matters relating to the Santiago network under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Urge flexibility among Parties to reach a landing zone at COP that operationalises the Santiago Network.
- Advocate for an outcome on the Santiago Network that is not duplicative, and draws lessons from existing UNFCCC bodies such as the Climate Technology Centre and Network.

### Key messages

- Operationalising the Santiago Network is critical to the success of this COP.
- For Aotearoa New Zealand the urgency of the issue is clear. In our region, the Pacific, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is a present day reality and existential threat.
- The Santiago Network is needed to catalyse technical assistance, building on the strengths of the agencies already working in this area and we must ensure that the Network is well resourced and effective.
- We need to show flexibility and move beyond the stalemate on structure. New Zealand is prepared to support a model that draws on successful experiences elsewhere in the UNFCCC system, such as the Climate Technology Centre and Network.
- We also want to see the lessons from those other experiences built in – the independent reviews of the CTCN are an important resource, and show that we need to ensure close coordination across the network and policy arms, and more technical and less politically-driven decision making.
- There are many agencies already doing good work including technical humanitarian assistance, food security, disaster risk reduction, risk management, early warning systems, assessing loss and damage (including non-economic losses such as cultural heritage), capacity building and knowledge sharing.
- There is a role for the Santiago Network in supporting increased coordination and action on loss and damage, in particular identifying the needs of countries and prioritising these needs. We do not see it as an additional mechanism for disaster risk reduction or adaptation, but rather that it should focus on the needs of countries in preparing for and responding to loss and damage.
- New Zealand could consider supporting the Santiago Network undertaking needs assessments.
- We see a role for the network in focusing on bringing providers and decision makers together to scale up and support new partnerships. Similarly, the Network could provide visibility of on the ground experiences, along with ways of navigating the challenges of the UNFCCC's political layers.
- We see a role for the Warsaw International Mechanism Executive Committee (ExCom) in continuing with its well defined, rolling mandate – acting as the 'policy arm' of the Santiago

Network, with the Network itself remaining distinct, focusing on collating and curating the practical and technical support that exists.

- Regarding funding, a Secretariat should direct countries to existing programmes and help countries focus requests on gaps and catalysing new technical assistance. When gaps exist, network members should request funding to carry out technical assistance. Requests from network members should be considered on the basis of appropriate policies, frameworks, and guidelines, to be developed by the Network secretariat and approved by an advisory body.

## Issues/background

1. Agreement on operationalising the Santiago Network is a minimum success factor for COP27. <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(j)</sup>

## Governance Arrangements

2. A core point of contention has been governance arrangements – with the G77 + China seeking a more “Party-driven” model, <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(j)</sup>
  - while major developed countries (US, EU) have an opposing desire for a leaner model run by technical experts out of the Warsaw International Mechanism Executive Committee (WIM ExCom). <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

3. PSIDs have been clear to us that they support the push for a more Party-driven model, and propose the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) model, established in 2/CP17 Annex VII<sup>13</sup> offers a useful precedent to the establishment of the operationalisation of the Santiago Network. Based on this example, the Santiago Network would be embedded in the UNFCCC structure, consisting of a network, an advisory board and a national focal point or coordinating entity for each Party.

## New Zealand position

4. Operationalisation of the Santiago Network is a priority for New Zealand – both from the perspective of maintaining COP credibility and from a substantive policy perspective. We will be looking to show the necessary flexibility at COP, and encourage likemindeds to do so also, to ensure this can get across the line.

5. Reports of the effectiveness/current functioning of the PSIDs-preferred CTCN model have been relatively positive. The second independent review by EY in 2021 found that the CTCN was perceived ‘positively on the whole’ by stakeholders, was demand driven and ‘more agile and responsive and less bureaucratic than other entities in the United Nations system’. It found that while activity could have been funded through other mechanisms CTCN intervention ‘nevertheless helped projects to start and be deployed more quickly’. The review found, however, that resource mobilisation remained a challenge. It found that the Advisory Board ‘overall efficiency ... has

<sup>13</sup> FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1

improved over the past few years thanks to more regular interaction among members ... and a stronger emphasis on technical than political issues' -the latter suggesting that undue emphasis on political issues had been reducing effectiveness in the past. [Report on the second independent review of the effective implementation of the Climate Technology Centre and Network | UNFCCC](#)

6. While we have had some concerns that another advisory board could potentially create duplication with the role of the ExCom, we assess that it will be timely at COP27 to show further flexibility at COP27 to support PSIDs preferred CTCN-based governance structure and hosting arrangements<sup>14</sup>, while we will advocate for the leanest/most cost effective version of this model which can secure consensus support.

7. This assessment is informed by: the strength of the developing country position; the importance of this issue for Pacific developing countries; the fact that the Santiago Network is being established for the benefit of developing countries and there is therefore a need to co-design and have ownership by them –with a developed/developing divide on this issue particularly unhelpful; and indications of flexibility by other likemindeds.

8. This flexibility is consistent with the general principles of the negotiations mandate which set out that we will: seek effective and efficient outcomes, advocate for outcomes that support the interests of Pacific Island countries, to the extent possible, in ways consistent with New Zealand's national interest, and continue work to respond to the threat of climate change, particularly in the Pacific, including through the provision of climate-related support, delivered bilaterally and through regional or multilateral mechanisms.

9. In line with this mandate, we will advocate for an outcome on the Santiago Network that adds real value for SIDS, ensures support for loss and damage is accelerated and dispersed more widely, in a coherent and regionally appropriate way. We will focus on adding our voice to solutions that catalyse change, address issues with existing support architecture, and encourage others to make the conceptual contributions that provide a Network that delivers for SIDS.

10. s9(2)(g)(i)

#### Santiago Network Background

11. The Santiago Network is intended to connect vulnerable developing countries with the providers of technical assistance, knowledge and resources that they need to address climate risks comprehensively in the context of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. This assistance can be provided through a number of channels – e.g. UN, humanitarian, or other expert agencies – it does not necessarily need to be provided by individual governments.

12. The Santiago Network was established under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage at COP25 in Madrid. The specific mandate of the Santiago Network is drawn from 2/CMA.2 paras 42-45, to act as a catalyst for technical assistance, increasing and showcasing action already undertaken by many stakeholders across the spectrum of loss and damage action.

*"42. Recognizes the importance of building the capacity, and enhancing the facilitation, of the provision of technical support to developing countries for approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;*

---

<sup>14</sup> FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2

43. Establishes, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change **to catalyse the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts** for the implementation of relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

44. Invites the organizations, bodies, networks and experts referred to in paragraph 43 above engaged in providing technical assistance to developing countries to report on their progress to the Executive Committee;

45. Requests the Executive Committee to include relevant information from the organizations, bodies, networks and experts that have reported on their progress, as referred to in paragraph 44 above, in its annual reports;"

*(Lack of) Progress to Date*

1. At COP26, Parties agreed the functions of the Santiago Network and set a process intended to ensure it became fully operational by COP27. However progress has been poor. Intersessional work has suffered from entrenched positions and circular discussions on basic procedural aspects of the network and its modalities. The envisaged detailed development plan for the Network to be adopted at COP27/CMA4 could not be agreed, and Bonn discussions resulted instead in an 'informal note' meaning future discussions at COP27 will effectively start from scratch.
2. This informal note listed the items various Parties raised for future discussion (to note the lack of agreement on the various items);
  - Operational modalities
  - Structure; G77+China see this as largely following a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) model. UG members are largely in favour of a much leaner model structured around the WIM Excom.
  - Advisory board; the most contentious element. Views appear to have solidified on either side of having an advisory body (part of the CTCN model), vs the WIM ExCom playing this role.
  - Loss and damage contact points; a surprisingly contentious aspect. G77+China are keen to see these contact points do not become "gatekeepers" or slow the process.
  - Terms of reference for a potential convening body or host; there remains disagreement on the various options for who or how the network would be "hosted". Parties have not yet discussed particular organisations but Australia has suggested the WIM commission a report and discuss with various organisations <sup>s6(a)</sup> ). The idea of a consortium has also been raised.
  - Funding arrangements for the network; a highly contentious aspect. G77+ China see this as an agenda item to discuss how the network itself will be funded. Others see it as a discussion for how funding will be dispersed within the network. <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>



*Items for discussion; operational modalities*

13. We note LDCs are likely to ask for:

- A common needs assessment process and dedicated and additional funding, including financing for carrying out assessments, capacity-building and support for national contact points, and for the provision of technical assistance.

14. New Zealand can support the need for needs assessments, and note our support for dedicated funding (see finance brief). Any financial support for this will need to be provided with robust mechanisms and in line with 2/CMA.2.

*Structure*

15. We understand that there appears to be some emerging consensus on a functioning organisation outside the UNFCCC acting as the host of the Santiago Network Secretariat –with a competitive bidding process akin to the TOR established in 2 CP17 Annex VII. UNEP currently hosts the CTCN. We can support this process as long as it remains transparent, inclusive and impartial, and maintains a close working arrangement with the WIM ExCom and its expert groups, technical expert group and task force. We will encourage a broad membership base for the Network, with strong engagement from the private sector.

*Role of the Executive Committee and its expert groups, the task force and technical expert group*

16. New Zealand continues to support the ExCom in its capacity as a 'policy arm' of the network (and as such funded an expert, Pene Lefale, to fill New Zealand's seat on the ExCom in the role of technical expert). A key consideration will be the interaction between the Network and the WIM - this needs to be coordinated and carefully linked, perhaps through the use of champions for the Network within the WIM.

*Role of loss and damage contact points and other relevant stakeholders*

17. We will indicate a preference (while signalling flexibility) that each country be represented by a Santiago Network National Designated Contact Point, though we do not assess a battle on this as in our interests.

*Possible elements for the terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body that may provide secretarial services to facilitate work under the Santiago Network*

18. As others have suggested, the terms of reference for the organization providing secretariat services should include elements related to the mission of the Santiago Network, functions, architecture, roles and responsibilities, governance, organisational structure of the secretariat, reporting and review, and term of the memorandum of understanding with the host organization.

*Climate Change Division and Development, People and Planet*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

*October 2022*

## **Agenda item 17: Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism**

---

- (a) Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;**
- (b) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention;**
- (c) First periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of decision 1/CP.21;**
- (d) Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer.**

### **(a) Joint annual reports of the TEC and the CTCN**

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand does not play a substantial role in the TEC or CTCN, but it is in our best interest they continue to work together to ensure the Technology Mechanism implements the development and transfer of technology with the highest possible environmental integrity and ambition.
- Thank the TEC and CTCN for their work and encourage the prompt implementation of their monitoring and evaluation processes.
- Agree with the recommendations in the report<sup>15</sup>.

#### Key messages

- New Zealand welcomes the efforts by the TEC and CTCN to increase collaboration and incorporate the guidance provided by the Technology Framework under the Paris Agreement, particularly in their respective work plans.
- Suggest the next report should focus more equally on both bodies – this one primarily focused on the CTCN.
- It is important to keep the TEC and CTCN relevant to countries, including the Pacific, as we increase our climate action to implement the Paris Agreement. This includes strengthening engagement with stakeholders and the private sector and linking work more strongly to NDCs and NAPs.

#### Issues/background

1. CMA 1 adopted the technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement. COP20 decided that the TEC and the CTCN shall continue to prepare a joint annual report to the COP. COP21 decided that the TEC and the CTCN shall report to the CMA, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

2. <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

Their view is it would be ideal if the TEC produced policy recommendations that could be fed into the CTCN in its implementation of technical assistance.

---

<sup>15</sup> [sb2022\\_04\\_adv.pdf](#)

## **(b) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention**

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Linkages between the financial and technology mechanisms are crucial to enhancing climate technology development and transfer to developing countries, ensuring the most ambitious long-term vision.
- New Zealand supports the operation of non-duplicative institutional architecture with the financial mechanism to maximise the effectiveness of the technology mechanism. These should be focused on promoting and enhancing environmentally sound technologies in developing countries.
- Avoid discussions specific to the finance mechanism, such as any attempts to guide to Green Climate Fund/Global Environment Facility – direct these to the finance negotiations.

### Key messages

- New Zealand is pleased to see strengthened linkages between the Technology and Financial Mechanisms, such as meetings and joint dialogues, the CTCN's partnership with the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, as well as new activities to collaborate further in the TEC and CTCN's new work plans.
- We encourage continuing to strengthen linkages between the Technology and Finance mechanisms to scale up the CTCN's resources to support developing countries, which is essential to support a global transition to a low-emissions future.
- Recently, assistance from the CTCN has increased in popularity with Pacific Island countries, completing projects in Tonga, Samoa, and the Solomon Islands. New Zealand encourages this work while ensuring the CTCN does not duplicate our work in the Pacific and that assistance provided is high quality and tailored to the region.

### Issues/background

3. COP22 invited the TEC, the CTCN and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to provide information on their actions in strengthening the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. The outcome at COP26 was compromise language on "continuing working with the operating entities of the Finance Mechanism to further strengthen their linkages with the aim of scaling up the CTCN's provisions of technical support to developing countries".

4. While it is likely developing countries will raise the concern of linkages between the Technology and Financial Mechanism, these processes have been going well overall. The issue that is likely to flare up is the dire financial situation of the CTCN, which does not have sufficient funds to run its operations. The CTCN has received two rounds of donor Party funding (New Zealand has not contributed) and has made efforts to diversify its funding base, including focusing on pro-bono and private sources. The structure and niche of the CTCN (providing technical assistance at less than \$100,000) make it difficult to attract and leverage private and philanthropic finance. It would not reflect well on the health of the UNFCCC institution if the CTCN were to fail at the beginning of the first NDC period of the Paris Agreement.

5. At SB56, there was consensus on the need to strengthen these linkages, but no agreement on how. There was a push from the UG and EU to fold this item into the annual review, so it can be considered consistently each year, however, the G77+China and Africa group thought this

would minimise the importance of this agenda item, and this is expected to be raised again at COP27.

**(c) First periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of decision 1/CP.21**

Objective/New Zealand's position

- We welcome the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism this year as agreed to in decision 16/CMA.1.<sup>16</sup>
- We largely support the recommendations given to the CTCN and TEC in the report, in particular, to use the findings of IPCC AR6 Working Group III and to encourage diverse participation such as the private sector.
- Continue to highlight the benefits, as decided at COP26, of folding the independent review of the CTCN into the periodic assessment, to reduce duplication and inefficiency between both review processes.

Key messages

- New Zealand encourages progress that avoids duplication and back-to-back reviews, to ensure that attention and resources can be dedicated to focusing on the implementation of technology development and transfer activities and on-the-ground outcomes.

Issues/background

6. COP21 decided to undertake a periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The long-standing issue of alignment of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism and independent review of the CTCN was finally resolved at COP26, where the two were synchronised.

**(d) Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer**

Objective/New Zealand's position

- Avoid additional mandatory funding channels, minimise duplication of work, and focus on on-the-ground outcomes of the highest ambition, environmental integrity and that are tailored to the region.
- Help find solutions to ease worries over the suggested closure of this agenda item, due to the Poznan strategic transfer programme no longer having funding or new projects.

Key messages

- Like the technology mechanism as a whole, this item is the "means of implementation" of the UNFCCC, making it crucial for developing countries. Therefore, while this is a 'light touch' portfolio for New Zealand, it is important to be engaged, particularly with an African COP this year.

---

<sup>16</sup> [sbi2022\\_13.pdf](#)

## Issues/background

7. The Poznan Strategic Programme (PSP) on Technology Transfer is run by the GEF to support technology transfer to developing countries, as they move towards a low-carbon development path, utilising the following process.

8. The GEF no longer provides funding for PSP but embeds technology transfer in its programming strategies. There appears to be potential for overlap/duplication between the work of the CTCN and the PSP, because of this there has been a push for the last few years to close this agenda item, though this has been unsuccessful so far.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
May 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 18: Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund

---

- (a) Reports of the Adaptation Fund Board;
- (b) Membership of the Adaptation Fund Board;
- (c) Fourth review of the Adaptation Fund

### New Zealand's objectives/position

- Ensure the Adaptation Fund continues to engage with all regions and countries, including the Pacific.
- Ensure the recommendations from the meeting support the Adaptation Fund continuing to add value to the climate finance architecture.
- Ensure the smooth transition of the Adaptation Fund from serving the Kyoto Protocol to serving the Paris Agreement.
- Continuing to support an effective Adaptation Fund Board that delivers on its work efficiently without excessive bureaucracy or undue politicisation.
- We are interested in a deeper understanding of the governance and allocation process,  
s9(2)(j)

### Key messages

- New Zealand recognises the Adaptation Fund's niche role in the climate finance landscape and the value our Pacific partners see in it.
- We appreciate the Adaptation Fund's engagement in the Pacific, including through the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and hope that Pacific Island countries will increasingly draw on this fund given the priority placed on adaptation in the Pacific.
- [TBC] We are announcing a contribution to the Adaptation Fund at COP 27 [time/location tbc].
- We welcome the increase in maximum financing for national allocations from USD\$10 to \$20 million and the number of accredited national implementing entities per eligible developing country Party from one to two
- We are keen that the work to link the GCF and the Adaptation Fund continues.
- New Zealand supports the smooth transition from the Fund serving the Kyoto Protocol to serving the Paris Agreement.

### Issues/Background

1. The Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol to finance priority adaptation actions in developing countries. The primary source of revenue for the Adpatation Fund was to have been revenue from a 2 per cent levy on the sale of Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs) ring-fenced from each CDM project, but with the virtual collapse of the CDM, most of its funding comes from voluntary pledges.

2. New Zealand has an interest in ensuring UNFCCC bodies operate effectively, and supporting timely and useful reviews. New Zealand's primary interests in adaptation and the Adaptation Fund in the UNFCCC context relate to:

- understanding the governance and allocation procedures of the Adaptation Fund;
- enhancing the resilience of Pacific Island countries, acknowledging that adaptation is a critical issue for PICs;
- supporting efforts to double adaptation finance and achieving an overall balance between adaptation and mitigation, while avoiding adaptation actions being viewed as a substitute for mitigation actions;
- ensuring a smooth transition of the Adaptation Fund to serving the Paris Agreement.

3. Elections to the Adaptation Fund board are to be held at COP27, noting the COP26 decision to allow Parties to the Paris Agreement to be appointed to the board (i.e. not limited to Parties to the Kyoto Protocol).

4. COP24 agreed the Adaptation Fund would serve the Paris Agreement, effective from 1 January 2019. It will also continue to serve the Kyoto Protocol until the share of proceeds under Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement become available. At COP26, the US and Canada were able to get agreement in the Adaptation Fund guidance that Parties to the Paris Agreement are eligible to be appointed to the Adaptation Fund Board.

5. Pacific Island countries have not applied to the Fund as much as previously (likely due to the creation and profile of the GCF). However, the Fund is comparatively easier to access and funds projects of a size <sup>s6(a)</sup> SPREP (one of the two accredited entities in the region) is currently working with Pacific Island countries to encourage greater engagement with the Fund. <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

6. New Zealand made its first voluntary contribution to Adaptation Fund in 2019, having announced it at COP24. Following the announcement of our increased climate finance contribution (NZD 1.3bn), we are exploring further contributions to the Adaptation Fund. As such, we have an interest in the effective governance and operation of the Fund.

#### **(a) Reports of the Adaptation Fund Board**

Waiting on report of the Board.

#### **(b) Membership of the Adaptation Fund Board**

7. At SB56 Parties agreed that the Adaptation Fund Board is functioning well and changes in membership do not currently need to be made.

8. However, they disagreed whether to continue discussions under this agenda item. Some developed countries wished to use it for addressing legal issues related to how the CMP will cede authority of the Adaptation Fund to the CMA. Developing country groups preferred to defer discussions until the Adaptation Fund receives a share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism in order to avoid proliferation of agenda items. The issue was pushed to SBI57 via Rule 16.

- We do not have a strong position on this issue but should not position ourselves against the interests of PICs.

**(c) Fourth review of the Adaptation Fund**

9. The Fourth review of the Adaptation Fund is due to be finalised at CMA4 to ensure the effectiveness, sustainability and adequacy of the fund and its operations. The scope of the review will cover the progress made to date and lessons learned in the operationalization and implementation of the fund.

10. Informal consultations on this were held ahead of SB56 and Parties were invited to make voluntary submissions on the fourth review ahead of SB56. The EU, AILAC, EIG, USA, Vanuatu and Kenya submitted their views for consideration.

- The EU focused on the main elements of the review, including: provision of financial resources, lessons learned from approved programmes, programming and project coherence between the Adaptation Fund and other institutions, and the institutional arrangements of the Adaptation Fund;
- The EIG commented that the Adaptation Fund functions well, but that institutional arrangements need to be made to allow for the transition to serving the Paris Agreement, and called for additional voluntary contributions;
- Vanuatu noted that support and streamlined processes for SIDS and LDCs seeking accreditation should be made, and should also include special support for project design and guidance during approval procedures.

11. At SB56, Parties agreed on the Fund's overall effectiveness in assisting developing countries' adaptation, although many lamented its limited financial resources to date. Several developing countries called for the review to focus on identifying ways the Fund can improve and scale up direct access modalities.

12. Developed and developing countries disagreed over language specifying "grant-based" finance, with the former arguing it should be removed to not prejudice discussions about broadening the Fund's funding instruments. Developing countries preferred retaining the language, noting the review is "backward-looking" and thus will not prejudice future changes.

- We would not oppose reference to grants in the review

13. Parties agreed not to begin work on a draft CMP decision, preferring instead to wait for the Secretariat to complete a technical paper on the review process.

*Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*



**Agenda item 19: Matters relating to capacity-building**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 10.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 20: Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement**

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Ensure New Zealand is viewed as a pragmatic and constructive contributor, utilising any opportunities to promote our recent work and showcase the positive impacts implementing climate policy can have.
- Keep discussions on how we can measure progress and continue to implement the current work plan – go against any attempts to re-open the work plan, add extra sessions, or new modalities.
- s6(a)
- Seize opportunities to discuss trade measures, particularly fossil fuel subsidy reform, to promote how they can actively support the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
- s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

### Key messages

- New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to discuss with Parties how the response measures forum, and the associated work of the Katowice Committee of Experts on the impacts of the implementation of response measures (KCI), can contribute to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement, including by enabling Parties to take action that reflects their highest possible ambition.
- We consider the work taken over the past two years, despite the COVID-19 global pandemic, to be good progress in undertaking technical work under all four activities implemented by the KCI and as mandated by the forum's six-year work plan.
- We now need to continue to implement activities as mandated, take stock of our progress and provide any further advice to the forum on advancing implementation. It is vital that the work plan on response measures is not re-opened or any new modalities are added, as the theme of COP27, we must continue to focus on implementation.
- Trade policy can play a constructive role as a key lever in driving the transition to a low-emissions, climate-resilient, global economy. For example, reforming harmful fossil fuel subsidies can free up scarce government resources to invest in the transition to a low-emissions future. It would be useful for the forum to hold a joint discussion with relevant organisations on the interface between trade policy and response measures, without duplicating existing competent bodies.
- New Zealand situates itself as a leader in just transition to a low-emissions economy. Our just transitions unit, established in 2018, produced a 2050 transition plan for Taranaki, with efforts underway to produce a similar plan for the closure of the Tiwai Point Aluminium Smelter in Southland. Under the Paris Agreement, a Just Transition refers to workforce transition and conversation should focus on labour issues, steering clear from issues such as climate justice.

## Issues/background

1. "Response measures" refers to the range of actions that Parties should undertake to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Developing countries are concerned about the negative impact that measures undertaken may have on their development progress, particularly those taken by developed countries. As climate policies become more ambitious, so must the necessary response measures undertaken. All countries need to be conscious of and report on the impact they have.

2. At COP24 (Katowice) Parties decided to relaunch the work of the forum. At COP25 Parties agreed to the six-year work plan, covering four areas: economic diversification and transformation; just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs; assessing and analysing the impacts of the implementation of response measures; facilitating the development of tools and methodologies to assess the impacts of the implementation of response measures. Since then, the KCI has implemented the activities that were originally mandated. The forum may consider, if needed, additional modalities for the work plan to adopt.

3. New Zealand has submitted information on how we are minimising the adverse impacts of our climate change mitigation policies, as a part of our 2022 National Inventory Report. We will continue this in 2023, even though it will no longer be required under the Kyoto Protocol given there is no third commitment period.

### *Expectations for COP27*

4. At COP27 Parties are encouraged to constructively engage in consultations to take stock of progress and provide any further guidance to the KCI and the response measures forum.

5. As observed at the previous SB session, <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(j)</sup>

The perceived lack of technical work undertaken due to COVID-19 may be used to push this. We should resist these attempts which would draw resources away from implementation.

6. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

7. Furthermore, the vast number of topics under response measures meant that most of the meeting time was being used simply deciding what to discuss, let alone coming to conclusions. We should listen carefully and respectfully to all interventions, but try to keep discussions focused on specific mandated items, such as reviewing the work plan. <sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

### *Historical Context*

8. At COP26 key issues negotiated were the number of workshops on response measures to be undertaken and who/how/when/what would be fed into the first global stocktake (with some developing countries arguing that the "forum", i.e. the technology working group at each COP, should contribute). The other main outcome was securing some gender language in exchange for an extra two day forum (which took place this year).

9. <sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup> Parties, particularly those from developing countries and with fossil fuel reliant economies are not happy with the work undertaken by the KCI and the forum, as expressed during the first midterm review. China raised

---

<sup>17</sup> The African Group continues to be vocal in the negotiations, concerned that its members' development will be further left behind in the transition to a low-carbon economy, including trade-related impacts, because of lack of capacity and support.

concerns about CBAMs, Saudi Arabia about economic diversification / energy policies, and the Africa group + G77 advocated for greater support from developed countries, focusing on a Just Transition and Article 6 linkages.

10. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 21: Gender and climate change

---

### Objectives/New Zealand's position

- To demonstrate how New Zealand is supporting and implementing the Gender Action Plan (GAP) and conclude the intermediate review of the GAP at COP27.
- To ensure the GAP remains manageable, effective and within its mandate.
- To ensure the GAP is relevant to all wāhine (women) and kōtiro (girls) of Aotearoa New Zealand, and recognises the special relationship between indigenous communities and the environment.

### Key messages

- New Zealand strongly supports the integration of gender perspectives across all levels of climate change work. We welcome the opportunity to share views on progress in the implementation of the GAP in its intermediate review initiated at SB56, and look forward to its conclusion here at COP27.
- We stand committed to a fair and equitable global response to climate change, and are currently developing policies to mainstream human rights into our climate change action internationally. New Zealand is implementing the GAP by undertaking work to improve gender responsive government policy related to climate change, and strengthening how we target gender outcomes in the delivery of climate finance.
- We are pleased to see the continuing positive trend of integrating gender perspectives into the processes of constituted bodies, and increased representation of women on most constituted bodies. We were pleased to contribute to this by appointing two women to roles on constituted bodies this year.
- More work is needed to ensure the full, meaningful and equal participation and leadership of women and girls in all their diversity, in all aspects of the UNFCCC process. As the most recent gender composition report highlights, there is still a gap in the active participation of women compared to men in sessions. Addressing this gap is vital for achieving long-term climate goals and ensuring gender equality in the negotiations.
- Ahead of COP26, New Zealand was pleased to increase its climate finance commitment four-fold to NZD 1.3 billion for 2022-2025. This will be delivered via our International Development Cooperation (IDC) programme, which is strategically guided by New Zealand's Gender Action Plan 2021-2025. It aims to increase New Zealand's gender principal investment<sup>18</sup> to 4 percent of our IDC appropriation, and our gender significant<sup>19</sup> investment to 60 per cent IDC by targeting and mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment across our development programme including in climate change activities<sup>20</sup>.
- In August, New Zealand launched its International Climate Finance Strategy. This articulates and incorporates relevant outcomes from New Zealand's Gender Action Plan 2021-2025 in the strategy. We are developing a tool to mainstream a human rights-based approach to

<sup>18</sup> Gender principal means gender equality is the main objective of the activity and fundamental to its design and expected results.

<sup>19</sup> Gender significant means gender equality is mainstreamed as an important and deliberate objective but not the principal reason for undertaking the activity.

s9(2)(g)(i)

our IDC programming with a focus on climate change and recognising that the people whose rights we aim to realise, including women and girls in all their diversity, live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change.

- New Zealand actively engaged in the 66th session of the Commission on the Status of Women. This year's priority theme of: "Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes" provided greater recognition of the importance of achieving gender equality and women's empowerment in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction.
- At the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit in 2019, we were pleased to join the Gender initiative. In addition, at COP26, New Zealand joined the Glasgow Women's Leadership Statement and the Women Leading on Climate Coalition. In doing so, we have committed to implementing climate actions that contribute to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity.

s9(2)(j)

- We should be mindful of the mandate of the GAP, which is non-binding and allows for flexibility in its implementation. Mainstreaming gender responsiveness into Parties' climate actions will require flexible guidance based on information exchange and sharing of good practice. The GAP has made good progress in this area and its activities in this regard should be maintained.
- High levels of prescription may undermine the outcomes intended to be achieved. For example, the Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility already have gender work underway. Furthermore, every country has a different context. Blunt prescription in the GAP, such as mandating quotas or duplicative guidance to bodies, will not be effective in mainstreaming gender across all Parties' policies.
- We appreciate the reports prepared by the secretariat and work done to clarify the role of the National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points (NGCCFP). The workshops were useful in exploring how NGCCFP could best contribute to achieving the objectives of the GAP, taking into account and coordinating with, other gender processes across the UN. Using this information, New Zealand will continue to consider the appointment of a NGCCFP.

s9(2)(j)

- In the few sessions that we have, we should endeavour to focus on the substantive review of the GAP activities. Any preambular text that refers to previous text should be streamlined.
- In reviewing the GAP, we should seek to maintain activities that still require attention. For example, it is concerning to see the decrease in the representation of women in Party delegations at COP26 and the June SBs<sup>21</sup>. This reversal of the positive trend observed since 2018 shows that more work is needed to continue to ensure gender balance and women's leadership at all levels. The collection of gender-disaggregated data is helpful for understanding where the gaps remain.
- In last year's virtual UNFCCC sessions, female representation as Party delegates had increased to 49 per cent (a 9 per cent increase from the previous report), while HODs and

---

<sup>21</sup> At COP26, 63 per cent of delegates were men and 74 per cent of HODs and DHODs were men. Report by the UNFCCC Secretariat on gender composition: [FCCC/CP/2022/3](https://www.unfccc.int/documents/1362622)

DHODs had increased 12 per cent to 39 per cent. In the most recent gender composition report, we note that the in-person Bonn meetings saw this backsliding slightly to 48 per cent.

- The virtual workshop series were helpful for facilitating knowledge sharing and capacity-building on good practice for developing gender-responsive climate policy, and provided key opportunities for the GAP to raise awareness and visibility of gender and climate change issues. The virtual format meant that activities could continue to implement the GAP despite the COVID-19 pandemic, but we also recognise the challenges faced by developing country delegates, including internet access and in particular timezone challenges for the Pacific.
- We also see opportunities for a gender responsive lens to be incorporated into work on developing approaches to just transition and maximising participation of indigenous communities and perspectives. We support further opportunities for collaboration between constituted bodies working on this, such as the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform<sup>22</sup> and the steps taken to organise the joint dialogue held on 9 November.
- The GAP could take further steps to support Parties in sharing knowledge and experience on gender-responsive implementation of the Paris Agreement, for example by incorporating gender-responsive policies to raise ambition of NDCs, formulate net-zero long term strategies, and adaptation planning.
- The GAP should give specific attention to the links between phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and gender responsive climate action. Elimination of fossil fuel subsidies would generate savings of at least USD 500 billion globally that could be invested in gender empowerment and clean energy, which would have positive impacts on the health of women and girls in all their diversity associated with cooking fuels.

#### Issues/background

1. The Paris Agreement decision (1.CP/21) calls for Parties to respect, promote and consider their obligations on gender equality and empowerment of women when taking action to address climate change. The decision also calls for capacity building and adaptation action to be gender responsive.
2. COP22 decided that the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) should be continued for a period of three years and that a review of the work programme should be conducted at COP25. COP23 adopted a Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2018-19 to support the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates in the UNFCCC process. The GAP was adopted at COP23 and seeks to advance women's full and equal participation in the UNFCCC and promote gender-responsiveness in the development and implementation of climate policy.
3. At COP25, Parties agreed to a 5-year LWPG and its GAP<sup>23</sup>. New Zealand contributed to the development and implementation of the GAP, and joined the initiative on Gender as part of the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit in 2019.

#### GAP

4. The GAP sets out, within five priority areas, the activities which will drive the achievement of its objectives<sup>24</sup>. Parties, the UNFCCC and relevant organizations are invited to undertake as

<sup>22</sup> The Dialogue on Gender, Innovation and Technology with the Facilitative Working Group of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (FWG LCIPP), the Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN) and the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) is one example of good collaboration between the GAP and other constituted bodies.

<sup>23</sup> Decision 3/CP.25: <https://unfccc.int/documents/210471>

<sup>24</sup> [The Gender Action Plan | UNFCCC](#)

appropriate activities under the GAP. New Zealand used the 2019 submission on the review of the GAP to show that the GAP is being effective, and provided suggestions on how it could be improved while not opening up further avenues for the duplication of similar efforts across other UN processes.

5. Ahead of SB56, New Zealand made a submission in May 2022 which provided updates on gender and climate-related projects under way in international development cooperation and more broadly across government, reiterate any previous suggestions that have not progressed, and support proposals made by likeminded Parties on future areas of work for the GAP.

6. An intermediate review of the GAP was initiated at SBI 56, but failed to reach a substantial conclusion. The negotiations saw developed-developing country lines being pushed on issues such as provision of finance and capacity building. Parties highlighted the progress being made on implementing the GAP and agreed to continue the review at COP27. There was debate about how the discussions so far would be captured, as two informal notes were prepared – one version from 11 June<sup>25</sup>, and the other from 13 June<sup>26</sup>. Parties could not agree on either informal note, so it was proposed that both versions would be referenced in the draft conclusion.

7. Key issues discussed under the review included whether new activities should be added, or whether the review should focus on activities that need to be implemented; further streamlining or removing agreed text, strengthening agreed language and addition of new language. As mentioned, financial and technical support to developing countries for capacity-building and supporting the implementation of the GAP came up in the course of discussions.

8. New Zealand would like the GAP to maintain clear priority areas and activities that remain within its mandate. A more focused GAP will make it simpler for Parties and stakeholders to implement as well as monitor progress. We have defensive interests in avoiding mandate creep on this issue, creating new finance obligations, as well as minimising blanket prescription on Parties that does not allow for a range of different contexts and circumstances.

9. The GAP should continue to draw stronger connections with Paris Agreement implementation, deliver for all women and girls in countries most vulnerable to climate change (especially the Pacific) and indigenous communities, and use the GAP as an avenue within the UNFCCC to advocate for the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies. We also suggest a continued focus on gender balance and leadership within the UNFCCC to ensure women are part of decision-making as well as information sharing between experts and Parties on best practice to achieve gender responsive climate policy.

10. Following a series of virtual and in-person workshops hosted from 2020-2021 on the role of the National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points (NGCCFP), there is more clarity on what the role and work might encompass, without assigning prescriptive resource-intensive tasks. New Zealand is still considering its position on whether to appoint a NGCCFP and the value it may add for our own policy settings. We have heard from Pacific Island country delegates of the importance of this role (none have appointed NGCCFP yet except PNG) and many of our colleagues have NGCCFP (including Australia, Canada, US, Japan and UK).

*New Zealand's work on gender and climate change*

11. Gender parity is a traditional hallmark of New Zealand's UNFCCC delegations. At COP26, women made up 50 per cent of NZ's delegation – officials and non-officials (compared to the average 37 per cent in COP23 delegations), including the Alternate Head of Delegation and National Focal Point. The high level of representation of women on New Zealand's negotiating team illustrates structural gender equality. Under New Zealand's International Human Rights

---

<sup>25</sup> <https://unfccc.int/documents/510626>

<sup>26</sup> <https://unfccc.int/documents/510624>



Action Plan (IHRAP), we have committed to taking a leadership role in and prioritising gender equality and women's empowerment globally.

12. New Zealand currently has gender relevant work programmes in a wide range of work related to climate change policy across central government, including:

- Strengthening gender-responsive policy making across government through the Ministry for Women's gender analysis tool ("[Bringing Gender In](#)"), which is applicable to all government policies, including climate-related policies. This tool aims to apply a gender lens to the whole policy-making process. Collecting more robust gender-disaggregated data by refining national guidelines that provide for non-binary and gender fluid people.
- Te Mahere Whai Mahi Wāhine: The [Women's Employment Action Plan \(Plan\)](#). The Plan outlines actions to help women fulfil their potential, improve women and their whānau's resilience to future social and economic shocks, including COVID-19, and prepare women for the changing nature of work which is affected by climate change and other global challenges. The Plan includes addressing the needs of all women and girls, including wāhine Māori, Pacific women, young and older women, disabled women, women who are former refugees and recent migrants, rural women, and LGBTQIA+.
- Partnering with Government agencies, indigenous and social partners and local communities to ensure gendered-related employment barriers are addressed within Aotearoa New Zealand's just transition towards a more productive, sustainable, and inclusive economy and society.
- Implementation of initiatives funded by Budget 2022 that address gendered related issues that are exacerbated by climate change such as gender-based violence and improving women's health outcomes. Strengthening consideration of policy initiatives and programmes on rural and remote communities, including acknowledging disproportionate impacts felt by rural and remote women and girls.
- Considering how Pacific-led gender analysis can be more effectively incorporated in the design and delivery of New Zealand's climate-related support in the Pacific, in existing projects and specifically in Aotearoa New Zealand's increased climate finance commitment.<sup>27</sup>
- Development of specific gender-related climate change policy by the Ministry for Women. This is still in the early stages but aims to connect existing government initiatives that relate to gender and climate across Government, as well as encouraging gender-based analysis on climate change-related policies as outlined above.

*Climate Change Division and Development, People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ministry for Women  
October 2022*

---

<sup>27</sup> One example of Pacific-led gender and climate activity is the Gov4Res activity, where Mainstreaming Climate Change in Governance Activity supported the Solomon Islands Ministry of Women head office and provincial officers to work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock extension officers to ensure that the differing needs of women, youth and the elderly are central to the design and implementation of model farms.

## Agenda item 22: Action for Climate Empowerment

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Position New Zealand as a constructive participant in the Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE).

### Key Messages

- New Zealand welcomes continued conversations around public awareness, public participation, and public access to information on climate change.

### *On the duration of the ACE work-programme*

- In order for the Glasgow Work Programme (GWP) to continue to achieve positive change, it should be focused on a streamlined set of clear priority areas over a four-year timeframe. This would allow a more strategic and consistent approach to achieving the systemic changes required. Activities should be specific, time-bound, with identified actors so they can be more easily understood, implemented and progress monitored.

### Background

1. The ACE is anchored in Article 6 of the UNFCCC. Its implementation is seen as pivotal for everyone to understand and participate in solving complex climate change challenges – through education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation. Recognising this, ACE encompasses not just Art 6 of the UNFCCC, but also Art 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol and Art 12 of the Paris Agreement. ACE is further reflected in other international frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Action Programme for Education for Sustainable Development, among others.

2. The 7<sup>th</sup> Dialogue on ACE took place in June 2019, during SBI 50. It focused on the final review of the Doha work programme and ways of enhancing the implementation of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international and regional cooperation so as to also enhance actions under Article 12 of the Paris Agreement. The 8<sup>th</sup> Dialogue took place virtually in 2020 and was organised through four regional dialogues and two global events<sup>28</sup>.

3. At COP 26, Parties adopted the Glasgow work programme (Decisions 18/CP.26<sup>29</sup> and 22/CMA.3<sup>30</sup>) and requested SBI56 to develop an action plan focusing on immediate action through short-term, clear and time-bound activities, guided by the priority areas set out in the work programme. The SBI initiated this at SBI56 and agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI57. The SBI may recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP27/CMA4.

4. COP26 also requested the SBI hold an annual in-session Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) dialogue at its first regular session of each year with the participation of Parties, representatives of relevant constituted bodies, and relevant experts, practitioners and stakeholders that focuses on the progress of implementation of the Glasgow work programme and on its four priority areas: policy coherence; coordinated action; tools and support; and

---

<sup>28</sup> [8th Dialogue on Action for Climate Empowerment | UNFCCC](#)

<sup>29</sup> <https://unfccc.int/documents/460955>

<sup>30</sup> <https://unfccc.int/documents/460952>

monitoring, evaluation and reporting. This first in-session Dialogue<sup>31</sup> focused on the engagement of children and youth in implementation of these priority areas.

5. In addition, at SB56 a technical workshop for Parties<sup>32</sup> was convened. The focus is on how the priority areas of the Glasgow work programme can guide the implementation of the six ACE elements, through a short-term action plan guiding organisation of the annual in-session Dialogue. Parties agreed to open this workshop to participation from observers as well. We supported this call.

6. The first ACE dialogue under the Glasgow Work Programme took place on 7 June<sup>33</sup>. In addition, several days of technical workshops took place from 8-9 June.<sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

7. In the negotiations, Parties did not manage to come to an agreement on all of the activities for inclusion in the short-term action plan for ACE. While there was some agreement that it would be 4 years, with the 5<sup>th</sup> year reserved for a review, and be structured similarly to the Gender Action Plan, there was a divergence on some of the activities.

8. <sup>s6(a)</sup> had made a proposal that the action plan be focused around the ACE dialogues, and instead of being thematic, each dialogue was to be centred around one of the four priority areas. Disagreements arose when discussing what each activity would entail. Issues such as the proposal to have a youth ACE focal point, requirements for Parties to report on how ACE has been implemented at the national level, and financing of ACE were key sticking points. Financing of ACE was also one of the areas in which civil society activists were significantly engaged. The discussions were captured in an informal note, for further deliberation at COP27.

#### *New Zealand and participation of non-state actors*

9. New Zealand is championing the participation of non-state actors across our climate change policy. At the UN Secretary General's Climate Action Summit in 2019 we signed the Kwon Gesh Pledge to include public voices in climate action.

10. The "Zero Carbon" amendment to the Climate Change Response Act 2002 was passed in 2019 with cross party support. The Bill was devised by Generation Zero, a group of young university students. Generation Zero essentially developed the legislation, employing the capability of its youth membership, all of whom are volunteers. Young lawyers, policy analysts, communications specialists, and campaigners all came together to launch a huge campaign – making climate change an election issue in 2017. The Bill was picked up by the Green Party, who negotiated to make it government policy.

11. Cross party support for the bill was in part due to public pressure. The bill received a record number of public submissions with more than 15,000 New Zealanders having their say. Public meetings were held in 17 different town centres and more than 14,000 written submissions were received. The School Strikes 4 Climate campaign has captured the New Zealand public. The biggest march in September 2019 had 170,000 participants (3.5 per cent of New Zealand's population), the highest level of participation per capita globally.

12. As we do each year, we will have a small contingency of non-officials for COP27. They represented a broad range of interests from indigenous rights to business. This demonstrates New Zealand government recognition that a just transition to a low emissions future requires

<sup>31</sup> [In-session Action for Climate Empowerment Dialogue | UNFCCC](#)

<sup>32</sup> [Technical Workshop for Parties on how priority areas of the Glasgow Work Programme can guide implementation of the six elements of Action for Climate Empowerment | UNFCCC](#)

<sup>33</sup> Recording of session here: [UNFCCC \(azureedge.net\)](#)

input from many. In the past, we have also included youth on our delegation to COP24 and COP25, but agreed with Minister for Climate Change that we wouldn't this year. In our stakeholder briefing, we received criticism on the lack of youth representation on the delegation. We assessed that their interest in holding governments to account are better served by obtaining accreditation through other means. We will review this process in early 2023.

*Climate change in New Zealand school curriculum*

13. Domestically, New Zealand has introduced climate change into the school curriculum. Every school has access to materials about climate change, written by scientists and science agencies. It explains the role science plays in understanding climate change, aids understanding of both the response to it and its impacts – globally, nationally and locally – and explores opportunities to contribute to reducing and adapting to its impact on everyday life. It includes tools for students to plan their own activism, and to process their feelings of “eco anxiety” over the crisis. New Zealand’s emissions reduction plan goes further and introduces changes to the early childhood and school curriculum that embed well-being into climate change learning, as well as local and regional stories and actions.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 23: Administrative, financial and institutional matters**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 18.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**SBSTA 57**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 3: Report of the Adaptation Committee**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 11.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**Agenda item 4: Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 14.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 5: Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 6: Matters relating to the Santiago network under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 16.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 7: Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform

---

### Objectives/New Zealand's position

- Continue to support the work of the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) in operationalising the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP).
- Play an active and constructive role in the FWG of the LCIPP as the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) representative.
- Share New Zealand's experiences of how Māori have shaped domestic environmental and climate policy, particularly in relation to the development of the emissions reduction plan and national adaptation plan.
- Encourage the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities in the LCIPP, regardless of their countries' position on participation these groups in domestic policy-making.

### Key messages

- New Zealand congratulates the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) on the adoption of its 2022-2024 work plan at COP26. We look forward to continuing progress made under the first work plan and building on the previous activities, and seeking new opportunities to advance the functions of the LCIPP.
- New Zealand was pleased to be nominated as the Party representative for the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) on the FWG. This is a role that we do not take lightly, and will focus our efforts on playing an active and constructive role in the FWG.
- It will be important to turn attention to activities that raise awareness of the Platform's effective work and purpose and mainstream this through the UNFCCC system by collaborating with other UNFCCC bodies and work programmes.
- We are pleased to see the increasing attention to indigenous knowledge in mitigation and adaptation action in constituted bodies, and encourage greater coherence between the work of the LCIPP and other constituted bodies.
- We welcome the steps the LCIPP has taken to implement the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan and to empower and strengthen voices of indigenous women in climate action, including by hosting the first ever Joint Dialogue between the LCIPP and the GAP at COP27. We see opportunities for greater incorporation of gender perspectives into the work of the LCIPP as we implement the second three-year workplan.
- We should be mindful of placing our efforts and resources efficiently to enable the Platform to have the maximum impact. For example, the web portal should be used to make the work of the Platform accessible, not to capture and disseminate traditional and local knowledge systems [if raised: we view proposals as such being challenging under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples].
- We acknowledge that user-uploaded content and translation is important to disseminate the Platform's work and findings. A good solution is to upload official UNFCCC documents related

to the LCIPP on the website which are already translated into the six UN languages, and other content can be considered on an ad hoc basis if translation is requested.

- The Glasgow Climate Pact emphasises the important role of indigenous peoples' and local communities' culture and knowledge in effective action on climate change and urges Parties to actively involve indigenous peoples and local communities in designing and implementing climate action.
- Climate change poses a significant risk for Māori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand. The New Zealand government strongly encourages the involvement of Māori in the climate response. Practical examples of how Māori have shaped environmental and climate policy domestically include the Zero Carbon Act, the development of our emissions reduction plan released in May and our recently released (August 2022) national adaptation plan.
- A key outcome from the ERP and NAP is to establish a platform for Māori climate action. The platform will be a space to build relationships and capacity on both sides of the Crown–Māori relationship, to provide more equal partnership and improve knowledge and data to help Māori plan for transitional and climate change impacts.
- As in the past, we will have iwi Māori representation accompany us on the official New Zealand delegation to COP27. We are pleased to support them to share New Zealand's experiences and work with other indigenous peoples groups to strengthen indigenous perspectives in the UNFCCC process and in domestic climate action.

## Background

1. The Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) was established pursuant to paragraph 135 of Decision 1/CP.21. It aims to facilitate local communities and indigenous peoples to exchange, with Parties, experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner.
2. The LCIPP Facilitative Working Group (FWG) is a constituted body that was established at COP24 in Katowice, December 2018 after difficult political negotiations, largely based around language on rights of indigenous peoples cutting across countries' national sovereignty.
3. The FWG was established with the objective of further operationalising the LCIPP and facilitating the implementation of its three functions related to knowledge, capacity for engagement, and climate change policies and actions. It will also collaborate with other bodies under and outside the Convention, as appropriate, to enhance the coherence of the actions of the Platform under the Convention. The UNFCCC secretariat supports and facilitates the work of the body.
4. The FWG is comprised of 14 representatives, half of which are representatives of Parties, and half of which are representatives from indigenous peoples' organisations. The addition of three representatives of local communities and three additional Party representatives were considered at COP26 as part of a broader review mandated by para 27 2/CP.24<sup>34</sup>.
5. New Zealand had previously attended the FWG meetings as an "observer" and provided input through the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) representative. At COP26 New Zealand successfully nominated Tiana Carter for the role of WEOG representative. Her term began at FWG7 in May 2022 and will end in May 2025.

---

<sup>34</sup> COP24 report (FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1):  
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf>

6. In regards to the addition of three members to the FWG representing local communities, <sup>s6(a)</sup> was that although generally supportive of the idea of local community representation on the FWG, self-mobilisation and self-identification of these communities had not been fully realised. UNFCCC processes had yet to be satisfied for local communities to warrant classification as an informal constituency. A related issue was how “balance” might be achieved between IPs, LCs and Parties if 3 additional Party representatives are appointed as per the requirement that there be an even number of Parties to indigenous and local community representatives.

7. <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

We heard an update from a LC representative who advised that they are currently going through the process of becoming accredited, but there may be a long time yet before they become a UNFCCC-recognised constituency. FWG will continue to welcome and invite the participation of LC in its work. This is a live issue, but will not require a decision until 2024.

8. At FWG1, a two-year work plan for 2020-2021 was proposed and welcomed at SBSTA 51. The work plan contained 30 activities, which decision 2/CP.24 requested that the FWG report on its outcomes and present a draft three-year work plan. The FWG5 report<sup>35</sup> and 2022-2024 work plan was welcomed and adopted in decision 16/CP.26<sup>36</sup>.

9. At the virtual FWG5 in June 2021, we supported the streamlining of activities under the work plan. The new 2022-2024 work plan contains 9 activities, which build on previous activities under the first work plan. We would like to see resources focused on delivering tangible events and activities under the new work plan.

10. The FWG7 took place at SB56 in Bonn. The focus of the meeting was mainly procedural (appointment of co-chairs and vice co-chairs, co-leads for 2022-2024 workplan activities) and on getting the new members up to speed on the work of the FWG. Tiana Carter was appointed as vice co-chair.

11. FWG7 heard presentations from a number of speakers, and some key topics discussed included: the increasing recognition of indigenous knowledge and local knowledge systems in IPCC reports and convergence with science; increased engagement of indigenous peoples through structural change to UNFCCC constituted bodies’ processes and other UN-systems; and the need for coherence with other constituted bodies under the UNFCCC.

12. At COP24, Mike Smith and Hinekaa Mako, Iwi Chairs Forum representatives on the New Zealand Delegation and Te Ara Whatu, Māori youth representatives (at the COP independently) were active in the negotiations, and the indigenous peoples caucus on this issue. At COP25, Mike Smith, Hinekaa Mako and Te Huia Taylor (Ngāti Te Ata) were non-officials on the delegation representing Māori and contributing Māori perspectives.

13. Alison Cole and Kera Sherwood-O’Regan attended COP26 as iwi Māori representatives. They were nominated by the Iwi Chairs Forum. For COP27, Mike and Hinekaa will rejoin the delegation. Lisa Tumahai (co-chair of the Iwi Chairs Forums’ Climate Change Pou and chairperson of Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu) will join the delegation in her capacity as co-chair of the Climate Change Commission.

14. The functions of the Platform provide opportunities to highlight to others globally indigenous peoples’ engagement in domestic mitigation and adaptation. For example, during

<sup>35</sup> Report of the FWG of the LCIPP (FCCC/SBSTA/2021/1):

[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2021\\_01E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2021_01E.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> COP26 Report (FCCC/CP/2021/12/Add.2):

[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2021\\_12\\_add2\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2021_12_add2_adv.pdf)

consultation on the Zero Carbon Bill Discussion Document in 2018, specific hui were held with the Federation of Māori Authorities (FOMA) and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. The Te Arawa Lakes Trust also coordinated a hui in Rotorua with members of Te Urunga o Kea (Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group). The Climate Change Commission, set up by the Zero Carbon Act, specifically considered Crown-Māori relations, iwi/Māori interests and impacts on Māori in undertaking its work and the Government's response under this framework.

15. A key outcome from the emissions reduction plan was the establishment of the Māori Climate Action Platform. The platform will be a space to build relationships and capacity on both sides of the Crown-Māori relationship, to provide more equal partnership and improve knowledge and data to help Maori plan for transitional and climate change impacts.

16. The platform will build on the three focus areas of: partnership and representation, strategy and alignment, and community activation. It will support the expertise and leadership of Māori, empower Māori and elevate te ao Māori or the Māori worldview in the context of the transition. It will serve as one vehicle to support an equitable transition for Māori, led by Māori.

17. The Platform will be established in two phases. The first phase will be the establishment of an interim ministerial advisory committee. Currently, MfE is leading the process for establishing this committee and it will be launched before the end of the year. The second phase, the Māori Climate Action Platform, will be established by 2024.

18. In regards to adaptation, iwi and hapū were engaged in the development of the national adaptation plan, specifically on how the government can enable system-wide change to support locally-led adaptation action. The Ministry for the Environment partnered with Māori organisations to facilitate discussions and run thematic workshops and webinars to seek input from iwi and hapū on the draft NAP.

19. In working in partnership with Māori to develop and implement the NAP, the New Zealand Government acknowledged an indigenous worldview of climate change and the criticality of Mātauranga Māori (Māori traditional knowledge) at both the iwi and hapū level to inform local and central government adaptation responses. Taking a locally-led and intergenerational approach to adaptation will help ensure outcomes are effective and build resilience in the long-term.

20. MFAT is in early discussions Māori representatives to co-design a process that ensures Māori perspectives are represented in future climate change policy development and implementation across agencies. The next opportunity to conduct this will be the in-depth review of our mandate early next year.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 8: Koronivia joint work on agriculture**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 10.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**Agenda item 9: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3.**

---

See SB I57 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 10: Matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 11: Matters related to science and review**

---

- (a) Research and systematic observation;**
- (b) Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it**

See SBI 57 agenda item 9.

### **(a) Research and systematic observation**

#### Issues/background

1. During the second sessional period each year, the SBSTA focuses its consideration on systematic observation.
2. The SBSTA Chair has prepared a summary report on Earth Information Day 2021. As requested, the secretariat will organize Earth Information Day 2022 at SBSTA 57, under the guidance of the SBSTA Chair, on the basis of submissions received. The Earth Information Day provides a dialogue for exchanging information on the state of the global climate system and developments in systematic observation. Earth Information Day 2022 will consist of a dialogue session and poster session. A full programme and information note will be made available prior to the event but was not available at the time this brief was written.
3. SBSTA 52–55 welcomed the GCOS status report. As requested by the SBSTA, GCOS will submit the update to its implementation plan to the secretariat in 2022.
4. In addition, the SBSTA has invited, at sessions that consider systematic observation, GCOS, WMO, and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites and the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites to provide relevant updates.
5. The SBSTA will be invited to consider the information received and to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 27.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

**Agenda item 12: Development and transfer of technologies:  
joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee  
and the Climate Technology Centre and Network**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 17.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 13: Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 20.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 14: Methodological issues under the Convention**

### **(a) Training programme for review experts for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Training of review experts for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories is an ongoing need to meet current review requirements under the Convention as well contributing to future requirements for review experts under the Paris Agreement.
- New Zealand can support extending the implementation period of the current training programme to ensure that there are enough experts available to conduct the reviews of greenhouse gas inventories from Annex I Parties prior to the submission of greenhouse gas inventories and biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement.
- A time-bound extension would be acceptable, and if this is practical and agreed by all Parties, then the agenda item could be closed.
- We recognise that the secretariat needs to give high priority to designing and implementing the training programme for review experts for biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement: both are needed.

#### Issues/background

1. COP 20 requested the secretariat to implement the training programme for review experts for the technical review of GHG inventories of Annex I Parties. SBSTA 56 assessed the continued utility and implementation period of the training programme for review experts for the technical review of GHG inventories of Annex I Parties, taking into account paragraphs 42 and 44 of decision 1/CP.24, the number of reviews for which reviewers might be needed after 2024, and the outcome of the deliberations of Parties on the training programme for technical experts participating in the technical expert review of biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement.
2. The SBSTA will be invited to continue consideration of this matter with a view to concluding it at SBSTA 57 or determining any further action, as appropriate.

### **(b) Training programme for review experts for the technical review of biennial reports and national communications of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Training of review experts for the technical review of biennial reports and national communications is an ongoing need to meet current review requirements under the Convention as well contributing to future requirements for review experts under the Paris Agreement.
- New Zealand can support extending the implementation period of the current training programme, taking into account that the 5th and final biennial reports (BR5s) together with 8th national communications are due to be submitted in December 2022, and that the review of these reports will occur as in-country reviews (in line with current review guidelines) over the following year to eighteen months.
- There must be sufficient review experts available for these reviews to ensure a robust and balanced process given that a particular focus of the BR5 reviews will be on assessment of achievement of 2020 targets.

- If a satisfactory outcome can be agreed by all Parties that addresses current needs and any potential future needs relating to the review of national communications, then the agenda item could be closed.
- We recognise that the secretariat needs to give high priority to designing and implementing the training programme for review experts for biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement: both are needed.

#### Issues/background

3. COP 20 requested the secretariat to develop and implement the training programme for review experts for the technical review of biennial reports and national communications of Annex I Parties. COP 23 requested the secretariat to enhance the materials and user interface of the training courses and to implement them through to 2020.

4. SBSTA 56 assessed the continued utility and implementation period of the training programme for review experts for the technical review of biennial reports and national communications of Annex I Parties, taking into account paragraphs 42 and 44 of decision 1/CP.24 (on the transition from the MRV system under the Convention to the ETF under the Paris Agreement), the number of reviews for which reviewers might be needed after 2024 and the outcome of the deliberations of Parties on the training programme for technical experts participating in the technical expert review of biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement.

5. The SBSTA will be invited to continue consideration of this matter with a view to concluding it at SBSTA 57 or determining any further action, as appropriate.

#### **(c) Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

##### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Given that Parties will be using the Article 13 MPGs (annexed to decision 18/CMA.1) for inventory reporting under the Paris Agreement, there seems little practical sense in revising the greenhouse gas inventory reporting guidelines.
- Any revision to the Annex I greenhouse gas inventory reporting guidelines at this late stage only serves to perpetuate the current bifurcated MRV system.
- Through the Article 13 MPGs each Party is encouraged to use the 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands, and reporting on harvested wood products is also provided for in the MPGs.
- Given that time has run out for any revision to the current inventory reporting guidelines, and that the Article 13 MPGs are not going to become any more detailed before their scheduled review in 2028 (if then), this agenda item under the Convention could be closed.
- New Zealand should continue to advocate for a conclusion from the SBSTA (or a COP decision) that requests the secretariat to make available, prior to the 2023 greenhouse gas inventory submissions, a version of the CRF Reporter that applies the IPCC AR5 GWPs (it is currently set up with AR4 GWPs). This would mean that the first annual inventory report for the period covered by NDC1 would be in line with the GWPs that are required to be used for inventory reporting under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

## Issues/background

1. SBSTA 56 continued the discussion on the use of the 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands for GHG inventory reporting. It also continued the discussion on the reporting of carbon dioxide emissions and removals relating to harvested wood products. The SBSTA also discussed matters related to CRF Reporter and the due date in 2024 for submission of the annual GHG inventories of Annex I Parties.
2. SBSTA 56 agreed that consideration of the matter would continue at SBSTA 57 on the basis of the informal note prepared by the co-facilitators for this agenda sub-item.<sup>37</sup>
3. The SBSTA will be invited to continue its consideration of this matter with a view to making recommendations to the COP on the further development of the "Guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual greenhouse gas inventories".

### **(d) Common metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of greenhouse gases**

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- To conclude this agenda item under the Convention.
- Given that the CMA has already requested SBSTA to review the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) for the transparency framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement no later than 2028 (see decision 18/CMA.1) it is appropriate for metrics to be included in that review as the use of metrics is included in the MPGs (paragraph 37 refers). No further action is required by SBSTA to make that happen.
- After completion of the IPCC Sixth Assessment cycle an appropriate forum for discussion of the science of greenhouse gas metrics could be the SBSTA Research Dialogue, or a SBSTA special event on the findings on common metrics contained in the IPCC 6th Assessment Report, similar to that presented at SBSTA 40.

#### Key messages

- The Working Group I component of the IPCC 6th Assessment Report contains an up to-date scientific assessment of greenhouse gas metrics, including on 100 year time-horizon global warming potentials (GWPs). IPCC Working Group III also includes a discussion of the application of different metrics, and the Synthesis Report (the final part of the 6th Assessment Report) may also traverse the issue. The Synthesis report is scheduled to be completed in October 2022.
- For reporting aggregate emissions and removals of GHGs expressed in carbon dioxide equivalent, Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed in decision 18/CMA.1 to use the 100-year time-horizon GWPs from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, or the 100-year time-horizon GWPs from a subsequent IPCC assessment report as agreed upon by the CMA.
- We note that each Party may in addition also use other metrics assessed by the IPCC to report supplemental information on aggregate emissions and removals of greenhouse gases, expressed in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent.

---

<sup>37</sup> Available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/510637>



- These decisions balance the need to have a common metric for reporting emissions which is widely understood and comparable with other countries, with some countries' desire to highlight unique aspects of their emissions profile.
- It is important to have scientific and technical discussion of greenhouse gas metrics.
- This could be done by SBSTA recommending that an item be placed on the CMA agenda for 2023 to initiate a discussion on the latest scientific findings, or by building this discussion into the Research Dialogue under SBSTA at an appropriate future session.
- We note that given the CMA has already requested SBSTA to review MPGs no later than 2028 (see decision 18/CMA.1) it is appropriate for metrics to be included in that review as the use of metrics is included in the MPGs (paragraph 37 refers). No further action is required by SBSTA to make that happen.

## Issues/background

1. SBSTA 34 agreed that the consideration of common metrics under the methodological issues under the Convention would continue at SBSTA 36, taking into account the report on the workshop on common metrics held on 3 and 4 April 2012. Consideration of common metrics continued at SBSTA 40, 41, 42 and 44, including consideration of the findings on common metrics contained in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report presented at a special event at SBSTA 40.
2. SBSTA 47 resumed consideration of this matter, recognized that further consideration of common metrics by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement was necessary and agreed that consideration of common metrics would continue at SBSTA 50 to be able to take into account deliberations under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement on this matter. SBSTA 56 noted the relevance of common metrics to climate change policy and agreed to continue its consideration of this matter at SBSTA 57.
3. The SBSTA will be invited to continue its consideration of this matter with a view to determining any further action.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

### **(e) Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport.**

#### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Keep the pressure on:
  - the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) to effectively address international aviation emissions, including outlining measures to achieve the recently agreed Long-Term Aspirational Goal (LTAG), in line with an equitable transition.
  - the IMO (International Maritime Organization) to effectively address international maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and to adopt a revised IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships in line with efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, and in line with an equitable transition.

## Key messages

### ICAO

- The adoption of the resolution for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) at the 39th ICAO Assembly is an important step towards addressing emissions from international aviation. ICAO recently conducted the CORSIA periodic review at the 41<sup>st</sup> General Assembly in September 2022, which maintained the environmental ambition of CORSIA by altering the baseline emissions to be comprised of the average of 2019 and an 85 percent of 2019 emissions.
- ICAO also agreed LTAG with a goal of net zero aviation emissions by 2050. ICAO will now need to seek to progress the measures to reach this goal, while supporting States with less capability and ensuring an equitable transition.

### IMO

- A revised IMO Strategy on the Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships Strategy is to be adopted by the IMO in 2023. We expect discussion on this at the upcoming IMO negotiations in December 2022<sup>38</sup>, which the New Zealand delegation will attend. It is essential to push for greater ambition in the revision of the Strategy in line with efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, and to ensure an equitable transition is imbedded in the strategy.
- Discussions on mid- and long-term measures are ongoing and the IMO negotiations in December will discuss these. New Zealand is supportive of a “basket” of mid-term measures, which could include:
  - a price signal in the form of a market-based measure, such as a carbon levy or emissions trading scheme; and
  - a command-and-control regulation such as a fuel standard.

## Issues/background

4. Historically, UNFCCC Parties have expressed concern about the slow progress made by ICAO and IMO in addressing GHG emissions. The progress made to date will need to be sustained to hold off pressure for the UNFCCC to seek to regulate international aviation and maritime emissions.

### ICAO

5. ICAO has adopted a medium-term global aspirational goal to achieve carbon neutral growth in the international aviation sector from 2020. CORSIA, a global market-based measure to reduce and offset carbon emissions from international aviation, is the first key measure to help achieve this goal. New Zealand is voluntarily participating in CORSIA, which commenced on 1 January 2021.

6. The CORSIA emissions baseline required emissions in excess of the average of 2019 and 2020 levels to be offset by the purchase of emissions units that represent emissions reductions outside the aviation sector. Given the disruption Covid-19 caused to the aviation sector in 2020, ICAO agreed the baseline year would be based only on 2019 data until the first review. ICAO's first periodic review of the CORSIA was completed at the recent 41<sup>st</sup> Assembly. It resulted in support by most States to adjust the baseline, to be the average of 2019 and 85 percent of 2019

---

<sup>38</sup> The IMO's 13<sup>th</sup> Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG) Meeting will run from 5 December 2022 – 9 December 2022 and the IMO's 79<sup>th</sup> Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) Meeting will run from 12 December 2022 – 16 December 2022.

emissions. This decision retains the ambition of the CORSIA, ensuring offsetting will be required in the coming years as the aviation sector continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.

7. CORSIA is one of four measures the international aviation sector is using to reduce its carbon emissions. Sustainable alternative fuels, technology advancement and operational improvements will also contribute to the goal to achieve carbon neutral growth from 2020. Of the other measures, sustainable alternative fuels are seen as the best opportunity to accelerate the transition to a low carbon aviation sector.

8. At the 41st Assembly, States also overwhelmingly agreed to an LTAG of net zero international aviation emissions by 2050. The LTAG resolution provides for States to decide how they will contribute to this goal and considers the need to support some to transition with assistance, capacity building and training.<sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

Subsequent investment in sustainable aviation fuels will be important for achieving LTAG.

9. Pacific Island States, Fiji, Samoa, and Papua New Guinea, with support from New Zealand, voiced their concerns at ICAO on climate change and need for urgent action. Tuvalu also made a country statement on the same theme. The Pacific Regional Aviation Strategy was also launched at ICAO.<sup>s6(a)</sup>

10. New Zealand continues its outreach with<sup>s6(a)</sup> Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa and the Solomon Islands on CORSIA. Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have volunteered to participate in the CORSIA pilot phase from 2022.

11. China, the Russian Federation, Venezuela, Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of Korea expressed their intent to lodge a reservation on both the LTAG and CORSIA resolutions.<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(j)</sup>

#### *International Aviation Climate Ambition Coalition*

12. New Zealand joined the International Aviation Climate Ambition Coalition, as headed by the United Kingdom during COP26 in 2021. This involved signing the Aviation Net Zero Declaration, which supports the goal of net zero international aviation emissions by 2050, implementing CORSIA, and investigating a sustainable biofuels mandate to support alternative fuels for aviation.

#### **IMO**

##### *Revision of the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships*

13. The Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships was adopted at MEPC 72 (April 2018). The levels of ambition agreed to in the Strategy are:

- a. to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per transport network, as an average across international shipping, by at least 40 percent by 2030, pursuing efforts towards 70 percent by 2050, compared to 2008;
- b. to peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and
- c. to reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50 percent by 2050 compared to 2008.

14. These provisions are not consistent with the commitment in the Paris Agreement for States to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C. However, a revised Strategy is to be adopted

by the IMO in 2023 and we expect discussion on this in upcoming IMO negotiations in December 2022.

15. New Zealand would like to see an ambitious revision to the Strategy in line with the 1.5°C Paris temperature goal. This will be achieved through setting a zero emissions target at a date determined by the latest climate science, and intermediate quantitative targets for 2030 and 2040.

16. It will be important for the sector to move quickly to revise the Strategy because the longer it is delayed in setting new targets the steeper the subsequent decarbonization trajectories will need to be.

17. New Zealand is a co-sponsor to the Republic of the Marshall Islands-led resolution (put forward to MEPC 79) to align the Strategy with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement temperature goal. The resolution notes the international shipping sector's transition to zero GHG emissions is essential to keeping the goal within reach. It calls on the IMO to ensure the sector decarbonises no later than 2050, with more than 80 percent reduction by 2040. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

18. At ISWG-GHG 12 the New Zealand delegation intervened to support the IMO committing to an equitable transition. Ours was the first intervention to offer an explanation of what the term meant and was resoundingly endorsed by Pacific delegations (as intended), a broad range of other states and environmental NGOs. A small number of larger developing countries responding negatively to our emphasis on focusing support on LDCs and SIDs and rejection of arbitrary bifurcated differentiation (special treatment for all developing countries).

19. New Zealand will continue to negotiate for an equitable transition to be imbedded in the Revised Strategy.

Mid- and long-term measures to reduce emissions from shipping

20. IMO negotiations in December 2022 will discuss mid-term measures again. New Zealand recognises that a "basket" of potential mid-term measures (including market-based measures) to reduce emissions from international shipping in line with the 1.5°C Paris temperature goal are being negotiated at the IMO.

21. To date member States and industry observers have proposed a variety of measures including a carbon levy; an emissions trading scheme (ETS); and a low carbon fuel standard. New Zealand is supportive of a "basket" of mid-term measures and that the "basket" needs to include a price signal in the form of a market-based measure (making zero carbon fuels price competitive with fossil fuels) and a fuel standard (measuring and reducing the GHG intensity of fuels).

22. At previous IMO negotiations, the New Zealand delegation supported the Republic of the Marshall Islands' proposal for a levy of \$100 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> to be considered as part of this basket of measures.

23. There is significant work ahead for the IMO to develop and adopt mid- and long-term measures (including market-based measures) and revise the Strategy within agreed timelines. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

*Environment, Emissions and Adaptation*  
*Ministry of Transport*  
*October 2022*

## **Agenda item 15: Matters relating to reporting and review under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: options for conducting reviews on a voluntary basis of the information reported pursuant to chapter IV of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, and respective training courses needed to facilitate these voluntary reviews**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand recognises that this is an important issue for a number of developing country Parties and Groups and supports finding a way to address the issue without relitigating the Article 13 modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) in decision 18/CMA.1, and the guidance for adaptation communications in decision 9/CMA.1.
- New Zealand supports exploring the options for review on a voluntary basis, noting that the process for administering the agreed mandatory elements of review under Article 13 already increases the burden on the secretariat without also incorporating review of elements on a voluntary basis.
- Any such "review on a voluntary basis" must be facilitative in nature.
- The review of the information that developed countries report on climate change impacts and adaptation in their national communications has a focus on completeness (adherence to reporting guidelines), transparency and improvement of reporting over time. A similar approach could be taken to the voluntary review of the information on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation provided in biennial transparency reports (BTRs), with a view to building capacity for improving reporting over time.
- During the June 2022 SBSTA session (SBSTA56) some developing countries were promoting the idea that the country under review would nominate which parts of the impacts/adaptation chapter of the BTR would be reviewed, whereas other countries suggested that all reported elements should be reviewed. New Zealand suggested that all reported elements should form part of the review, but the Party could nominate which reported elements could be of particular focus in the review.
- An issue that so far has not come up is what it might mean to review adaptation information when adaptation is a core part of a country's NDC. This is possibly a consideration for discussion prior to finalising any guidance on voluntary reviews.
- Development and administration of the training courses needed for the mandatory elements of review under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement need be take priority over the development of any training courses that might be needed to facilitate these voluntary reviews, noting that secretariat resources for this essential work are already stretched.
- In the absence of specific training courses to support voluntary review of information on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, members of technical expert review teams undertaking this review should be expected to have undertaken (and passed the

examination for) the general training course for BTR reviewers as well as having expertise in the fields of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation.

## Issues/background

1. The CMA noted that information pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1, annex, chapter IV, is not covered by the scope of the technical expert review pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1, annex, paragraph 150, and that voluntary review of such reported information is not prohibited under the same decision. It also noted that Parties have expressed interest in the possibility of requesting that the information be reviewed on a voluntary basis.
2. As requested by the CMA, SBSTA 56 considered options for conducting reviews on a voluntary basis of the information reported pursuant to decision 18/CMA.1, annex, chapter IV, and the respective training courses needed to facilitate these voluntary reviews, including the associated budgetary considerations. Discussion at SBSTA 56 resulted in a draft text which is available on the UNFCCC website<sup>39</sup>.
3. In the current MRV system under the Convention, the information that developed countries report on climate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation in their national communications is reviewed as part of the national communication review. The information that developing countries provide in their national communications (including on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation) is not subject to any form of review. Biennial update reports (BURs) from developing countries do undergo a form of "review" (technical analysis) by a team of technical experts, but provision of information on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation is not included in the reporting guidelines for BURs. Even though information in national communications on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation is part of the national communication review, there are no specific training courses to support the expert review of this information.
4. The review of the information that developed countries report on climate change impacts and adaptation in their national communications has a focus on completeness (adherence to reporting guidelines), transparency and improvement of reporting over time. A similar approach could be taken to the voluntary review of the information on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation provided in biennial transparency reports (BTRs).

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

---

<sup>39</sup> <https://unfccc.int/documents/510572>.

## **Agenda item 16: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement and in decision 2/CMA.3**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand seeks to advance the implementation of Article 6.2 guidance to operationalize cooperative approaches allowing Parties to undertake cooperation in international carbon markets as soon as possible.
- Implementation of the Article 6.2 guidance must ensure the delivery of internationally traded mitigation outcomes (ITMOS) with high environmental integrity, verified through the process of robust accounting, reporting, tracking, and review.

### Key messages

- New Zealand supports the effective implementation of Article 6.2 which provides the guidance to allow Parties to begin cooperation in international carbon markets as soon as possible. After six years of negotiations, it is time to move towards implementation, and we must now finalize the guidance to make it fit for purpose.
- We emphasize that the purpose of operationalising robust tracking and reporting tools is to deliver mutual trust in the emissions reductions achieved through Article 6 cooperative approaches. To achieve this effectively means that neither reporting nor infrastructure implementation can be developed in isolation of each other. Similarly, the ability to review and have this be substantive, is critical.
- Our remaining technical decisions on reporting tables and outlines must facilitate how Parties provide and share information, and how the information is evaluated through the review process. These decisions are key contributors to the transparency of the Paris Agreement.
- New Zealand further supports the development of infrastructure for Article 6 that reflects the reporting needs. To enable this means information needs to be traced back from NDC accounting to the mitigation activities that delivered the reductions.
- The infrastructure must also be accessible, enabling Parties to participate effectively to track and report their cooperation activities in line with the requirements set out in the decision text.
- To this end, New Zealand also supports robust capacity building efforts to assist developing countries develop and implement the institutional processes and frameworks required for participation in cooperative approaches.

### Issues/background

1. At COP26 Parties agreed to guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement. Article 6.2 must now move into the implementation phase, supporting Parties to cooperate in international carbon markets. Until the Article 6.4

central mechanism is set up and operational (See brief for Article 6.4), bilateral cooperative approaches are the only available approach for market cooperation under Article 6.

2. The work programme for Article 6.2 focuses on implementation including agreement on technical elements of reporting, review, and infrastructure for tracking.

#### *Reporting*

3. Article 6.2 guidance includes three mandated reports: 1) Initial Report 2) Annual Information 3) Regular Information. All three contribute to the transparency of Article 6 cooperative approaches and enable Parties to share the qualitative (outlines) and quantitative (tables) information of their cooperation.

4. Regardless of the final agreed format, reporting tables and outlines should: simplify information flow, ease reporting burdens, and facilitate consistency checks in the review process. New Zealand will need to ensure that the reporting outlines and tables capture all reporting requirements, and do not include elements outside the scope of the decision text (i.e., avoidance).

5. <sup>s9(2)(j)</sup>

6. Review processes, including in relation to the Article 6 technical expert review team, should also be delivered in a manner that minimizes the burden on Parties and the Secretariat.

#### *Infrastructure*

7. New Zealand contends that the guidance already provides for the infrastructure we need to track and report on Article 6 cooperative approaches. What is needed is a shared understanding of the role of these different elements and a holistic view of how they work together. A more detailed look into the internal functions of each of these infrastructure elements would facilitate understanding and ensure Parties deliver on the TACCC principles (transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, consistency).

8. There is a lack of shared understanding around the role of registries (national, international and programme level) as well as the Article 6 Database. Some Parties still advocate for the need of a highly centralized registry system, believing that registries are where reconciliation of ITMO tracking, and therefore accounting, takes place. New Zealand supports the provisions in the guidance for using the Article 6 Database, and annual reporting through the agreed electronic format (AEF), to deliver on reconciliation and facilitate consistency checks between Parties, rather than developing highly centralized registry systems.

#### *Review*

9. New Zealand also supports the development of tracking and reporting tools that support the review process. This means ensuring the Article 6 expert review team can undertake consistency checks within and across Parties participating in the same cooperative approach.



10. We further advocate for ensuring the Article 6 review process is aligned with Article 13 and the Enhanced Transparency Framework. To this end, New Zealand would see the review of Article 6 completed before the review of the Biennial Transparency Report.

11. New Zealand has put forward a proposal to define 'consistency' in the review that encompasses:

- a. Ensuring the information reported is complete and fully consistent with the guidance.
- b. Ensuring consistency with the TACCC principles, demonstrating traceability of the reported information
- c. Ensuring consistency across the different reporting requirements (Initial report, Annual Information, Regular Information, and the Biennial Transparency Report)
- d. Ensuring consistency of reporting across Parties engaging in the same cooperative approaches

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 17: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- New Zealand seeks the effective implementation and function of the Article 6.4 central mechanism ensuring the high environmental integrity of projects approved, and A6.4ERs issued by the mechanism.

### Key messages

- In setting up an effective central mechanism, we seek to empower the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body with the responsibilities to implement the rules, modalities, and procedures agreed in Glasgow. This means ensuring high environmental integrity through conservative baselines and robust additionality provisions.
- Robust accounting, reporting, and review is the means through which we will have transparency and mutual trust and confidence in actions under Article 6. To deliver this, it is important that the reporting and review requirements of the 6.2 guidance are effectively triggered and applied by Parties using the central mechanism, where A6.4ERs are authorised resulting in ITMOs.
- New Zealand understands the importance of delivering overall mitigation in global emissions as a means of going beyond off-setting within NDCs to help close the ambition gap. In line with the guidance agreed in Glasgow, we support the development of a process to deliver a mandatory 2 per cent OMGE through the cancellation of A6.4ERs, where these are correspondingly adjusted for the full amount of units issued into the mechanism registry.
- Likewise, New Zealand supports the development of a process to deliver a share of proceeds (SOP) of 5 per cent of A6.4ERs, where these are correspondingly adjusted for the full amount of units issued into the mechanism registry.
- In line with a view to deliver high integrity projects, New Zealand does not support the inclusion of avoidance activities. Avoidance activities do not, and cannot, meet the additionality provisions required as part of the rules, modalities, and procedures of the central mechanism, and therefore do not have sufficient environmental integrity.

### Issues/background

#### *Supervisory Body*

1. The Supervisory Body must be empowered with the responsibilities to oversee the implementation of the mechanism in line with the rules, modalities, and procedures agreed at Glasgow.
2. With the limited time at COP27 to deliver on the mandate to set up the central mechanism, New Zealand advocates for the prioritisation of issues which are critical for its implementation and operationalisation. In New Zealand's view, this includes operation of the mechanism registry, delivery of SOP/OMGE, and Host Party Reporting.

3. These critical elements would be followed by other issues of the mandate such as the appropriate transition of CDM project activities and certified emissions reductions (CERs) in alignment with the Glasgow criteria.
  - a. New Zealand does not support the use of pre-2020 units towards NDCs. Our priority is to ensure these are clearly labelled in the mechanism registry to easily distinguish from A6.4ERs and enable Parties to purchase high integrity units.
  - b. Similarly, we would see the transition of any Clean Development Mechanism projects into the A6.4 central mechanism undergo the necessary scrutiny to ensure they meet the criteria to issue high-integrity units fit for the Paris-era.

#### *SOP and OMGE*

4. New Zealand has been a key supporter of developing country partners in their request for the delivery of share of proceeds (SOP) and overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE) through the A6.4 central mechanism.

5. AT COP26, New Zealand and AOSIS together drafted the final text that provided a mandatory 2 per cent cancellation for OMGE at issuance. Some Parties now advocate that these units are not correspondingly adjusted. New Zealand, along with AOSIS, interprets the Glasgow decision to provide for the corresponding adjustment of all units cancelled for OMGE, regardless of whether the remaining 98 per cent are authorised for international transfer.

6. The Article 6.4 mechanism must also provide a meaningful and predictable contribution to adaptation finance, which those in the Pacific must be able to easily access. New Zealand remains an ally to the Pacific, ensuring that Parties deliver on the Glasgow commitment to deliver a mandatory 5 per cent SOP, where the units are correspondingly adjusted regardless of whether the remaining 95 per cent are authorised for international transfer.

7. This means that a mandatory 7 per cent of A6.4ERs are correspondingly adjusted by host Parties when using the 6.4 central mechanism, regardless of whether any other A6.4ERs are authorised and internationally transferred after issuance.

8. s9(2)(j)

New

Zealand should continue to support small island developing country interests in this regard, as this is a priority issue for our neighbours in the Pacific.

#### *Reporting*

9. New Zealand emphasizes the importance of clarifying the reporting requirements of activities using the 6.4 central mechanism. To deliver on the transparency of Article 6, Parties must report their 6.4 activities where these involve the transfer and use of *authorized* units, as these result in ITMOs and are therefore subject to the reporting guidance of Article 6.2.

#### *Avoidance*

10. Avoidance remains a contentious political issue in the Article 6 room, with some Parties seeking to gain market access by selling units that stem from the absence of activities that emit GHGs. Avoidance does not pass the test of additionality required for a high integrity unit, and as

such these “activities” cannot deliver an ITMO. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

11. Avoidance should not be confused with conservation enhancement or reduction activities associated with forestry. New Zealand supports forestry activities, including REDD+, if these meet the activity criteria required by the central mechanism and the Supervisory Body.

12. New Zealand does not support the automatic approval of REDD+ activities in the central mechanism. REDD+ activities would need to meet all the requirements set by the Supervisory Body, just like any other existing methodology.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 18: Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement**

### Key messages

- New Zealand recognises non-market cooperation is an important element of increasing action and ambition, where linkages between mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development can be facilitated and strengthened.
- Cooperation is underway amongst many Parties in many different forms. The A6.8 Framework can improve the visibility of cooperation, draw out best practice and lessons learned, and inform and guide efforts to replicate arrangements for future and planned cooperation. This will help Parties to assess, choose, and effectively and efficiently implement non-market cooperation to increase action and ambition.
- The schedule for implementing the work programme activities should be efficient. While cooperation can and will continue independent of this work-stream, the sooner the A6.8 Framework is implemented, the sooner Parties can reap the facilitation, acceleration, and enhancement opportunities it offers.

### Issues/background

1. New Zealand encourages Parties to begin the implementation of the Article 6.8 work programme and avoid further delays. The work programme could include session planning, identifying what information is valuable, and facilitating this to be shared.
2. New Zealand recalls the short, inclusive list of focus areas for the work programme activities was intended to emphasise the wide array of potential cooperation and avoid prioritising any type of cooperation above others. This short list does not preclude the development of additional focus areas in future. New Zealand views it as a helpful starting point for the work programme, but not a barrier to interested Parties engaging in cooperation across a broad range of areas as soon as possible.
3. The work programme could be reviewed as Parties enhance their understanding of the opportunities of non-market cooperation in both their national circumstances, and the Paris Agreement goals.

#### *The web-based platform*

4. Remaining areas of discussion include primarily the functionality of the web-based platform. The web-based platform has potential to be a valuable tool in enhancing cooperation. It can bring together ideas for, and examples of, non-market approaches allowing Parties, stakeholders, and civil society to easily engage and share information.
5. New Zealand has several suggestions about this platform, also expressed in our submission to the UNFCCC. These include:
  - a. to avoid duplication and maximize reach, the web-based platform will need to link to other relevant websites and platforms. Many existing cooperation arrangements have websites, and it will be important to facilitate access to these to identify synergies and co-benefits;

- b. to support equitable access and dissemination, information should be easily searchable by any end user, and be easy to consume by a non-technical audience, including governments, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector;
- c. to maximise utility, the platform should include new, ongoing, and past cooperation, highlighting best practice and lessons learned;
- d. participants in non-market approaches to cooperation may wish to include open invitations to create, join, or contribute to such approaches;
- e. the web-based platform should be updated regularly as opportunities for cooperation are identified or newly developed. But we emphasize that cooperation need not wait for the completion of the web-based platform nor publication of information about approaches on it.

6. New Zealand seeks to ensure that negotiation of Article 6.8 does not delay the implementation of Articles 6.2 or 6.4 – while also ensuring that the Article 6.8 work-programme is effective, and non-duplicative, in promoting ambition enhancing cooperation.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 19: Annual reports on technical reviews**

---

### **(a) Technical review of information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications**

#### Issues/background

1. The secretariat prepares an annual report containing information on the composition of expert review teams, the conclusions of the latest meeting of lead reviewers of biennial reports and national communications, and the latest information on the technical review of information related to biennial reports and national communications reported under the Convention by Annex I Parties.

2. The SBSTA will be invited to take note of the information contained in the report referred to in the paragraph above. As with SBI agenda items 3 (a), (b) and (c), it is possible that SBSTA may defer consideration of this agenda item as it is also amongst a few agenda items affected by the territorial dispute between Russia and Ukraine.

### **(b) Technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention**

#### Issues/background

1. The secretariat prepares an annual report containing the latest information on the technical review of the GHG inventories submitted by Annex I Parties, including information on the composition of expert review teams and the selection of experts and lead reviewers for those teams, and suggestions on how to improve the quality, efficiency and consistency of the review. The 2020 and the 2021 review reports were available for consideration at SBSTA 52–55, where it was agreed to defer consideration of this matter to SBSTA 56, which, in turn, deferred consideration to SBSTA 57. An additional review report is being prepared for 2022.

2. The SBSTA will be invited to take note of the information contained in annual reports on the technical review. As with SBSTA item 19(a) above and SBI agenda items 3 (a), (b) and (c), it is possible that SBSTA will also defer its consideration of this agenda item.

### **(c) Technical review of greenhouse gas inventories and other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.**

#### Issues/background

3. The secretariat prepares an annual report containing the latest information on the technical review of GHG inventories and other information reported by Annex I Parties, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol. The report also includes information on the review of the reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount for the second commitment period pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, of the Kyoto Protocol.

4. The SBSTA will be invited to take note of the information contained in the annual report on the technical review. As with SBSTA items 19(a) and (b) above and SBI agenda items 3 (a), (b) and (c), it is possible that SBSTA will also defer its consideration of this agenda item.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**CMA 4**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 4: Matters relating to the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred to in paragraph 27 of decision 1/CMA.3.**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 5: Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement**

---

**(a) Provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-building**

See SBI 57 agenda item 4.

**(b) Options for conducting reviews on a voluntary basis of the information reported pursuant to chapter IV of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, and respective training courses needed to facilitate these voluntary reviews.**

See COP 27 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 6: Matters relating to adaptation**

---

**(a) Report of the Adaptation Committee;**

See SBI 57 agenda item 11.

**(b) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee;**

See COP 27 agenda item 6.

**(c) Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3**

See SBI 57 agenda item 14.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 7: Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts**

---

See COP 27 agenda item 7.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Agenda item 8: Matters relating to finance

---

- (a) Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance
- (b) Guidance to the Green Climate Fund
- (c) Guidance to the Global Environment Facility

See COP 27 agenda item 8.

- (d) Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund

See also SB I57 agenda item 18.

- (e) New collective quantified goal on climate finance

Objective/New Zealand's position

- 
- Encourage the development of a clear work programme for 2023 that continues to build and improve upon the Technical Expert Dialogues (TEDs) from 2022. We support broad participation in the TEDs and think more participation from private finance representatives would be valuable.
- Priorities for New Zealand at this early stage include:
  - Ensuring the NCQG supports implementation of Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, which is about ensuring all finance flows, public and private, are consistent with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development;
  - Ensuring climate finance provided is effective and delivers the intended impact for developing countries;
  - Expanding the donor base to ensure providing climate finance is a collective effort of all countries that are in a position to do so;
  - Prioritising the needs of LDCs and SIDS, including access to finance;
  - Increasing the share of adaptation finance to respond to the needs of LDCs and SIDS and achieve a balance with mitigation finance.
- To address these issues, we support a multidimensional NCQG with quantitative and qualitative components that are both dynamic and updatable in respond to changing needs and priorities.
- We do not oppose recognition of loss and damage finance in the NCQG.

### Key messages

- New Zealand remains committed to meeting its financial commitments under the Paris Agreement and setting ambitious new finance goals that reflect the uplift we must see to meet our shared mitigation and adaptation goals.

- New Zealand has shared its early thinking on the purpose and shape of the new goal with a submission to the UNFCCC in March 2022.<sup>40</sup>
- We support the work of the co-Chairs and are appreciative of the efforts made this year to organise the TEDs and adapt them in response to Parties' feedback, including through involving technical experts in more "deep dive" sessions.
- It is important to develop a work programme that gives clear direction for the TEDs in 2023 that continues to allow collective consideration of key conceptual issues and lead us to begin exchanging views on potential structures of the goal.
- The NCQG is our opportunity to raise collective ambition towards finance for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. It should link directly to Article 2.1c and mobilise public and private finance from all sources and Parties towards low emissions and sustainable development.
- This includes increased commitments from developed countries as per Article 9 but also efforts by all Parties to improve enabling environments, transparency, and other policies that will attract private finance and redirect financial flows towards climate action. We believe this can be done in a way that supports collective ambition while also recognising different capacities and not overburdening recipient countries.
- Our collective progress will be greater if all countries in a position to do so play a role in the provision of climate finance. Further, reflecting in the new goal the broadest possible donor base, as well as all public and private finance flows, will better incentivise action to achieve Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement.

## Issues/background

1. Since 2009, developed countries have been working towards the goal of collectively mobilising USD 100 billion in climate finance per year for developing countries by 2020 until 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation. The goal has not yet been met. Aotearoa New Zealand significantly increased its contribution in 2021 in support of this goal, by committing NZD 1.3 billion in climate finance for 2022-25.
2. At COP 26, Parties initiated deliberations on setting the NCQG by 2024. It is viewed by all Parties as an opportunity to learn from the shortcomings of the current goal and create a more strategic climate finance goal that helps achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.
3. Parties at COP 26 also launched a work programme on the NCQG for 2022-24 that includes four TEDs each year. The first two TEDs in March and June 2022 surveyed the landscape of issues and signalled a strong desire to "deep dive" into particular issues in the subsequent TEDs. TED 3 in Manila in September 2022 was the first "deep dive" into needs and priorities of developing countries and sources of climate finance. TED 4 will take place alongside COP 27 (5 November) and deep dive into access to finance.
4. Discussions so far have remained largely conceptual and focused on flushing out the key issues for Parties rather than negotiating them politically. Parties have not yet seriously considered specific options for the structure of the NCQG but this is likely to be needed at some point for progress to be made in 2023.
5. The main contours of the NCQG debate so far focus on the determination of the quantitative aspect of the goal, the nature and relative importance of qualitative components of

---

<sup>40</sup> [Climate finance goal submission MCC review \(unfccc.int\)](https://unfccc.int/Climate-finance-goal-submission-MCC-review)

the goal, and the linkages with Articles 9 and 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

Most Parties, however, including all developed countries, see it as a chance to capture both an increased commitment under Article 9 and help achieve Article 2.1 by mobilising and redirecting financial flows from all actors towards low emissions and sustainable development.

6. The discussion in this agenda item will likely consider progress made during the TEDs in 2022 and the work programme for 2023. There may also be linkages into the high-level Ministerial event on the NCQG depending on the sequencing of agenda items.

7. Parties have so far avoided major discussions on loss and damage finance in the context of the NCQG. However, there is a feeling that loss and damage will enter the discussions as some point, perhaps after more progress is made on the issue elsewhere.

*Development, People, and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

**(f) Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing loss and damage**

**See COP 27 agenda item 8.**



## **Agenda item 9: Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement**

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Support the centrality of achieving Article 2.1c to discussions of climate finance under the Paris Agreement, including setting the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance.
- Encourage an understanding of Article 2.1c that involves actions from all Parties, without minimising the ongoing importance of developed countries taking the lead and providing climate finance to developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.
- Highlight the importance of removing harmful fossil fuel subsidies as a critical near-term step that can be taken to achieve Article 2.1c and our efforts as part of the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in pushing for this.
- Support decisions to improving tracking and monitoring of progress towards achieving Article 2.1c.

### Key messages

- We welcome this opportunity for a dedicated agenda item and discussion on Article 2.1c.
- Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development is one of the three objectives of the Paris Agreement. Without achieving it, we will also fail to deliver on the other goals of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees and increasing adaptation and climate resilience.
- Article 2.1c calls us to focus on ALL financial flows, public and private, in all countries, in order to "shift the trillions" required to limit warming to 1.5 degrees and build resilience globally. This will require leadership from the private sector and action from all Parties to develop enabling environments and implement policies that transparently shift financial flows towards climate action.
- We welcome the reports of the Standing Committee on Finance mapping information relevant to Article 2.1c and synthesising views on achieving it. These add to our growing understanding of financial flows in the context of climate and highlight that much more needs to be done.
- The reports highlight many initiatives that Parties can and should immediately take forward to implement Article 2.1c, including reforming and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. Elimination of fossil fuel subsidies would generate savings of at least USD 500 billion globally that could be invested in the transition to low emissions and sustainable development.
- We see implementing 2.1c as closely linked to the efforts of developed countries to provide climate finance support under Article 9. Efforts towards one do not take away from the other. In fact, scaling up provision of climate finance under Article 9, including public finance

and mobilised private finance, is a critical lever to help accelerate the delivery of Article 2.1c.

- We would like to see this connection reflected in the NCQG. The new goal should focus and enhance our efforts to achieve Article 2.1c through, helping develop enabling environments and mobilising and enhancing coherence between all finance sources, public and private, provided and mobilised, including increased support under Article 9.

## Issues/background

8. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement sets out the objectives of the Agreement to “strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”. It also specifies three ways of achieving this, with Article 2.1a focusing on limiting global heating to 1.5 degrees, 2.1b focusing on increasing the ability to adapt, and 2.1c on finance.

9. Specifically, Article 2.1c commits Parties to “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”.

10. With significant agenda items already focusing on mitigation and adaptation, this agenda item proposes to centre discussions on achieving this third component of the Paris Agreement objectives.<sup>s6(a)</sup>

11. New Zealand and most developed countries see Article 2.1c as fundamentally important to climate finance discussions. Centring it, supporting it, and encouraging efforts to achieve it will come up in many different finance discussions, including relating to the work of the SCF and the NCQG.

12. Some developing countries see attempts to focus on 2.1c as efforts by developed countries to distract from their obligations to provide climate finance support from Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the failure to as of yet deliver on the US \$100 billion climate finance goal.

13. The SCF produced two reports on Article 2.1c for consideration at COP 27. These were agreed relatively smoothly compared to other reports at the September SCF meeting.

- a. One report maps information available pertaining to Article 2.1c, which highlights developments since 2020 including the many new finance related initiatives such as financial disclosure policies and private initiatives such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, and their scope, coverage, and progress.
- b. One report synthesising views on achieving Article 2.1c, which highlighted different views on the scope of Article 2.1, how it should be linked to Article 9, and a range of suggested policy approaches to implement Article 2.1c.

*Development, People, and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## **Agenda item 10: Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 17.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 11: Capacity-building under the Paris Agreement**

See COP 27 agenda item 10.

### Background

1. Capacity building matters feature across a range of COP items and committees. New Zealand is keen to see the PCCB strengthened and to ensure that duplication of effort is avoided.
2. The COP decided to review at COP 25 - progress, need for extension, effectiveness and enhancement of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building and to take any action it considers appropriate with a view to making recommendations to CMA 1 on enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity-building consistent with Article 11, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. The CMA decided to consider and adopt at CMA 2 a decision on initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building.
3. The CMA will be invited to take any action it deems appropriate on the basis of the recommendations of the COP.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 12: Matters relating to least developed countries**

See COP 27 agenda item 11.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 13: Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures**

---

See SBI 57 agenda item 20.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 14: Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement**

---

See SBSTA 57 agenda item 16.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 15: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement**

---

See SBSTA 57 agenda item 17.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



**Agenda item 16: Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement**

---

See SBSTA 57 agenda item 18.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Agenda item 17: Report of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement**

---

See CMP 17 agenda item 10.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 18: Consideration of special needs and special circumstances of Parties**

---

### Objective

- Receive information about priority considerations and adaptation activities for the Africa Group.

### Key messages

- New Zealand appreciates the work of the Africa Group in identifying particular areas of vulnerability faced by African countries. COP27 – the African COP – is an ideal forum for this discussion and we look forward to engaging closely with colleagues.

### Background

1. The African Union Chairperson, while congratulating Egypt on its new role as the Incoming President of the COP, reaffirmed the Union's commitment to continue to support Member States, engage with relevant stakeholders towards a successful COP27 to ensure that Africa's special needs are prioritized at COP27. The full statement is included as Annex 1 to this brief.
2. As one of the regions most adversely affected by the impacts of climate change, Africa has been advocating for urgent and practical global, regional and national actions and enhanced ambition to combat climate change. African countries have sought greater support in their efforts to adapt to climate change, particularly as one of the regions contributing the least to the climate crisis.
3. At COP27, the African Group will seek to ensure progress on the global goal on adaptation to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change.
4. This item was included on the provisional agenda in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, which provide that any item proposed by a Party and received before the agenda is circulated must be included Rule 10(d).

*Legal Division*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

*October 2022*

**Annex 1:**

**Statement by  
H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat  
Chairperson of the African Union Commission  
On the Occasion of the Meeting of the Committee of African Heads of States and  
Government on Climate Change**

**6 February 2022**

I wish to welcome you all to the meeting of the Committee of African Heads of State and Governments on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) taking place in person at the African Union Headquarters and virtually.

Before proceeding, please allow me to express our profound gratitude to the outgoing CAHOSCC Coordinator H.E. Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa for steering and leading this esteemed Committee for the past two years. I would also like to warmly welcome H.E Macky Sall president of the Republic of Senegal as the incoming Coordinator of CAHOSCC for the next two years.

**Excellencies**, I would like to also recognize the contributions of other members of the Committee for their strong commitment and continued engagement on climate change issues at the continental and international levels. The continued engagement by members of the Committee along with efforts to highlight the interconnectedness between climate change and other factors such as peace and security, conservation of nature and development facilitated the Committee's work in guiding our Climate Change Negotiators at both the Ministerial and Experts levels. The political support from the Committee boosted their confidence and solidarity in the global negotiations as evidenced at the Glasgow Climate Conference. I say a big thank you to all of you.

**Excellencies**, I am also pleased that this meeting will also receive updates from the three African Climate Commissions and the Continental Adaptation Initiatives. We are pleased to see the progress made since their launch as African Flagships at CoP 21 in Paris and CoP 22 in Marrakesh.

**Excellencies**, on a personal note, I feel proud that Africa remains a strong force in the Climate Negotiations through the political leadership provided by CAHOSCC and guidance by AMCEN to our Negotiators at the expert level. In order to maintain this unity of purpose, it remains important that the AGN and the Commission are in continuous dialogue and engagement.

**Excellencies**, As Africa engages itself in domesticating the Paris Agreement. As we are all aware, the Paris Agreement sets an ambitious target by agreeing to hold the increase in the global average temperature to "well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels" and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. It is truly gratifying to note that all African countries submitted ambitious targets under their NDCs. I believe that with adequate financial and technical support, member States will be on track to fulfil their commitments and obligations under the Paris agreement.

**Excellencies**, Addressing climate change challenges contributes to the attainment of the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals. Bearing in mind the enormous risks posed by climate change to Africa's development, I am pleased that another item that will be considered at this meeting is the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan to guide, coordinate and support the Continent's response to Climate Change for the period 2022-2032. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all member States for their support and valuable input that led to the finalization of the Strategy. Additionally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Democratic Republic of Congo for co-hosting the Africa Day Event at COP 26 and to all member States for honoring our invitation

to the Africa Day. The success of the event demonstrated Africa's solidarity and commitment to work in unity towards a common cause.

**Excellencies**, as I conclude, I wish to congratulate Egypt on its new role as the incoming CoP President. Indeed we all look forward to a continued engagement with Egypt in the lead up to and at CoP27 to ensure that Africa's special needs are prioritized. Through the CAHOSCC and the CoP27 president, we look forward to a strong engagement and collaboration with all relevant stakeholders including the civil society, the private sector, women and the youth.

I would also like to reiterate the unflinching commitment of the African Union Commission to continue to support Member States, engage with relevant stakeholders towards a successful CoP27 and a climate resilient continent.

**Excellencies**, I thank you all for your kind attention and wish the Committee fruitful and successful deliberations at this meeting and a prosperous 2022.

Thank you.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## **Agenda item 19: Administrative, financial and institutional matters**

---

- (a) Audit report and financial statements for 2021;
- (b) Budget performance for the biennium 2020-2021

See COP 27 agenda item 18.

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## EVENT BRIEFS

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



## **4th Workshop under the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation**

---

Date: Saturday 5 November

Time: 0900 – 1800

Venue: Sharm el-Sheikh International Convention Center, Room TBC

### **Key objectives**

---

- Participate in the workshop, and as appropriate share New Zealand's experience with communicating and reporting on adaptation priorities.
- New Zealand welcomes the exchange of information that has taken place under the first workshops under the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme and looks forward to this continued exchange at this 4<sup>th</sup> workshop.

### **Format TBC**

---

Note that this workshop is not part of the Ministerial or high-level segment programme

### **Key participants**

---

The workshop is open to all Parties and observers.

### **Background**

---

1. CMA 3 (Glasgow) established a comprehensive two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation (2022-2023) to be carried out jointly by the SBSTA and SBI (decision 7/CMA.3). Four workshops per year are to be held under the work programme.
2. This fourth and last workshop for 2022 has the theme "Communicating and reporting on adaptation priorities". Particular topics for discussion under the overall theme of the workshop will be shared in advance of the workshop in a concept note that will also include guiding questions for the workshop. The concept note was not available at the time this brief was prepared.

### **New Zealand's first national adaptation plan**

3. New Zealand's first national adaptation plan was published in August 2022. The national adaptation plan supports all New Zealanders to adapt, live and thrive in a more damaging climate. It looks at the impacts of climate change with us now and into the future and sets out how Aotearoa New Zealand can adapt.
4. The long-term adaptation goals in New Zealand's adaptation plan embody the adaptation goal in the Paris Agreement: reducing vulnerability, enhancing our ability to adapt and strengthening resilience. The national adaptation plan is the first in a series. Every six years, the Climate Change Commission will prepare a national climate change risk assessment. This will identify the climate risks that need to be addressed most urgently. New national adaptation plans that respond to those risks will be developed in consultation with all New Zealanders.

5. The first plan focuses on getting the foundations right. It sets out what the Government will do to enable better risk-informed decisions, drive climate-resilient development in the right locations, help communities assess adaptation options (including managed retreat) and embed climate resilience into all of the Government's work. It also acknowledges an indigenous worldview that sits alongside the plan, which is represented by the Rauora framework. Actions in the plan support the further exploration of this framework.

6. The implementation and effectiveness of the national adaptation plan will be reported on by the Climate Change Commission by August 2024.

### **New Zealand's experience with communicating and reporting on adaptation**

7. New Zealand has reported on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability in all its national communications under the UNFCCC and is currently preparing its 8<sup>th</sup> national communication for submission in December 2022. Chapter 6 of New Zealand's 7<sup>th</sup> national communication also served as New Zealand's first adaptation communication under the Paris Agreement, and Chapter 6 of the 8<sup>th</sup> national communication will serve as New Zealand's second adaptation communication.

8. Under the Paris Agreement New Zealand will report information related to climate change impacts and adaptation every two years in its biennial transparency reports (BTR), with the first BTR being due for submission by December 2024.

### **Adaptation finance**

9. Aotearoa New Zealand recognises the need for urgently scaling up adaptation finance. It is a particular priority for Pacific Island countries to be able to deliver on their National Adaptation Plans and develop the pipeline of projects to build climate resilience.

10. As a member of the Champions Group on Adaptation Finance, we are advocating for a doubling of climate finance as urged at COP 26, achieving balance with mitigation finance, as well as improving the quality of and access to adaptation finance.

11. We deliver this through our own climate finance commitment, is 2022-25 is NZ\$1.3 billion dollars in grant funding with at least 50 percent of this to be focused on the Pacific and 50 percent dedicated to adaptation.

12. We also encourage multilateral development banks to commit to and update projections for ambitious targets for adaptation finance and screen all projects for incorporating adaptation components as appropriate.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## High-level Ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambition

---

Date: Tuesday 15 November TBC

Time: TBC

Venue: Sharm el-Sheikh International Convention Center, Room TBC

### Key objectives

---

- Highlight the actions that the New Zealand Government has taken this year towards its domestic emissions target as well as contributing to achievement of New Zealand's nationally determined contribution (NDC):
  - setting Aotearoa New Zealand's first three emissions budgets
  - publishing the first emissions reduction plan setting out the policies and strategies for achieving the first emissions budget and putting Aotearoa New Zealand on track to meet the long-term targets
  - publishing the first national adaptation plan that supports all New Zealanders to adapt, live and thrive in a more damaging climate, and is an essential element of making the transition to a low emissions and climate resilient society
  - announcing its proposal for pricing agricultural greenhouse gas emissions [with consultation currently underway on how a proposed farm-level emissions price levy will be set, governance arrangements of the system, how farmers and growers will report and pay for their emissions, and recognising sequestration]
- Highlight the importance of all nationally determined contributions being in line to limit warming to 1.5°C, and urge all Parties, in particular the large emitters to take a close look at their nationally determined contributions.
- Highlight the importance of implementing the nationally determined contributions that are on the table – these nationally determined contributions mean nothing unless there is a follow-through to implementation.
- Highlighting the importance of Parties following through and being accountable for their Glasgow Climate Pact commitments.

### Background

---

1. This roundtable has its origins in the mitigation section of decision 1/CMA.3 (from Glasgow) where it was decided to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, beginning at the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement i.e. the meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh.
2. At the time this brief was prepared there was no information available on the format, framing and focus of the roundtable. It is understood that there has been some thought about starting with framing around science and IPCC reports, and then linking to actual implementation – presentations, success stories, experiences; guiding questions around opportunities and challenges; opening the floor for expectations for the future annual roundtables. But none of this is confirmed.
2. The Ministerial roundtable is part of a wider mitigation agenda which includes revisiting of NDCs and publication of the NDC synthesis report (prior to COP), the Mitigation Work Programme,

preparation for the 2025 global stocktake (GST) under the Paris Agreement, finalising the Periodic Review under the Convention to avoid overlap with the GST, and following up on other mitigation aspects of the Glasgow Climate Pact. It potentially provides a forum for ministers to hold each other to account for delivering the mitigation action they committed to in Glasgow.

3. Other mitigation aspects of the Glasgow Climate Pact include the call upon Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.

4. The Glasgow Climate Pact also invites Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## High-level Ministerial dialogue on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance

---

Date: Wednesday 9 November (Finance Day)

Time: TBC [pm]

Venue: TBC

### Key objectives

---

- This is the first Ministerial dialogue on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. The purpose will be to build political rapport ahead of more difficult political negotiations to agree the goal in 2024 and give direction to the ongoing series of technical dialogues in 2023.
- Our objective is to support a constructive tone and work towards consensus that the goal should contribute to achieving Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, have both both quantitative and qualitative elements and address public and private finance mobilisation by all Parties in a position to do so.

### Key participants

---

It is likely that the Dialogue will be attended by Finance and Environment Ministers. As this event is taking place in the first week of COP 27, some delegations may be represented by senior officials instead.

#### Delegation attendees

- Kay Harrison, New Zealand Climate Change Ambassador (on behalf of Minister of Climate Change)
- Ben Abraham, Senior Adviser Climate Finance / Ali Carlin, Lead Adviser

### Key points

---

#### *General / purpose of the high-level Ministerial*

- New Zealand remains committed to meeting its financial commitments under the Paris Agreement and setting ambitious new finance goals that reflect the uplift we must see to meet our shared mitigation and adaptation goals.
- The new collective quantified goal is an important opportunity to drive an uplift in collective ambition for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- With plenty of water to still flow under the bridge before agreeing the goal in 2024, we value these high-level opportunities to build political rapport and understanding, exchange views, and keep the momentum of deliberations building.
- It is also important to give direction for the technical expert dialogues in 2023 that continues to allow collective consideration of key conceptual issues and leads us to begin exchanging views on potential structures of the goal.

*Sources and types of finance / Article 2.1c / donor base*

- The new goal should link directly to Article 2.1c and mobilise both public and private finance towards low emissions and sustainable development.
- Developed countries must continue to lead the way in providing and mobilising finance towards developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable. However, much has changed since 1990. Annex II of the Convention no longer accurately reflects where global financial resources lie. All countries in a position to do so must play a role.
- The goal should have a quantified component but also qualitative aspects that drive efforts by all Parties to improve enabling environments, transparency, and other policies that will attract private finance and redirect financial flows towards climate action. We believe this can be done in a way that supports collective ambition without overburdening recipient countries.

*Needs and priorities of developing countries*

- The goal should help deliver on the need for increased adaptation finance towards achieving a balance with mitigation finance.
- The goal should clearly take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries in both its quantitative and qualitative elements. It should be dynamic so these elements can be updated over time

*Access to finance*

- Improving access to finance, particularly for LDCs and SIDS is critical. We are interested to hear ways in which the new goal can promote this.

**Background (see agenda item brief on the new goal for more detail)**

---

1. At COP 26, Parties initiated deliberations on setting the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) for climate finance by 2024. It is an opportunity to learn from the shortcomings of the current goal and create a more strategic climate finance goal.
2. There are four technical expert dialogues (TEDs) per year on NCQG for 2022-24. The first two TEDs surveyed the landscape of issues. TED 3 was a "deep dive" into needs and priorities of developing countries and sources of climate finance. TED 4 will take place alongside COP 27 (5 November) and deep dive into access to finance.
3. Some developing countries have argued the NCQG should be a massively increased quantitative goal for public climate finance from developed countries under Article 9. Most Parties, however, including all developed countries, see it as a chance to capture both an increased commitment under Article 9 and help achieve Article 2.1c by mobilising and redirecting financial flows from all actors towards low emissions and sustainable development.
4. Parties have so far avoided major discussions on loss and damage finance in the context of the NCQG. However, there is a feeling that loss and damage will enter the discussions as some point, perhaps after more progress is made on the issue elsewhere. We do not oppose the inclusion of loss and damage in the NCQG.

*Development, People, and Planet Division*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

*October 2022*

## **Fifth biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance**

---

Date: Tuesday 15 November (tbc)

Time: TBC [pm]

Venue: TBC

### **Key objectives**

---

- This Ministerial dialogue will focus on assessing progress towards and fulfilment of the US\$100 billion per year climate finance target for 2020-2025.
- Our objectives are to
  - Highlight our commitment to delivering on the goal, including through our new climate finance strategy;
  - Encourage efforts to deliver a doubling of adaptation finance by 2025 as part of this; and
  - Encourage efforts to improve access to this finance, particularly for small island developing states and least developed countries.

### **Key participants**

---

It is likely that the Dialogue will be attended by Finance and Environment Ministers.

#### **Delegation attendees**

- Minister of Climate Change
- Ali Carlin, Lead Adviser / Ben Abraham, Senior Adviser Climate Finance

### **Key points**

---

- Aotearoa New Zealand remains committed, along with all other donor countries, to meeting the US\$100bn finance goal as soon as possible. We acknowledge the failure to deliver it by 2020. We understand the importance of rectifying this and strongly support the Delivery Plan led by Canada and Germany to ensure we do so by 2023 and through 2025.
- New Zealand has committed to a significant uplift and a step-change in our climate finance, committing to NZ\$1.3bn in grant based finance over 2022-2025. This is a fourfold increase on our previous commitment clearly shows we are willing to do our part in delivering the goal as soon as possible.
- Achieving the US\$100bn goal has been difficult and all countries must consider lessons learned from the delivery of the goal. In particular the failure to mobilise private finance to the degree expected.
- We (New Zealand) have tried to incorporate many of these lessons into our new climate finance strategy *Tuia te Waka a Kiwa*, launched our Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta in Tonga in August this year. This strategy highlights our progress towards turning our new climate finance commitment into action as effectively and rapidly as possible.

- We recognise that adaptation finance has remained far too low. We strongly encourage developed countries to deliver a doubling of adaptation finance by 2025 as urged at COP 26. To ensure we are doing our part and contributing to a balance of adaptation and mitigation finance, our new strategy commits at least 50% of our climate finance to focus on adaptation.
- Multilateral Development Banks also have an important role to play in delivering adaptation finance. We need them to commit to ambitious climate finance targets, screen all projects for adaptation needs, and updated collective projections for adaptation finance by 2025
- We are also acutely aware of the challenges SIDS face in securing to access finance. This is why our new strategy commits at least 50 per cent of our finance to Pacific Island Countries, prioritises supporting partner-led national strategies, and will continue to fund specific programmes supporting access to finance.

## Background

---

1. Since 2009, developed countries have been working towards the goal of collectively mobilising USD 100 billion in climate finance per year for developing countries by 2020 until 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation.
2. The failure to meet the goal was a major subject of criticism at COP 26. Germany and Canada produced a delivery plan to achieve the goal by 2023 and through to 2025 and donors are still expecting to meet the goal in 2023.
3. Aotearoa New Zealand significantly increased its contribution in 2021 in support of this goal, by committing NZD 1.3 billion in climate finance for 2022-25.
4. In the Long-term climate finance agenda discussions at COP 26, Parties:
  - a. requested the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) to prepare a report in 2022 on progress towards achieving the US \$100bn climate finance goal; and
  - b. Decided to convene biennial high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in 2022, 2024 and 2026 and invited the COP 27 Presidency to host the 2022 dialogue on progress and fulfilment of the US\$100bn goal
5. The SCF report on the US \$100 billion goal highlighted:
  - c. That there are different views about methodologies and accounting for climate finance, but the OECD report series noted mobilization of USD 83.3 billion in 2020, 16.7 billion short of the goal;
  - d. Data from the SCF's fifth biennial assessment showed a 36 per cent growth from 2013-2020 in climate-specific finance from developed to developing countries;
  - e. US \$100 billion per year will still fall far short of meeting the needs and priorities of developing countries (reported NDC needs are 5.8-5.9 trillion)
6. Germany and Canada released a 2022 progress update on the delivery plan that:
  - f. Highlighted progress against all 10 action areas, including new finance commitments from Japan, Sweden, Netherlands, and Norway
  - g. Emphasised i) transparency on achieving a doubling of adaptation finance by 2025, ii) improving access to finance for LDCs and SIDS, iii) increasing MDB focus on climate



finance, and iv) improving the mobilisation of private finance as four priorities needing extra attention

*Development, People, and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## THEMATIC BRIEFS

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Adaptation

---

### Key points

- New Zealand is committed to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change through action at home and globally, particularly in the Pacific.
- Guided by the IPCC's AR6 reports, our collective adaptation work should be transformational, advancing from current incremental efforts to drive well-planned and systemic approaches that address the multiple climate change risks. Our work should also consider sustainable development and mitigation synergies and co-benefits. We should seek to be inclusive, and inspire collaboration across constituencies on achieving the global goal on adaptation (GGA), including through the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh two-year work programme on the global goal on adaptation.
- New Zealand considers this work programme important in helping Parties to establish a collective understanding of progress on adaptation through shared lessons learned and good practice, including by identifying the gaps in capacity, finance and data on which progress has been limited to date.
- Together, the Glasgow Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme, along with the first Global Stocktake, create a crucial opportunity to focus attention and accelerate action on adaptation.

### Background

1. Adaptation issues appear in multiple parts of the agendas across the subsidiary bodies, the COP and the CMA. Further information on these agenda items can be found in the relevant sections of this delegation brief.

### National adaptation plan

2. New Zealand has made significant progress on its own preparation for addressing the impacts of climate change with the publication of its first national adaptation plan in August. The national adaptation plan supports all New Zealanders to adapt, live and thrive in a more damaging climate. It looks at the impacts of climate change with us now and into the future and sets out how Aotearoa New Zealand can adapt.

3. The long-term adaptation goals in New Zealand's adaptation plan embody the adaptation goal in the Paris Agreement: reducing vulnerability, enhancing our ability to adapt and strengthening resilience. The national adaptation plan is the first in a series. Every six years, the Climate Change Commission will prepare a national climate change risk assessment. This will identify the climate risks that need to be addressed most urgently. New national adaptation plans that respond to those risks will be developed in consultation with all New Zealanders.

4. The first plan focuses on getting the foundations right. It sets out what the Government will do to enable better risk-informed decisions, drive climate-resilient development in the right locations, help communities assess adaptation options (including managed retreat) and embed climate resilience into all of the Government's work. It also acknowledges an indigenous worldview that sits alongside the plan, which is represented by the Rauora framework. Actions in the plan support the further exploration of this framework.

5. The implementation and effectiveness of the national adaptation plan will be reported on by the Climate Change Commission by August 2024.

6. As part of the overhaul New Zealand's resource management system, the Government plans to repeal the Resource Management Act 1991 and introduce three Bills including the Climate Adaptation Act (CAA) - to help New Zealand better deal with climate change, particularly 'managed retreat' (the strategic relocation of communities or assets prone to natural hazards - like increased flooding or coastal inundation).

### **Adaptation finance**

7. Aotearoa New Zealand recognises the need for urgently scaling up adaptation finance. It is a particular priority for Pacific Island Countries to be able to deliver on their National Adaptation Plans and develop the pipeline of projects to build climate resilience.

8. As a member of the Champions Group on Adaptation Finance, we are advocating for a doubling of climate finance as urged at COP 26, achieving balance with mitigation finance, as well as improving the quality of and access to adaptation finance.

9. We deliver this through our own climate finance commitment, is 2022-25 is NZ\$1.3 billion dollars in grant funding with at least 50 percent of this to be focused on the Pacific and 50 percent dedicated to adaptation.

10. We also encourage multilateral development banks to commit to and update projections for ambitious targets for adaptation finance and screen all projects for incorporating adaptation components as appropriate.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

## Agriculture

---

### Key points

- New Zealand strongly advocates for increased global ambition to reduce emissions from agriculture and support adaptation to sustainable, climate resilient agriculture systems.
- This ambition needs to be articulated as outcomes-focused. This means promoting action towards positive climate and environmental outcomes without prescribing specific approaches that may not be appropriate for all circumstances.
- New Zealand is committed to reducing emissions from agriculture and supporting climate resilient adaptation both domestically and internationally.

### *Domestic action*

- New Zealand has legislated methane reduction targets of 10 per cent by 2030 and 24-47 per cent by 2050 against a 2017 baseline.
- Given 91 per cent of New Zealand's biogenic methane comes from agriculture, the sector will be at the forefront of achieving these targets. New Zealand has legislated to price agricultural emissions, including methane, by 2025 as a tool to achieve this target. This will be done either through a specifically designed pricing mechanism, or introducing surrender obligations for agriculture in the NZ ETS.
- The Government established He Waka Eke Noa, a partnership between Government, Māori, and the sector, to provide recommendations on a pricing mechanism as an alternative to the NZ ETS, and support the sectors readiness. He Waka Eke Noa presented their recommendations earlier this year, and the Government is currently undertaking a public consultation on a proposed farm-level pricing mechanism.
- The key features of the farm level levy are:
  - Farmers and growers will enter data into the bespoke emissions calculator.
  - They will receive a bill for their farm's emissions numbers for methane and long-lived gases.
  - They can use approved technologies and practices to deliver measurable emission reductions and receive a payment to reduce their levy cost.
  - Approved on-farm vegetation can be recognised through a sequestration contract.
  - Revenue from the system will be used to fund admin costs, incentive and sequestration payments, the establishment of a dedicated fund for Maori landowners, and an advisory board to advise Ministers on the revenue recycling strategy
  - GST registered farmers and growers with more than 550 stock units (deer, sheep, cattle) or 50 dairy cattle, or who apply 40t of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser, have to register and pay for their on-farm emissions.

*International*

- Internationally, New Zealand seeks to drive global ambition on agricultural climate action through our engagement in the UNFCCC and related initiatives.
- The Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases is a key avenue for New Zealand. This includes funding mitigation projects and scholarships into low emission research and development, and hosting the Secretariat.
- New Zealand recently announced a NZ \$10M investment into a partnership through the GRA supporting the Latin America and the Caribbean region. This will build resilience, enhance food security and address the challenges of climate change for small-scale primary producers.

## Background

**Agriculture and Adaptation Day is a key opportunity for New Zealand to advance our agriculture related objectives by leveraging success at the OECD Agriculture Ministerial**

1. The Presidency has planned an Adaptation and Agriculture Day on 12 November. This key day for progressing our agriculture priorities will include:

- a. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) hosted Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture Ministerial discussion.
- b. Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Transition (FAST) initiative Ministerial level launch event.
- c. Policy Dialogue on Transition to Sustainable Agriculture Ministerial Roundtable event organised by the UK as outgoing COP26 President.
- d. Global Research Alliance Blue Pacific Pavilion Side Event 'Measuring to mitigate, adapt and revive.'

2. On November 3-4 the Minister for Agriculture is Co-Chairing the OECD Agriculture Ministerial. The text negotiated by Officials for adoption by Ministers includes impressive wins for New Zealand in relation to climate change and agriculture which should be leveraged in our COP27 engagement on agriculture. Specifically, this text:

- a. Acknowledges the need for agricultural policies including support to contribute to GHG reductions
- b. Commits Parties to increase mitigation efforts by reducing emissions from agriculture and food systems, including giving 'positive consideration' to sector specific reduction targets
- c. Commits Parties to invest in mitigation research and development
- d. Includes multiple references to adaptation efforts and food security without compromising the need for urgent mitigation action.

**Further information on New Zealand's position on outcomes-based text and environmentally harmful agriculture subsidies**

3. New Zealand's outcomes focused approach means ensuring the focus is on reducing global emissions and supporting sustainable agriculture, enabling flexibility for countries to deliver this according to their national circumstances and informed by local and indigenous knowledge as appropriate.

4. Agroecology is a specific approach commonly proposed which New Zealand pushes back on in agriculture related negotiations. This primarily comes from the EU subsidised approach in their Farm-to-Fork Strategy.

5. Elimination of trade and production distorting, and environmentally harmful agricultural subsidies (EHAS) is a long-standing priority for New Zealand. In multilateral agreements these are often phrased as public or domestic support. New Zealand seeks to encourage Parties to identify and phase out EHAS. Where text calls for repurposing EHAS towards environmentally positive measures, New Zealand seeks recognition that repurposed subsidies must be designed effectively and not lead to trade- and production-distorting outcomes.

6. New Zealand is supportive of increasing investment in general services such as research and development or climate-focused extension services, to accelerate emissions reductions in agriculture.

#### **Further information on New Zealand's agricultural emissions profile**

7. Agriculture makes up almost 50 per cent of New Zealand's emissions. This is significantly more than most industrialised countries due to our largely decarbonised electricity generation, and because agriculture is a key sector of New Zealand's economy.

8. New Zealand's emissions profile means that we must grapple with this challenge of agricultural emissions earlier than most other developed countries. However, as other countries decarbonise their energy and transport sectors, agriculture will increasingly feature in their emissions profiles, forcing them address the challenge. This provides an opportunity to share New Zealand's expertise and shape the emerging best practice for low emissions, climate resilient agriculture.

#### **Further information on the key agriculture related initiatives New Zealand has joined**

9. New Zealand hosts the Secretariat to the Global Research Alliance and this is the key avenue through which we engage internationally. Much of our international engagement seeks to encourage membership to the GRA and attract finance to collaborate on greenhouse gas mitigation research development and innovation.

10. In 2021 New Zealand joined the Agricultural Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM for Climate), launched by the US and UAE. This initiative is focused on increasing investment into climate smart agriculture. It also provides a platform for promoting projects in the agricultural climate action arena (termed 'Innovation Sprints'). The GRA is an 'Knowledge Partner' to AIM for Climate and a number of their projects were adopted as innovation sprints in 2021, including three which New Zealand was involved in.

11. In 2021 New Zealand also joined the Global Methane Pledge. New Zealand has developed a Methane Reduction Action Plan which is heavily focused on action in our agriculture sector, given this is the primary source of methane for New Zealand.

12. New Zealand is involved in the UK launched Policy Dialogue on Accelerating Transition to Sustainable Agriculture through Redirecting Public Policies and Support and Scaling Innovation. Our keen interest in this relates to the Dialogue's focus on repurposing environmentally harmful agriculture subsidies.

13. As COP27 President, Egypt is launching the Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Transition Initiative (FAST initiative). This initiative looks to set up a work programme to support better access to finance for agricultural and food systems action, provide a central knowledge and capacity building platform, and convene policy dialogues on agricultural climate action support



for NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS. New Zealand attended the initial consultations prior to FAST's launch, and intend to join FAST prior to COP27.

*International Environment  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Ambition

---

### Key points

#### Ambition

- An effective climate response and limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees is key to New Zealand and our Pacific neighbours.
- Ambition, and follow-through on this ambition, is critical for delivering **all three aims of the Paris Agreement** (2.1a – mitigation, 2.2b – adaptation, and 2.1c making financial flows consistent with low emissions and climate resilient development).
- These aims are interlinked. Mitigation and adaptation efforts can have co-benefits. Aligning financial flows with the low-emissions and climate resilient future we require, is necessary to getting us there.
- Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees is vital to New Zealand, to the Pacific, and to the world. Critically, as set out in the IPCC's Sixth Assessment report - **Mitigation is necessary to enable us to successfully adapt, and to limit loss and damage.**
- To deliver on the aims of the Paris Agreement we need ambition, action and implementation now. We need real world outcomes this decade.
- The world New Zealand wants to see – both the science and our values (such as manaakitanga, whanaungatanga, mahi tahi and kotahitanga, and kaitiakitanga) align.

#### Ambition related negotiations

- Ambition will be delivered through actions both within (e.g. countries delivering on their targets, taking actions to reduce emissions and build resilience) and outside of the process. Negotiation areas that relate directly to ambition include:
  - Mitigation – work programme on urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation, global stocktake
  - Adaptation / climate resilience – global goal on adaptation
  - Financial flows – deliberation on the new quantified collective goal; EU and EIG proposed new agenda item on Article 2.1c
- Regardless of how/where it is pursued, given the scale and urgency of the climate crisis, action that leads to real world results is vital.

#### NDCs

- It is important that **all countries**, including large emitters and high and middle income countries, take action aligned with 1.5 degrees.
- New Zealand's NDC is deliberately and purposefully aligned with 1.5 degrees. Our ambition is to contribute a volume of emissions reductions that is aligned with 1.5 degrees – not limit ourselves to only what can be done within New Zealand.
- The world will not achieve the scale or urgency of emissions reductions needed globally, if each country only looks at what it can individually do. Many countries may be able to contribute more emissions reductions if they supplement domestic action with international cooperation.

## New Zealand's priorities for the COP

- New Zealand's first order priorities for the COP are:
  - **Contribute to, and foster effective global ambition** – including contributing to negotiations relating to ambition (such as the global goal on adaptation, the mitigation work programme, and transparency); and initiatives aimed at strengthening ambition, such as the High Ambition Coalition.
  - **Enhance the mobilisation of climate finance** – including contributing to deliberations on the next quantitative climate finance goal; sharing our experiences of Climate Risk Disclosure; and showcasing our climate finance strategy.
  - **Support a resilient and empowered Pacific transition** – including supporting Pacific interests in negotiations (including on loss and damage and climate finance); co-location with Pacific delegations; supporting the Pacific Pavilion, to profile issues of regional importance; and the hosting the annual New Zealand – Pacific Ministerial policy roundtable.
  - **Cooperate to reduce emissions in other countries to contribute to New Zealand's Nationally Determined Contribution** – taking opportunities to progress our international carbon markets strategy through: a series of bilateral meetings with potential partners; taking part in initiatives or events to promote high-integrity in carbon markets; and being active in Article 6 technical negotiations and in our role on the supervisory body for Article 6.4 (the central mechanism).
- Other international engagement priorities relate to the SDGs, agriculture, climate change and trade, and New Zealand's transition – and as resources permit biodiversity and nature-based solutions, and climate change and security.

## What is New Zealand doing?

- New Zealand is taking action to reduce global emissions, ensure a fair and equitable transition of our economy, and build climate resilience both at home and abroad. Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees is critical to New Zealand. We have put this goal at the heart of our domestic climate change policy and legislation
- Highlights of New Zealand's action include:
  - An NDC that has been deliberately and purposefully aligned to contribute to limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees.
  - A climate finance strategy, developed with input from partners, that will guide delivery of the 1.3bn dollar commitment we made last year. This quadrupling of climate finance, includes at least half going to adaptation, and at least half to the Pacific.
  - Putting in place, and now implementing our first emissions reduction plan and domestic emissions budgets – to guide our low emissions transition.
  - Putting in place, and now implementing our national adaptation plan.

- Continuing to increase the breadth and effectiveness of emissions pricing and other economic instruments, to lower emissions and better align financial flows with low emissions and climate resilient development. This includes: supplementing the broad sectoral coverage of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme by pricing agricultural emissions from 2025; and further embedding financial disclosure of climate risks.
- New Zealand champions research and development to reduce agricultural emissions. This includes through the Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases of which New Zealand is a founding member.
- New Zealand leadership on increasing alignment of trade and climate policy development through initiatives such as Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) and ongoing advocacy for fossil fuel subsidy reform; as well as world leading climate change elements in free trade agreements
- Details of New Zealand's domestic policy response can be found in the thematic briefing '**Domestic policy update**'

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Climate Change and Oceans

---

### Key points

- New Zealand welcomes the increasing focus on the climate-ocean nexus in the UNFCCC, which helps drive ambitious mitigation and adaptation.
- New Zealand places great importance on the conservation and sustainable use of the ocean. Across the Pacific region, the ocean defines ways of life. Economies rely on the ocean environment, through fisheries and aquaculture, tourism and shipping; livelihoods are closely linked to the sustainable use of marine resources; and culture and recreation take shape around the ocean and its shores.
- The climate crisis is inextricably linked to the health of the ocean. The ocean is the world's largest carbon sink, and there is clear scientific evidence that it is warming, rising and becoming more acidic at an accelerated rate. Damage to the health of the ocean limits humanity's chance to prevent and adapt to dangerous climate change.
- In the Pacific, ocean warming and acidification will have dramatic adverse effects on community well-being. The decline of coral reefs will severely undermine food security and cultural values, climate-induced migration of tuna out of Pacific exclusive economic zones will undercut economic resilience, and sea-level rise poses an existential threat to atoll nations.
- The *Aotearoa New Zealand International Climate Finance Strategy – Tuia te Waka a Kiwa* includes a stated preference for supporting biodiversity, oceans and nature. It explicitly recognises the need for greater investment into the ocean-climate nexus.
- Continued advocacy for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' *Declaration on Preserving Marine Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise* is a priority for New Zealand and the region.
- *[If asked about proposed target to protect 30 per cent of land and marine areas by 2030]:* New Zealand is active in negotiations to support an ambitious new Global Biodiversity Framework, including a new global protected area target. To be effective we consider that a global target to protect 30 per cent of land and marine areas by 2030 must include strong qualitative elements to enable more effective outcomes for global biodiversity, respect the rights of indigenous peoples, and – as for all the global biodiversity targets – allow countries to determine how they will contribute to the target.

### Oceans within the UNFCCC

- COP26 saw two key outcomes for the ocean. The Glasgow Climate Pact invited relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC to consider how to integrate and strengthen ocean-based actions in their existing mandates and work plans, and instituted an annual ocean-climate dialogue<sup>41</sup>.
- The first ocean-climate dialogue was held on 15 June 2022 and produced an informal summary for consideration at COP27. The dialogue was necessarily high-level and its findings likely uncontroversial. Future annual dialogues will dive into particular issues to strengthen and support ocean climate action under the UNFCCC.

---

<sup>41</sup> [FCCC/CP/2021/12/Add.1](#): para 60-61

*Decarbonising the international shipping sector*

- The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is currently revising its Initial Strategy on the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships. Increasing the ambition of GHG reduction targets and development of market-based measures to incentivise decarbonisation of the sector will be the focus of the upcoming December meetings.

**Background**

1. The 2019 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate highlights the urgency of prioritising timely, ambitious and coordinated action to address unprecedented and enduring changes in the ocean and cryosphere. These include melting ice and rising seas; more frequent extreme sea level events; changing ocean ecosystems; declining Arctic sea ice and thawing permafrost.
2. The Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, finalised in February 2022, added to the growing body of scientific evidence that the ocean is warming, rising and becoming more acidic. The report states it is virtually certain that global mean sea level will continue rising over the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It will increase for centuries to millennia due to continuing deep ocean heat uptake and mass loss from ice sheets.
3. Climate impacts on the ocean will increase the risk of forced displacement (New Zealand's preferred term is "climate induced migration") for Pacific Island countries and coastal New Zealand communities. Warming above 1.5° will mean atoll nations may no longer be able to adapt. Nonetheless, the prevailing discourse is focused on global mitigation and adaptation efforts. Pacific Island countries' are determined to stay in their homelands, rather than consider how and where they might move.

**Oceans within the UNFCCC**

4. Pacific Island countries and others are concerned that the significance of climate change impacts on oceans is overlooked and want more formalised UNFCCC work on the climate change and oceans nexus. Some have called for a dedicated agenda item or work programme. Fiji has requested Egypt as COP27 Chair hold a high level ministerial dialogue on finance for oceans.
5. There are dimensions of the climate change and oceans nexus that are clearly not addressed by other fora. There are also concerns that some countries may seek credit for non-anthropogenic (i.e. naturally occurring) sequestration. Only the UNFCCC can engage countries in inter-governmental decision making around these issues. It is also important that genuine efforts to address oceans in the UNFCCC do not duplicate and undermine other international frameworks such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the international legal framework for all activities in the ocean.
6. Following last year's COP26 decision, the first formal Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue was held in June. The key findings of the dialogue:
  - reinforced the value of the ocean in offering sustainable climate solutions including mitigation and adaptation options that can be reflected in national climate policies and strategies;
  - recognised the role of marine technology and marine and coastal nature-based solutions and value of ocean science and other knowledge systems;
  - called for funding for ocean-climate action and strengthened finance and other support including capacity building; and
  - advocated a framework for collaborative efforts across UN processes to increase institutional support for ocean-climate action.

7. These findings, which will be reported to COP27, are likely to prove uncontroversial, although any framework would need to avoid imposing onerous requirements.

### **IMO efforts to decarbonise the international shipping sector**

8. Shipping is fundamental to New Zealand's economy and that of our Pacific partners. At the same time, shipping is a significant and growing contributor to GHG emissions. The IMO's 2018 Initial Strategy on the reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships commits members to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40 per cent by 2030 and to pursue efforts towards 70 per cent reduction by 2050 compared to 2008 levels. However progress in developing measures to support this transition has been slow. Work is currently underway for a revised strategy to be adopted in 2023.

### **Key Pacific concerns**

9. Ocean warming and acidification will dramatically affect coral reefs, and there will be flow on effects on the whole ridge-to-reef ecosystem (from the mountains to the coral reef). Sea level rise will add to these. Coral reefs are critical habitats for coastal fisheries, provide protection from storm surges and coastal inundation, and are cultural keystones. Pacific Islanders draw most of their protein from reef based fisheries, and the economic value that is drawn from fisheries and tourism is also significant. Even limiting warming to 1.5°C will likely lead to substantial declines in coral cover.

10. Warmer waters will also lead to the redistribution of the Pacific region's lucrative tuna fisheries, posing economic and management challenges. This is particularly important for skipjack tuna, which are migrating eastwards. With a high-emission scenario this is predicted to lead to a US\$90 million drop in government revenue per annum for Pacific Island countries by 2050. This will also push more tuna into international waters, increasing the risk of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

11. The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' *Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise* sets out our region's collective position on how the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea's rules on maritime zones should apply in the situation of climate change-related sea-level rise. It makes clear our intention to maintain our zones, without reduction. The Declaration upholds the integrity of UNCLOS and builds upon our region's long history of leadership on oceans issues. The alternate view, that baselines for measuring maritime zones move with the coastline as it recedes, would result in diminishing maritime zones. This would be highly detrimental for many Pacific Island countries that are dependent on these zones for their economic resilience.

### **Global Biodiversity Framework and new global protected area target**

12. Any new global target on protected areas will need to consider not only how much we protect, but what we protect and how that protection is designed. Protected areas need to be purposefully designed to deliver on essential qualitative elements, like ecological representativeness, and protection of areas of particular importance for nature to thrive. Equally important is that management and governance of these areas is effective and comprehensive to adequately protect their natural values. Ensuring respect for the rights of indigenous peoples in the way areas are protected is an essential element we have been advocating for.

*Pacific Regional Division and Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## Domestic policy update

---

### *Emissions reduction plan and first three emissions budgets*

1. On 31 May 2021, the Climate Change Commission provided the Government with its final advice on the first three emissions budgets (2022-2025, 2026-2030, 2031-2035) and on the policy direction for Aotearoa New Zealand's first emissions reduction plan 'Te hau mārohi ki anamata' (the plan). The second emissions reduction plan needs to be published by 31 December 2024.
2. In May 2022, the Government has now responded to this advice by setting Aotearoa New Zealand's first three emissions budgets:
  - The first emissions budget limits emissions to 290 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e from 2022 – 2025. This is estimated to require a further 11.5 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e reduction compared to existing projections.<sup>42</sup>
  - The second emissions budget limits emissions to 305 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e
  - The third emissions budget limits emissions to 240 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e.
3. In May 2022, the Government also published the first emissions reduction plan (which also serves as Aotearoa New Zealand's long-term low emissions development strategy (LT-LEDS) for the purposes of the Paris Agreement<sup>43</sup>). This sets out the policies and strategies for achieving the first emissions budget and puts Aotearoa New Zealand on track to meet the long-term targets.<sup>44</sup>
4. The emissions reduction plan was informed by public consultation and includes over 300 actions to:
  - achieve an equitable, fair and equitable transition for all New Zealanders
  - empower Māori and uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi<sup>45</sup>
  - align systems and cross-sector tools to enable and incentivise a low-emissions transition, including emissions pricing, funding and finance, planning and infrastructure, research science innovation and technology and circular economy and bioeconomy.
  - transition key sectors across our economy, including transport, energy and industry, building and construction, agriculture, forestry, waste and fluorinated gases.
5. To ensure that New Zealand remains on track to meet its climate mitigation goals:
  - Government agencies are establishing a monitoring and reporting system to track and manage implementation of the plan, this includes sector sub-targets to monitor emissions reductions in key sectors of the economy.
  - The Climate Change Commission will also have a role in monitoring and reporting on progress on emissions budgets and 2050 target, as well as the success of the plan

---

<sup>42</sup> Baseline projected emissions are already tracking down under current policy settings. The baseline does not include the new actions included in the emissions reduction plan.

<sup>43</sup> The emissions reduction plan was published in two stages. The first stage was communicated to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on 4 November 2021 (during COP26).

<sup>44</sup> The 2050 target requires long-lived greenhouse gas emissions to reach net zero by 2050. It also requires emissions of biogenic methane to reduce to 24-47 per cent below 2017 levels by 2050 (including a 10 per cent reduction by 2030). See section 5Q, Climate Change Response Act 2002.

<sup>45</sup> Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) is New Zealand's founding document and the source of principles that govern Crown-Māori relationships. These principles include partnership, participation and the active protection of Māori knowledge, interests, values and other taonga.



6. Statutory timelines set by the Climate Change Response Act 2002 originally required emissions budgets and the plan to be published by 31 December 2021. Due to the COVID-19 Delta outbreak in August 2021 and the impact of subsequent lockdowns on effective public consultation and engagement, Cabinet amended the statutory deadline to 31 May 2022. This change allowed more time to develop the plan to reflect public input through formal consultation. It also aligned the plan with Budget 2022, allowing decisions and policies to be directly supported with Government investment.

7. The Government has announced (11 October 2022) its proposal for pricing agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. Feedback is currently being sought on how a proposed farm-level emissions price levy will be set, governance arrangements of the system, how farmers and growers will report and pay for their emissions and recognising sequestration.

8. The government is consulting on a farm level levy, and a potential processor level levy as a transitional mechanism. Consultation closes on 18 November 2022. The key features of the farm level levy are:

- Farmers and growers will enter data into the bespoke emissions calculator.
- They will receive a bill for their farm's emissions numbers for methane and long-lived gases.
- They can use approved technologies and practices to deliver measurable emission reductions and receive a payment to reduce their levy cost.
- Approved on-farm vegetation can be recognised through a sequestration contract.
- Revenue from the system will be used to fund admin costs, incentive and sequestration payments, the establishment of a dedicated fund for Maori landowners, and an advisory board to advise Ministers on the revenue recycling strategy
- GST registered farmers and growers with more than 550 stock units (deer, sheep, cattle) or 50 dairy cattle, or who apply 40t of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser, have to register and pay for their on-farm emissions.

### **National adaptation plan**

9. New Zealand's first national adaptation plan was published in August 2022. The national adaptation plan supports all New Zealanders to adapt, live and thrive in a more damaging climate. It looks at the impacts of climate change with us now and into the future and sets out how Aotearoa New Zealand can adapt.

10. The long-term adaptation goals in New Zealand's adaptation plan embody the adaptation goal in the Paris Agreement: reducing vulnerability, enhancing our ability to adapt and strengthening resilience. The national adaptation plan is the first in a series. Every six years, the Climate Change Commission will prepare a national climate change risk assessment. This will identify the climate risks that need to be addressed most urgently. New national adaptation plans that respond to those risks will be developed in consultation with all New Zealanders.

11. The first plan focuses on getting the foundations right. It sets out what the Government will do to enable better risk-informed decisions, drive climate-resilient development in the right locations, help communities assess adaptation options (including managed retreat) and embed climate resilience into all of the Government's work. It also acknowledges an indigenous worldview that sits alongside the plan, which is represented by the Rauora framework. Actions in the plan support the further exploration of this framework.

12. The implementation and effectiveness of the national adaptation plan will be reported on by the Climate Change Commission by August 2024.

13. As part of the overhaul New Zealand's resource management system, the Government plans to repeal the Resource Management Act 1991 and introduce three Bills including the Climate Adaptation Act (CAA) - to help New Zealand better deal with climate change, particularly 'managed retreat' (the strategic relocation of communities or assets prone to natural hazards - like increased flooding or coastal inundation).

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Finance

---

### Key points

#### *US\$100 billion goal*

- New Zealand remains committed, along with all other donor countries, to its financial commitments under the Paris Agreement and setting ambitious new finance goals that reflect the uplift we must see to meet our shared mitigation and adaptation goals.
- We understand the urgency of developing countries' climate finance needs and the importance that developing countries place on the US\$100bn goal. That is why New Zealand has strongly stepped up in its climate finance ambition.
- This year's Delivery Plan progress report highlights that finance is increasing, including adaptation finance, and the donors remain committed to the task and are taking actions to improve and enhance climate finance across the board.

#### *New collective quantified goal (NCQG)*

- The NCQG is our opportunity to raise collective ambition towards finance for delivering on NDCs and National Adaptation Plans. It should link directly to Article 2.1c and help mobilise and redirect public and private finance from all sources and Parties towards low emissions and sustainable development.
- The goal will likely need to have multiple components, including a scaled up quantitative target but also qualitative components that encourage effective policies and enabling environments that will help redirect private financial flows.

#### *Adaptation finance*

- Adaptation finance through public sources is crucial to developing countries, especially the Pacific.
- Aotearoa New Zealand is a member of the Champions Group on Adaptation Finance, who are advocating for a doubling of climate finance as urged at COP 26, achieving balance with mitigation finance, as well as improving the quality of adaptation finance.

#### *Loss and damage finance*

- For Aotearoa New Zealand the urgency of the issue is clear. In our region, the Pacific, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is already a present day reality and existential threat.
- There should be no question that finance should be available to avert, minimise and address all forms of loss and damage.
- There is likely to be an agenda item on loss and damage finance for the first time at this COP. Building on efforts at COP 26, there will be a significant push to establish a dedicated funding facility at COP 27.
- Loss and damage arises from the impacts of climate change in multiple ways and there are multiple institutions and processes with equities in solving this. We need a multifaceted and multi-track solution to scale up responses.

### *Multilateral climate funds*

- The multilateral climate funds are often cumbersome and many small countries, including in the Pacific, have expressed their frustration at the difficulty of accessing finance from them – especially the Green Climate Fund. Efforts have been made to improve the access procedures but further improvements are required.

### *Donor Base*

- Developed countries must continue to lead the way in providing and mobilising finance towards developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable.
- However, much has changed since 1990. Annex II of the Convention no longer accurately reflects who the developed countries in the world are. All countries in a position to do so must play a role.

### *Effectiveness*

- While the quantum is important, we must not lose sight of the need for effective finance: effectiveness is just as important as the amount of money spent.
- There will always be finite resources and public finances alone cannot meet the needs of developing countries. We need to ensure the resources that we do have are used effectively.
- In this regard, we must ensure finance is made accessible and goes towards country priorities (like those outlined in NDCs and National Adaptation Plans).
- It also means that we need to do a better job of mobilising private funds to support our goals. The more we can unlock private finance the more public finance can be strategically used to fill gaps in funding where other sources cannot get to (e.g. adaptation).

### *Changing the finance landscape (Article 2.1.c)*

- Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement commits all Parties to “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”
- The finance conversation must move beyond just public finance and private finance mobilised. The landscape has changed since 2009 and the financial sector is shifting to align portfolios with the Paris Agreement.
- Globally fossil fuel subsidies total around US\$500 billion a year, five times the current US\$100bn goal. These could be redirected in support of climate action.

### **Background**

1. Climate finance is a key pillar of the Paris Agreement that enables implementation but also serves as a symbol of trust and collaboration between developed and developing countries.
2. It will be a major topic at COP 27 with pressure rising due to the failure of developed countries to meet the US \$100 billion goal by 2020 at COP 26. Donors acknowledge this shortcoming, and the Delivery Plan prepared by Canada and Germany provides the confidence that developing countries have [rightly] asked for that US\$100 billion goal will be met through to 2025.

3. There is also growing pressure to scale up adaptation finance. The Paris Agreement calls for climate finance to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation, but finance provided so far has disproportionately been for mitigation. The Glasgow Climate pact urged donors to deliver this balance, including by doubling collective adaptation finance by 2025 from 2019 levels.

#### **New Zealand's current commitment**

4. New Zealand's finance commitment for 2022-25 is NZ\$1.3 billion dollars in grant funding with at least 50 percent of this to be focused on the Pacific and 50 percent dedicated to adaptation. Of that commitment, \$800 million will be new funding to the aid programme (through which New Zealand delivers most of its climate finance). This represents a four-fold increase of our previous commitment from 2019-2022.

5. New Zealand announced its new international climate finance strategy *Tuia te Waka a Kiwa*<sup>46</sup> in Tonga in August 2022. The strategy sets out the principles and priorities for the delivery of our new commitment.

#### **New collective quantified goal (NCQG)**

6. Deliberations on the NCQG started at COP 26 and are set to agree a new goal in 2024. The NCQG is viewed by all Parties as an opportunity to learn from the shortcomings of the current goal and create a more strategic climate finance goal that helps achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

7. NCQG deliberations are being supported by four technical expert dialogues per year that bring together both Parties and experts from civil society and the private sector to discuss the key issues the goal must address.

#### **Multilateral climate funds**

8. The Green Climate Fund and Global Environmental Facility are critical pieces of the climate finance infrastructure and the UNFCCC's financial mechanism. They and others like the Adaptation Fund play an important role in galvanising global commitment to climate finance and providing central access points for developing countries.

*Development, People, and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

---

<sup>46</sup> [Climate change support | New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade \(mfat.govt.nz\)](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-mfat/our-work/our-work-areas/climate-change-support/Climate-change-support-%7C-New-Zealand-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs-and-Trade-(mfat.govt.nz))

## Forests, land use, and sustainable supply chains

---

### Key messages

- Afforestation, and preventing deforestation and forest and land-use degradation, play a key role in global climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.
- Forest and land-use mitigation must have environmental integrity, including ensuring emission reductions and removals are additional, long-lasting, and verifiable.
- We support global efforts to prevent deforestation which promote legal and sustainable forest management, including through supply chains. It is important to ensure these initiatives avoid creating unnecessary or inappropriate trade barriers.

### Background

#### **COP 27 UK forest and sustainable supply chain initiatives**

1. The UK intends to demonstrate action on the back of Parties signing the Glasgow Leaders Declaration on Forests and Land-use (GLD) at COP 26 by launching the FCLP (Forests & Climate Leaders' Partnership) and showing progress of the FACT (Forest, Agriculture, Commodity, and Trade) Dialogue at COP 27. The FCLP aims to create a new high ambition coalition for forest climate action, and establish a formal process for associated discussions, including for annual forest climate dialogues at each COP. The FACT dialogue aims to provide tools for countries to create "deforestation-free" supply chains.<sup>s9(2)(f)(iv)</sup>

#### **COP27 agenda items relevant for forests and land-use**

2. There are no major forest specific COP 27 agenda items. However, New Zealand does have an interest in ensuring the environmental integrity of forests and land-use under the Paris Agreement to support global mitigation actions and provide optionality for our engagement in forest and land-use based international carbon market approaches in future.

3. We also have an interest in mainstreaming forest and land-use climate action within the UNFCCC system. In particular, we support high integrity forest and land-use reporting under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. We also support global efforts to scale up forest and land-use climate mitigation and adaptation actions. The FAO and the IPCC have stressed the importance of increased global investment in sustainable forest measures to address the joint climate change, biodiversity, and food security crises.

#### **New Zealand's NDC forest and land-use accounting approach**

4. New Zealand has an economy-wide NDC which includes forests, land-use, and agriculture. We employ high integrity methods to account for removals and emissions in our UNFCCC reports and communications that meet Paris Agreement reporting requirements. This includes having methods which only credit additional sequestration from a set baseline and debit emissions from deforestation. We also use an "averaging approach" to accurately reflect the likely long-term carbon storage from New Zealand's production forests over several harvest and re-growth cycles. This ensures our accounting approach rewards New Zealand's additional forest mitigation actions, rather than recognising forest carbon stock changes from normal sustainable forest management activities.

## Forest climate change policy in NZ

5. As a signatory to the GLD, New Zealand recognises the urgent need for action to halt and reverse global forest loss by 2030 and the critical role of forests and sustainable land use for climate change mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity, indigenous peoples and local communities, and enabling the world to meet its sustainable development goals.

6. Since 2008 the NZ ETS has been encouraging forest mitigation by providing units for the establishment of new forests and additional carbon storage in existing forests. It also requires units to be surrendered for deforestation.<sup>47</sup> Alongside recent ETS changes to encourage emissions reductions, from 2023 we will be implementing ETS reforms to further encourage forest establishment. This includes introducing an “averaging” accounting approach (which removes financial risk from unit surrenders for harvesting activities), and the creation of a new permanent forest activity (which recognises the higher carbon stocks in non-harvested forests). Our ETS forest rules have been designed to reflect our NDC accounting and Paris Agreement environmental integrity principles.

7. In 2022 the Government launched New Zealand's national adaptation plan (NAP) and emissions reduction plan (ERP). The NAP contains actions to reduce adaptation risks for indigenous forests and to treat erosion-prone land. The ERP includes actions to maximise the contribution of our forests to reducing emissions and provide a long-term native carbon sink (to offset emissions from sectors where it will take time to reduce emissions). The ERP actions will also support our transition to a high-value, low-emissions economy and enhance New Zealand's biodiversity and natural environment. Increasing the production of low emissions materials and energy made from wood fibre will be a major focus of New Zealand's Forestry and Wood Processing Industry Transformation Plan, which is due to be finalised this year.

## Sustainability and legality of New Zealand's forest and agriculture supply chains

8. “Deforestation-free supply chain” proposals, including the UK's recently enacted import restrictions on “forest risk commodities” and a proposed EU regulation, are intended to prevent deforestation in areas like the Amazon Basin, where there are drivers to remove forest to produce agricultural products such as beef, soy, and palm oil. New Zealand does not import large quantities of these products from developing countries.<sup>48</sup> New Zealand's interest is in ensuring these proposals recognise national circumstances and do not create unnecessary trade barriers. For example, to recognise in some circumstances production forests will need to be moved to new locations to improve environmental and socio-economic outcomes.

9. New Zealand's deforestation rate is low due to our strong land and resource use laws<sup>49</sup>, ETS and other economic incentives. New Zealand's forest sector actively obtains sustainable forest management certifications (69% of plantation forests are certified). New Zealand is also progressing legislation to establish a new legal harvest assurance system for domestic and imported timber products. Through this legislation and active engagement in international fora, New Zealand is assisting global efforts to halt the international trade in illegally harvested timber.

*International Environment  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
2022*

---

<sup>47</sup> For most pre-1990 forests and all post-1989 forests voluntarily registered in the NZ ETS.

<sup>48</sup> We do import palm kernel expeller (PKE) for supplementary livestock feed to address drought-driven grass shortages. PKE is a by-product of the palm oil industry and makes up 1% of palm plantation revenue.

<sup>49</sup> NZ's natural forests are protected from deforestation by our Conservation and Forests Acts. Sustainable forest management practices are also required under our Resource Management Act and regulations enforced by local councils.

## Human rights and climate change

---

### Objective/New Zealand's position

- Position New Zealand as committed to climate action that is fully consistent with our human rights obligations.

### Key messages

- Climate change poses an immediate threat to people around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights. The negative impacts of climate change disproportionately affect persons facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, owing to geography, poverty, gender, age, disability, cultural or ethnic background and other marginalised identities.
- New Zealand is committed to a 'just transition' to a low emissions economy. We also recognise that Government policies can do more harm than good if not done right. Our Emissions Reduction Plan has policies in place to work collaboratively and inclusively with impacted groups to understand their needs.
- New Zealand recognises the human rights implications of our international development programming, including climate change initiatives. Aotearoa New Zealand's Human Rights Strategic Action Plan for International Development Cooperation 2021-2025 seeks to advance the realisation of human rights, prioritising people and groups at risk of being left behind.

### Background

#### The direct effect of climate change on human rights

The impacts of climate change threaten a broad range of human rights, including:

- a) *The right to life:* Climate change threatens the life and safety of millions of people. An increase in extreme weather-related events like storms, floods and wildfires put peoples' right to life at risk. Such events have already caused significant loss of life. Climate change is predicted to cause increased deaths from malaria, malnutrition, diarrhoea and heat stress between 2030 and 2050.<sup>50</sup> The extent of States' obligations to prevent threats to life from climate change is currently unsettled.
- b) *The right to self-determination:* Peoples whose homes and livelihoods are threatened by climate change risk losing their right to self-determination. The risk is particularly acute for peoples of low-lying countries (who may be forced to leave their homes as sea levels rise) and indigenous peoples.
- c) *The right to development:* The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recognises that "climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and prolong existing

---

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health>



and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger".<sup>51</sup>

- d) *The right to adequate food:* Environmental changes, such as increased temperatures and changes to hydrological cycles and seasonal weather patterns, have far-reaching implications for agricultural systems. The World Bank estimates that a 2°C rise in global average temperature will put between 100 million and 400 million more people at risk of hunger.<sup>52</sup>
- e) *The right to water:* Fresh water shortages are being experienced already due to changes to rainfall, increased demand for water in higher temperatures and salinization of freshwater supplies. In turn, this creates or exacerbates conditions for conflict.<sup>53</sup>
- f) *The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health:* The adverse health impacts of climate change include premature deaths, increased incidences of respiratory disease, cardiovascular disease, malnutrition, stunting, wasting, allergies, heat stroke, injuries, water-borne and vector-borne diseases. Climate change also erodes many of the key social and environmental determinants of health, including access to adequate food and water, clean air, culture and livelihoods. Health is also affected by climate-related displacement, migration and reduced access to health-care services.<sup>54</sup> There are also mental health challenges in times of acute disaster and with uncertainties related to slow-onset disasters.
- g) *The right to education:* Water and food shortages, acute weather disasters and other impacts of climate change lead to school closures or other reasons for children to not go to school.
- h) *The right to culture:* Forced relocation can impact on the relationship between people and their natural environment, and this may impact people's sense of self and wider cultural identity.
- i) *The right to be free from discrimination:* Marginalised groups are subject to heightened risks when their families, communities and societies are under disaster-related stresses. Marginalised groups include, amongst others, women and girls in all their diversity, children, the elderly, disabled people, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, ethnic/cultural minorities, and LGBTQIA+ people. Those people facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination are disproportionately impacted.
- j) *The rights of the child:* The Convention on the Rights of the Child, in describing the right to health, explicitly requires States to take measures to combat disease and malnutrition through the provision of food and clean drinking water and taking into account "the dangers and risks of environmental pollution".<sup>55</sup> Children are particularly vulnerable to health problems exacerbated by climate change, including vector-borne diseases, malnutrition, acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea and other water-borne illnesses. Globally, over 500 million children live in extremely high-risk flood zones; 160 million

---

<sup>51</sup> IPCC *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers* (2014) at 16.

<sup>52</sup> The World Bank, *World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change* (2010) at 4-5.

<sup>53</sup> "Climate change is exacerbating world conflict, says Red Cross president" [The Guardian](#) (21 Oct 2018).

<sup>54</sup> Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (A/74/161) at 31.

<sup>55</sup> Article 24(2)(c), UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

live in high or extremely high drought severity zones; and 115 million are at high risk from tropical cyclones.<sup>56</sup>

- k) *The right to housing*: Extreme weather events are already destroying people's homes, leaving them displaced. Slower environmental change, like droughts, erosion and sea level rise, threaten the homes of millions of people.
- l) *The right to a clean, sustainable and healthy environment*: while non-binding in nature, many countries have embedded the right to a clean, sustainable and healthy environment in their domestic legislation. This right advocates for the protection of ecological systems that provide human health. The right is interconnected with other health-focused human rights, such as the right to water and sanitation, right to food and right to health.

### **Indirect effects of climate change action on human rights**

1. Climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives can have human rights implications. For example, the requisite transformation to a carbon neutral economy will adversely and disproportionately affect some individuals, households and communities whose economic well-being is tied to carbon-intensive industries.
2. Domestically, the New Zealand Government has committed to a 'just transition' to a low emissions economy. This commits the Government to partner with Māori, communities and the private sector to help realise the opportunities that will emerge from a low emissions economy and transitioning people into these opportunities. Our Emissions Reduction Plan has policies in place to enhance collaboration and inclusivity with impacted communities.
3. Human rights principles of non-discrimination, participation and accountability underpin and are integral to all aspects of New Zealand's development work. All interventions consider the implications for human rights to mitigate doing harm and, where possible, promote and progress the realisation of human rights.
4. Internationally, there are variable standards of human rights protections. Weaknesses in policies and processes have, on occasion, led to climate change projects having adverse human rights outcomes.

### **The Human-Rights Based Approach to Climate Change Policymaking**

5. A human rights-based approach (HRBA) to climate change policymaking, is being advocated for by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), among others.<sup>57</sup>
6. The OHCHR explains the HRBA as: "a conceptual framework that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyse obligations, inequalities and vulnerabilities and to redress

---

<sup>56</sup> Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (A/74/161) at 41.

<sup>57</sup> The HRBA to climate change policymaking builds on the HRBA to development, which focuses mainly on security and liberty of vulnerable people: see United Nations Development Group "How do human rights standards relate to the development programming process?" UN Practitioners' Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming <[hrbaportal.org](http://hrbaportal.org)>.

discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede progress and undercut human rights.”<sup>58</sup>

7. A UN Human Rights Council resolution on human rights and climate change notes that:

“human rights obligations and commitments have the potential to inform and strengthen international and national policymaking in the area of climate change, promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes”.<sup>59</sup>

8. In summary, the HRBA to climate change policymaking involves deploying human rights in mitigation and adaptation policies and programmes as benchmarks, objectives and success indicators.

9. According to the OHCHR, UN agencies have agreed on the following essential attributes of a HRBA to climate change policymaking:

- a) As policies and programmes are formulated, a core objective should be to fulfil human rights.
- b) A HRBA identifies rights-holders and their entitlements, and corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations. It works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims of duty-bearers to meet their obligations.
- c) Principles and standards derived from international human rights treaties should guide all policies and programmes in all sectors and in all phases of the process.

10. In addition, the Human Rights Council appointed Ian Fry as its first Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change in March 2022. The role which was spearheaded by the Marshall Islands and endorsed by Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers in 2020, will work to strengthen the adoption by states of human rights-based climate change policies.

11. See Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples’ Platform brief for background on multilateral and domestic approaches to including indigenous peoples in climate policymaking.

*Climate Change Division and United Nations, Human Rights and Commonwealth Division*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

October 2022

---

<sup>58</sup> Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights *Applying a Human Rights-based Approach to Climate Change Negotiations, Policies and Measures* (OHCHR, 2010). See also Mary Robinson Foundation *Incorporating Human Rights into Climate Action* (May 2016) at 5.

<sup>59</sup> *Human rights and climate change* HRC Res 10/4 (2009) at preamble, tenth recital.

## IPCC 6th Assessment reports

---

### Key points

The IPCC's Assessment Reports are written periodically (roughly every six to seven years) and aim to provide a comprehensive assessment of the literature on the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation. Each full Assessment Report contains contributions from three Working Groups:

- Working Group I: the Physical Science Basis (released August 2021)
- Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (released February 2022)
- Working Group III: Mitigation (released April 2022)
- A Synthesis Report summarising/synthesising key information from each Working Group is due to be released in March 2023.

The underlying reports and associated Summary for Policymakers (SPMs) of each Working Group underwent extremely thorough review processes and have been accepted by governments. We are therefore confident that they represent a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the science.

The full SPMs, underlying reports and regional information can be found here: [IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](#)

### Key findings of the **Working Group I** report include

- Human influence on the climate system is unequivocal. This is a stronger statement compared to the IPCC's 5th Assessment Report (AR5) and reflects the strengthened evidence of the impact of human activities on different aspects of the climate.
- The effects of human-induced climate change can also be seen on extreme weather events globally. Many of these events, including heatwaves, intense rainfall and droughts, have become more frequent and intense as a result of climate change and will continue to intensify.
- Some changes to the climate system, including sea level rise and loss of glaciers, is irreversible over centuries to millennia. However, the rate and magnitude of these committed changes still depends on future greenhouse gas emissions.
- Warming can still be limited to 1.5°C but requires net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions around 2050 and deep reductions in other greenhouse gases such as CH<sub>4</sub> (methane).

### Key findings of the **Working Group II** report include

- A chapter dedicated to Australasia, which for the purpose of the IPCC includes just Australia and New Zealand. This chapter highlights ongoing climate trends in New Zealand, such as further warming and changing precipitation patterns.
- The magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depends strongly on near term mitigation and adaptation actions. Implementing adaptation measures with mitigation will support sustainable and climate resilient development.

- Existing vulnerabilities and social inequalities and inequities are exacerbated by climate change. Inclusive governance that prioritises equity and justice in adaptation planning and implementation can reduce these vulnerabilities and climate risk.
- A just transition as part of adaptation requires action now. Globally, financial flows are insufficient for and constrain implementation of a wide range of adaptation options. Delaying action will likely result in higher adaptation costs.

Key findings of the **Working Group III** report include

- Net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase globally since 2010 across all major sectors. Australia, Japan and New Zealand collectively contribute 3 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, down from 4 per cent in 2010.
- The responsibility for historic emissions played a large part in the approval process. Australia, Japan and New Zealand are historically responsible for 4 per cent of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1850-2019.
- Limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot requires rapid, deep and in most cases immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors. The report identifies many mitigation options for all sectors that, if adopted, will offer substantial potential to reduce emissions by 2030.
- The report provides a full assessment of various greenhouse gas metrics and their relevance to the policy-making process. It notes that the choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all metrics have limitations and uncertainties.

## Background

This section highlights some of the key policy-relevant findings from each Working Group.

### **Working Group I: the Physical Science Basis**

*The impacts of climate change can be seen globally*

1. Human-induced climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. Confidence in the attribution of heatwaves to climate change has strengthened significantly, to the point that it is now “virtually certain” that heatwaves have become more frequent and intense, and there is “high confidence” that climate change is the main driver. Similarly, heavy precipitation and drought events have increased.
2. Increases in the frequency of extreme events has increased the likelihood of compound extreme events (where multiple hazards combine to increase risks to human or ecological systems).
3. Projections of future sea level rise have increased slightly since AR5 due to improved estimates of future mass loss from the Antarctic Ice Sheet. A key advance in AR6 is the explicit recognition that sea level could fall outside the projected “likely” range, with sea level rise approaching 2 m by 2100 not ruled out under the highest emissions scenario due to considerable uncertainties regarding the processes driving sea level change.

*Limiting warming to 1.5°C is still possible, but requires significant change*

4. Future emissions scenarios, and their climate response, show that we can still limit warming to 1.5°C. In all assessed scenarios, the 1.5°C threshold is reached in the near term

(within the 20-year period 2021-2040), with the estimated crossing time in the early to mid-2030s.

5. Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires the globe to stay within a total carbon budget. For a 50 per cent chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, the remaining global carbon budget is just 500 gigatonnes (Gt) CO<sub>2</sub> (from the start of 2020). At present, global net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are about 43 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> per annum.

6. Although cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions dominate warming, this carbon budget is contingent on methane emissions reducing rapidly at the same time. If methane emissions are not reduced rapidly, the remaining carbon budget will shrink considerably. Rapid and strong global reductions in methane are a critical component of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2°C.

7. The report reconfirms and re-emphasises the need for urgent action to reduce global emissions, but does not fundamentally change the scale of global action needed to achieve the goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C.

### **Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability**

*A just transition as part of adaptation requires adaptation now*

8. The report finds that delaying action may result in higher costs when adaptation becomes more urgent and the impacts more extreme.

9. Current global financial flows for adaptation, including from public and private finance sources, are insufficient for and constrain implementation of adaptation options especially in developing countries. The overwhelming majority of global tracked climate finance was targeted to mitigation while a small proportion (estimated between 4-8 per cent) was targeted to adaptation.

10. How climate change will affect our communities and the quantum of associated losses and damages depends in part on how proactive we are in preparing for them now. Recognition of the role finance plays as an enabling condition of adaptation, dictating the ambition and feasibility of possible solutions, has strengthened since AR5.

11. Vulnerability to climate change is driven by socioeconomic development and unsustainable ocean and land use, among other factors. Impacts from climate change are crossing national boundaries from linked supply chains, markets, and natural resource flows. Increasing climate risks are also projected to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and social inequalities and inequities, including between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and between generations, rural and urban areas, incomes and health status.

*Integrated adaptation and mitigation policies support climate resilient development*

12. Adapting to climate change requires significant system-wide changes to the way we live and govern. To facilitate the change, new governance frameworks, nationally consistent and accessible information, collaborative engagement and partnerships with all sectors, communities, and indigenous peoples, and the resources for these groups to address the risks, are needed.

13. Embedding effective and equitable adaptation and mitigation in development planning can reduce vulnerability, conserve and restore ecosystems, and enable climate resilient development. Integrated and inclusive system-oriented solutions based on equity and social and climate justice reduce risks and enable climate resilient development. This also requires decision-making processes, finance and actions to be integrated across governance levels, sectors and timeframes.

14. Urbanisation offers a critical opportunity in the near-term, to advance climate resilient development. Integrated, inclusive planning and investment in everyday decision-making about

urban infrastructure, including social, ecological and grey/physical infrastructures, can significantly increase the adaptive capacity of urban and rural settlements.

15. Nature-based solutions (NbS) are key to managing climate change from both a mitigation and an adaptation perspective. For example, coastal wetlands protect against coastal erosion and flooding associated with storms and sea level rise. However, they are vulnerable to climate change impacts and their effectiveness declines with increasing global warming as ecosystems approach the limits of their natural adaptive capacity. For example, rates of sea level rise will eventually exceed the ability of a wetland to build sediment.

*New Zealand relevant findings*

16. The Working Group II report includes a chapter dedicated to Australasia, which for the purpose of the IPCC includes just Australia and New Zealand. This chapter provides a wealth of information relevant to current work programmes, including the development of New Zealand's first national adaptation plan.

17. Further climate change is inevitable, with the rate and magnitude largely dependent on the emissions pathway. Ongoing climate trends in New Zealand include further warming and sea-level rise, more hot days and heatwaves, significant glacier retreat, less snow, more rainfall in the south, less rainfall in the north, and more extreme fire weather in the east.

18. Adaptation progress is uneven, due to gaps, barriers and limits to adaptation, and adaptive capacity limits. The region faces an extremely challenging future, and any delay in implementing adaptation and [global] emission reductions will impede climate change resilient development, resulting in more costly climate impacts and greater scale of adjustments.

19. Sea level rise poses a distinctive and severe adaptation challenge as it requires dealing with slow onset changes alongside increased frequency and magnitude of extreme sea level events. Adaptation challenges will occur earlier under high rates of sea level rise, in particular, if low-likelihood but high impact events such as collapsing ice sheets occur. Sea level rise is a key adaptation challenge for New Zealand given our extensive coastline and number of settlements and vital infrastructure in low lying areas. Responses to ongoing sea level rise and land-subsidence in low-lying coastal cities and settlements and small islands include protection, accommodation and coastal advance, and planned relocation.

20. There are important interactions between mitigation and adaptation policies and their implementation. For example, projected increases in fire, drought, pest incursions, storms and wind place forests at risk and affect their ongoing role in meeting New Zealand's emissions reduction goals.

### **Working Group III: Mitigation**

*Significant mitigation measures are required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.*

21. Net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since 2010 across all major sectors globally, with an increasing share of emissions attributed to urban areas. Urban areas can create opportunities to increase resource efficiency and significantly reduce GHG emissions through the systemic transition of infrastructure and urban form through low-emission development pathways towards net-zero emissions.

22. All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) involve rapid and deep and in most cases immediate GHG emission reductions in all sectors.

23. The report identifies many mitigation options that are available now in all sectors, offering substantial potential to reduce emissions by 2030. The relative potential and cost of each mitigation option varies across countries and in the longer term compared to 2030, however

mitigation options costing USD100 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent or less could reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by at least half the 2019 level by 2030. Of this, options costing less than USD20 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent are estimated to make up more than half of this potential.

24. Accelerated and equitable climate action in mitigating, and adapting to, climate change impacts is critical to sustainable development. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted under the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can be used as a basis for evaluating climate action in the context of Sustainable Development. This report begins to identify the synergies and trade-offs between sectoral and system mitigation options and the SDGs.

*New Zealand relevant findings*

25. In the report, Australia, Japan and New Zealand were grouped together as the only developed countries from the Asia-Pacific region to avoid the need to label countries as "developed" or "developing". The Asia Pacific or South East Asia and Pacific groupings used in the report include only developing countries. This was important during the government approval process as there is no agreed definition of "developed" or "developing", with the state of development being on a continuum.

26. Australia, Japan and New Zealand collectively contribute 3 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions and are historically responsible for 4 per cent of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1850-2019.

27. Australia, Japan and New Zealand rank joint second highest behind North America (Canada and the United States) in net greenhouse gas emissions per capita, at 13 tonnes CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent per capita. This aligns with rough estimates calculated using the 2019 New Zealand Greenhouse Gas Inventory, which estimates approximately 11.2 tonnes CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent per capita for net emissions in New Zealand<sup>60</sup>.

28. Working Group III aggregates greenhouse gas emissions in its report on a CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent basis using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report. These values are an update on and are slightly different from the GWP100 values that New Zealand uses for its international greenhouse gas reporting, as these come from earlier IPCC reports. The Global Warming Potentials that New Zealand uses for its reporting are fully in line with internationally agreed guidelines.

29. The Summary for Policymakers notes that the choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all greenhouse gas emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future greenhouse gas emissions.

30. The Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report reports emissions and mitigation options for individual gases where possible. The underlying report provides a full assessment of various greenhouse gas metrics and their relevance to the policy-making process. CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions are reported in addition to individual gas emissions where this is judged to be policy relevant. This approach aims to reduce ambiguity regarding actual climate outcomes over time arising from the use of any specific greenhouse gas emission metric.

*Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

---

<sup>60</sup> Note this is a quick calculation and not an official estimate.



## Loss and Damage

---

### Objective

- Support a landing zone at COP27 that sees a swift, equitable and transparent process to find solutions on financing for loss and damage that make a real difference for vulnerable nations.
- Reinforce the perspective that the UNFCCC response to financing for loss and damage requires a multitrack response, in which technical and policy support is valued alongside provision of finance.

### Key points

- For Aotearoa New Zealand the urgency of addressing loss and damage is clear. In our region, the Pacific, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is acute, and loss and damage is a present day reality and existential threat.
- Pacific Forum Leaders, including our Prime Minister, have called for meaningful progress on loss and damage at COP27.
- Critically, the IPCC Sixth Assessment report (AR6) has found that losses and damages are **not comprehensively addressed by current financial, governance and institutional arrangements**, particularly in vulnerable developing countries. AR6 also found that:
  - Losses and damages escalate with every increment of global warming and become increasingly difficult to avoid, while strongly concentrated among the poorest vulnerable populations.
  - Near-term action that would limit global warming to 1.5°C would reduce future losses and damages but cannot eliminate them all.
  - Adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages, even with effective adaptation and before reaching soft and hard limits.
- Developing countries including in the Pacific have called for a dedicated UNFCCC loss and damage finance facility. Our Pacific neighbours have identified particular gaps in access to finance to address slow onset and non-economic losses including activities around relocation and memorialisation of culture; as well as post-disaster rebuild.
- New Zealand is not opposed to a facility as part of a comprehensive UNFCCC solution, but it will be important to get the leg work right to ensure dedicated funding and any other arrangements to address loss and damage are sustainable and deliver for our region.
- We do not support a compensation narrative around financing action on loss and damage, but do want to keep the door open to contributions by major developing country emitters.
- Our climate finance strategy anticipates New Zealand will continue to provide finance for action on loss and damage bilaterally. It is important to us that we can continue to do this.
- It is also a priority for New Zealand that we operationalise the Santiago Network, and make full use of the Glasgow Dialogue and WIM.

## Background

1. Loss and damage is expected to be a headline issue at COP27. Recognition for loss and damage as the “fourth pillar” of the UNFCCC has consolidated in the run up to Sharm-el-Sheik. Egypt has appointed Germany (Climate Envoy Jennifer Morgan) and Chile (Minister for the Environment, Maisa Rojas) to progress this issue in advance of and at the COP.
2. While loss and damage has been referenced in previous IPCC reports, the 2022 IPCC AR6 WG II report has gone much further with its findings that current financial, governance and institutional arrangements to address losses and damages are insufficient, that losses and damages are being experienced now, that they are projected to increase with global warming and that even effective adaptation will not be able to prevent all losses and damages.
3. Finance for Loss and Damage was a critical issue in the lead up to and at COP26. A push by developing countries to establish a Loss and Damage Facility resulted in the Glasgow Dialogue which is due to run through until 2024, with countries agreeing “to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage” .
4. Developing countries remain unsatisfied with the open-ended nature of the Glasgow Dialogue and want to cement an outcome of funding arrangements for loss and damage. The most prominent proposal from developing countries is for a loss and damage finance “facility” –a multilateral climate fund dedicated to loss and damage. AOSIS has championed this, and it is a significant priority for PSIDs.
5. New Zealand considers it will be important that Parties discuss loss and damage finance arrangements and supports an agenda item framed around consideration of the issue broadly rather than pre-supposing the establishment of a Loss and Damage Finance Facility. We support however, a more tangible commitment that the Glasgow Dialogue will deliver decisions on funding arrangements.
6. We want to support a landing zone at COP27 that sees a swift, equitable and transparent process to find solutions on financing for loss and damage that make a real difference for vulnerable nations.
7. Any decision making around a dedicated loss and damage facility or broader funding arrangements will be complex. Experiences of countries in our region accessing the GCF have proved challenging. Consideration needs to be given to:
  - The extent to which existing mechanisms are suitable (or can be made more suitable) to meet the existing need;
  - The extent to which a new facility can generate additional resources, or potentially detract from funding to existing institutions;
  - Institutional considerations such as eligibility of countries; how to meet the needs of a range of widely differing countries, across a potentially very wide range of issues; what would be funded, and what would be more appropriately covered by existing adaptation finance mechanisms). Any fund would need to be distinct from funding for adaptation projects; and
  - Governance arrangements.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

## Nature-based Solutions

---

### Key points

- New Zealand acknowledges nature-based solutions as integral to global climate change mitigation and adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts.
- Socio-economic and environmental co-benefits and safeguards, including for biodiversity and maintaining and enhancing the rights of indigenous peoples, are a key part of nature-based solutions.
- New Zealand recognises the climate and biodiversity crises are inextricably linked and is committed to aligning work and taking strong action in both areas.
- Nature-based solutions form part of New Zealand's emissions reduction plan, national adaptation plan, International Engagement Plan, and climate finance strategy.

### Background

1. New Zealand supports the concept of 'nature-based solutions' and is promoting the increased take up of nature-based solutions to climate change globally, in NZ, and in the Pacific, while recognising that these actions need to complement and not replace the need for stringent emission reductions in other sectors. For example, New Zealand's Emissions Reduction Plan includes actions to restore and protect native forests to achieve climate change mitigation and adaptation, and biodiversity benefits. Te ao Māori and mātauranga Māori will also play a vital role in designing our nature-based solutions.

#### *International engagement on Nature-based Solutions*

2. The **IUCN** has championed nature-based solutions for over 20 years and in 2020 developed a [Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions](#). The IUCN defined nature-based solutions as "Actions to protect, sustainably manage and restore natural or modified ecosystems that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits".

3. In 2019, as part of the **UN Climate Action Summit**, New Zealand and China co-led the work-stream on Nature-based Solutions, highlighting them as an effective method to combat climate change.

4. At the **UN Environment Assembly** in February 2022, an intensely-debated resolution put forward by the EU, supported by Costa Rica, Colombia, Pakistan and Peru, resulted in a multilaterally agreed definition of nature-based solutions:

"...nature-based solutions are actions to protect, conserve, restore, sustainably use and manage natural or modified terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems which address social, economic and environmental challenges effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously providing human well-being, ecosystem services, resilience and biodiversity benefits... and recognises that they "respect social and environmental safeguards, including those for local communities and Indigenous Peoples" and "play an essential role in the overall global effort to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals".

5. The resolution committed UNEP to convening intergovernmental consultations to compile examples of best practice in nature-based solutions, assess and discuss new proposals, criteria, standards and guidelines with a view to reaching a common understanding on implementation, and identify options for supporting sustainable investment in nature-based solutions. These consultations will start in the first half of 2023.

6. In the **Convention on Biological Diversity** negotiations on the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, some Parties (including New Zealand) support references to nature-based solutions, especially in Target 8 on climate change. Others are opposed, arguing that the

correct term within the CBD is “ecosystem-based approaches”. This debate continues, notwithstanding the progress made in the UN Environment Assembly earlier this year.

*Nature-based solutions for climate change and biodiversity*

7. **Land, forests, and oceans are important carbon sinks and potential emissions sources**<sup>61</sup>. The Working Group III contribution to the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment report (mitigation) is clear that limiting global warming to 1.5°C will require emissions reductions from the land sectors, including livestock agriculture and forests, alongside rapid reductions in fossil fuel emissions. It also highlights the potential co-benefits and risks of nature-based climate change solutions. For example, restoration of wetlands and preservation of native forests can reduce emissions and achieve biodiversity and adaptation benefits. Nature-based solutions can also create employment and economic opportunities that support an equitable transition, including for indigenous peoples.

8. However, **not all nature-based interventions result in socioeconomic and environmental co-benefits**. For example, planting forests in inappropriate locations could undermine indigenous peoples’ property rights or reduce water quality or availability. The IPCC also highlights that nature-based solutions for climate change are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with effectiveness declining with increasing global warming.

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry for Primary Industries, Department of Conservation,  
Ministry for the Environment  
October 2022*

---

<sup>61</sup> Deforestation and degradation of forests accounts for 11 percent of CO2 emissions globally, while the total land sector, including livestock agriculture is responsible for almost 25% of all global emissions.

## Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform

---

### Key points

- Continue to support the work of the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) in operationalising the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP).
- Play an active and constructive role in the FWG of the LCIPP as the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) representative.
- Climate change poses a significant risk for Māori but they are, as are many indigenous peoples around the world, great agents of change. We want to support and empower Māori to share Aotearoa New Zealand's experiences of how they have shaped domestic environmental and climate policy, particularly in relation to the development of New Zealand's emissions reduction plan and national adaptation plan.
- The Glasgow Climate Pact emphasises the important role of indigenous peoples' and local communities' culture and knowledge in effective action on climate change and urges Parties to actively involve indigenous peoples and local communities in designing and implementing climate action. Aotearoa New Zealand encourages the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities in the LCIPP, regardless of their countries' position on participation these groups in domestic policy-making.
- A key outcome from the Emissions Reduction Plan and National Adaptation Plan is to establish a platform for Māori climate action. The platform will be a space to build relationships and capacity on both sides of the Crown-Māori relationship, to provide more equal partnership and improve knowledge and data to help Māori plan for transitional and climate change impacts.
- As in the past, we will have iwi Māori representation accompany us on the official Aotearoa New Zealand delegation to COP27. We are pleased to support them to share their experiences and work with other indigenous peoples groups to strengthen indigenous perspectives in the UNFCCC process and in domestic climate action.

### Background

1. The Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) was established pursuant to paragraph 135 of Decision 1/CP.21. It aims to facilitate local communities and indigenous peoples to exchange, with Parties, experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner. The LCIPP Facilitative Working Group (FWG) is a constituted body that was established at COP24 in Katowice, December 2018.
2. The FWG was established with the objective of further operationalising the LCIPP and facilitating the implementation of its three functions related to knowledge, capacity for engagement, and climate change policies and actions. It will also collaborate with other bodies under and outside the Convention, as appropriate, to enhance the coherence of the actions of the Platform under the Convention. The UNFCCC secretariat supports and facilitates the work of the body.
3. The FWG is comprised of 14 representatives, half of which are representatives of Parties, and half of which are representatives from indigenous peoples' organisations. The addition of

three representatives of local communities and three additional Party representatives were considered at COP26 as part of a broader review mandated by para 27 2/CP.24<sup>62</sup>.

4. New Zealand had previously attended the FWG meetings as an “observer” and provided input through the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) representative. At COP26 New Zealand successfully nominated Tiana Carter for the role of WEOG representative. Her term began at FWG7 in May 2022 and will end in May 2025.

5. At FWG1, a two-year work plan for 2020-2021 was proposed and welcomed at SBSTA 51. The work plan contained 30 activities, which decision 2/CP.24 requested that the FWG report on its outcomes and present a draft three-year work plan. The FWG5 report<sup>63</sup> and 2022-2024 work plan was welcomed and adopted in decision 16/CP.26<sup>64</sup>.

6. At the virtual FWG5 in June 2021, New Zealand supported the streamlining of activities under the work plan. The new 2022-2024 work plan contains 9 activities, which build on previous activities under the first work plan.

7. The FWG7 took place at SB56 in Bonn in June 2022. The focus of the meeting was mainly procedural (appointment of co-chairs and vice co-chairs, co-leads for 2022-2024 workplan activities) and on getting the new members up to speed on the work of the FWG. Tiana Carter was appointed as vice co-chair.

8. The functions of the Platform provide opportunities to highlight to others globally indigenous peoples’ engagement in domestic mitigation and adaptation. For example, during consultation on the Zero Carbon Bill Discussion Document in 2018, specific hui were held with the Federation of Māori Authorities (FOMA) and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. The Te Arawa Lakes Trust also coordinated a hui in Rotorua with members of Te Urunga o Kea (Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group). The Climate Change Commission, set up by the Zero Carbon Act, specifically considered Crown-Māori relations, iwi/Māori interests and impacts on Māori in undertaking its work and the Government’s response under this framework.

9. A key outcome from the emissions reduction plan was the establishment of the Māori Climate Action Platform. The platform will be a space to build relationships and capacity on both sides of the Crown-Māori relationship, to provide more equal partnership and improve knowledge and data to help Maori plan for transitional and climate change impacts.

10. The platform will build on the three focus areas of: partnership and representation, strategy and alignment, and community activation. It will support the expertise and leadership of Māori, empower Māori and elevate te ao Māori or the Māori worldview in the context of the transition. It will serve as one vehicle to support an equitable transition for Māori, led by Māori.

11. The Platform will be established in two phases. The first phase will be the establishment of an interim ministerial advisory committee. Currently, MfE are leading the process for establishing this committee and it will be launched before the end of the year. The second phase, the Māori Climate Action Platform, will be established by 2024.

12. In regards to adaptation, iwi and hapū were engaged in the development of the national adaptation plan (NAP), specifically on how the government can enable system-wide change to support locally-led adaptation action. The Ministry for the Environment partnered with Māori

---

<sup>62</sup> COP24 report (FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1):

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> Report of the FWG of the LCIPP (FCCC/SBSTA/2021/1):

[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2021\\_01E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2021_01E.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> COP26 Report (FCCC/CP/2021/12/Add.2):

[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2021\\_12\\_add2\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2021_12_add2_adv.pdf)

organisations to facilitate discussions and run thematic workshops and webinars to seek input from iwi and hapū on the draft NAP.

13. In working in partnership with Māori to develop and implement the NAP, the New Zealand Government acknowledged an indigenous world view of climate change and the criticality of Mātauranga Māori (Māori traditional knowledge) at both the iwi and hapū level to inform local and central government adaptation responses. Taking a locally-led and intergenerational approach to adaptation will help ensure outcomes are effective and build resilience in the long-term.

14. In 2019, we consulted with iwi Māori on the negotiating mandate for the UNFCCC and received positive responses supporting our positions. We will undertake an in-depth review of our mandate early 2023, and welcome opportunities to engage with iwi and hapū on this.

*Climate Change Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Pacific Climate Change Priorities

---

### Key points

- With climate change posing catastrophic risks to the Pacific and growing frustration from our Pacific partners that not enough is being done, significant ambition and solutions across the COP agenda is essential.
- New Zealand stands with the Pacific in their call for efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C through increased mitigation ambition, finance solutions to fill the loss and damage (L&D) gap, and scaled-up climate finance to meet the USD\$100 billion goal.
- An outcome on funding for L&D at COP27 is a top priority for Pacific Small Island Developing Countries (PSIDS). There is consensus among PSIDS that there is an urgent gap in the UNFCCC finance mechanisms for a missing 'third pillar' on L&D in addition to mitigation and adaptation. New Zealand recognises the urgency of addressing L&D and supports understanding the full range of possible solutions to close the gap.
- Ambitious action on the ocean-climate nexus is a priority for New Zealand and Pacific Island countries. This includes continued advocacy for Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' *Declaration on Preserving Marine Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise*.

### Background

1. The Pacific needs support to rebuild and enhance resilience after the COVID-19 pandemic – especially regarding the region's dependence on tourism, a sector that will be greatly affected by the impacts of climate change. The pandemic continues to reverse decades of progress on key Sustainable Development Goals around the world, undermining adaptation efforts. This also impacts mitigation ambition if countries lock in fossil fuel pathways to economic recovery.
2. New Zealand prioritises "standing with the Pacific" on climate change in this challenging environment. We seek to amplify the Pacific voice on the international stage, and support Pacific ambitions to implement mitigation and adaptation, and solutions to close the L&D finance gap. At COP27, we are funding the Moana Blue Pacific Pavilion (and Pacific delegation office), which will host a series of events highlighting Pacific leadership and issues of significance.

### *Loss and Damage*

3. Pacific Island countries are some of the most exposed in the world to the effects of climate change, with indications that adaptation limits are already approaching in some locations. While robust attribution is difficult in the region due to a paucity of good data, that climate change is causing loss and damage in the region is almost certain. As extreme weather events intensify, sea level rises, and average temperatures increase, the economic and non-economic costs will become increasingly apparent.
4. Pacific Island countries are among a wide range of developing countries calling for a dedicated Loss and Damage Finance Facility to fill the loss and damage finance gap. New Zealand supported and endorsed the Pacific's call for an agenda item on a L&D facility at the FEMM, which was important for the region heading into COP. While New Zealand won't oppose a facility, we also want to encourage creativity and flexibility in finding responses to the call for dedicated finance for L&D, beginning with a better understanding of the problem and the full range of



possible finance solutions available rather than landing on a solution (such as a global finance facility) first.

#### *Oceans*

5. Ocean health is essential to the well-being of the Pacific but is severely at risk from climate change due to acidification, warming and deoxygenation. The ocean-climate nexus emphasises the role of the ocean in the global climate system and that this could be better captured in climate change discussions. We support better integration among the international ocean and climate processes, but want to avoid duplicating work that is already being done.

6. The impact of sea-level rise on maritime zones is a priority issue for Pacific Islands Forum members. Maritime zones, and the resource rights that come with them, are essential to Pacific countries' economies, identities and ways of life. The *Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level-Rise* makes clear our intention to maintain our zones, without reduction.

7. For more information, please refer to the Climate Changes and Oceans thematic brief.

#### *Access to finance*

8. A significant amount of finance is required to help Pacific Island countries adapt to the impacts of climate change and meet their Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Access to climate finance can be difficult for the Pacific and the costs and frustrations in navigating access to climate funds are amplified by limited resources. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

meaning country priorities are not always reflected. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

9. New Zealand tries to overcome these issues by advocating for simpler access processes and procedures in climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund. We also provide support for project development, including through contributions to project units within the Pacific's regional agencies.

#### *Pacific Political Climate Champions*

10. PIF members first confirmed Pacific Political Champions at COP26. The following Champions will be attending COP27:

- Champion for Climate Finance: Honourable Mark Brown, Prime Minister of the Cook Islands.
- Champion for Climate Ambition: TBC, Republic of the Marshall Islands.
- Champion for Loss and Damage: Honourable Seve Paeniu, Minister of Finance for Tuvalu.
- Champion for Oceans and Climate Finance: Honourable Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, Attorney General and Minister of Economy for Fiji.
- Champion for Environmental Integrity: Honourable Steven Victor, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment for the Republic of Palau.

*People and Planet Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
October 2022*

*[Leave blank for tab]*

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**ANNEX**

---

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## Useful links

---

### UNFCCC

<b>UNFCCC COP27 website</b>	<a href="#">Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference - November 2022   UNFCCC</a>
<b>Provisional agendas &amp; annotations</b>	<a href="#">COP27</a> <a href="#">CMP17</a> <a href="#">CMA4</a> <a href="#">SBI57</a> <a href="#">SBSTA57</a>
<b>Programme of mandated events and side events</b>	<a href="#">Overview schedule</a> <a href="#">Official side events</a>
<b>COP27 virtual platform</b>	<a href="#">Join the COP 27 virtual platform   UNFCCC</a>

### New Zealand policy

<b>Emissions Reduction Plan</b>	<a href="#">ERP document</a> <a href="#">ERP summary</a>
<b>National Adaptation Plan</b>	<a href="#">Website</a> <a href="#">Draft NAP</a>
<b>International Engagement Plan</b>	<a href="#">IEP</a> <a href="#">IEP Country objectives</a> <a href="#">COP26 Initiatives</a>
<b>Aotearoa New Zealand International Climate Finance Strategy – Tuia te Waka a Kiwa</b>	<a href="#">Strategy document</a>

## New Zealand's emissions profile

### In 2020, the latest year of the inventory:

Gross emissions<sup>65</sup> were 78.8 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e), 20.8 per cent higher than in 1990. The five emission sources that contributed the most to this increase were:

- enteric fermentation from an increase in the dairy cattle population (methane),
- fuel use in road transport due to traffic growth (carbon dioxide),
- agricultural soils, from increased fertiliser use (nitrous oxide),
- fuel use in *Manufacturing industries and construction* from increased production due to economic growth (carbon dioxide),
- and industrial and household refrigeration and air-conditioning systems from increased use of hydrofluorocarbon-based refrigerants that replaced ozone depleting substances (fluorinated gases).

**Table 1. 2020 gross emissions by sector**

Sector	%
Agriculture	50.0
Energy <sup>66</sup>	39.9
Industrial processes and product use	5.9
Waste	4.1

**Table 2. 2020 gross emissions by gas type (% on CO<sub>2</sub>-e basis)**

Gas	%
Carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> )	43.7
Methane (CH <sub>4</sub> )	43.5
Nitrous oxide (N <sub>2</sub> O)	10.7
PFCs, HFCs <sup>67</sup> & SF <sub>6</sub>	2.0

**Table 3. Changes in emissions between 1990 and 2020, in Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e.**

Emissions	1990	2020	Change since 1990	% change
Energy <sup>2</sup>	23.9	31.5	↑ 7.6	↑ 31.8
Industrial processes and product use	3.6	4.6	↑ 1.0	↑ 29.0
Agriculture	33.8	39.4	↑ 5.6	↑ 16.7
Waste	3.9	3.3	↓-0.7	↓-17.1
Gross emissions	65.2	78.8	↑ 13.6	↑ 20.8
LULUCF	-21.2	-23.3	↓-2.1	↓-9.8
Net emissions	44.0	55.5	↑ 11.5	↑ 26.1

Note: The negative signs for LULUCF (land use and forestry) are to indicate the numbers are net removals rather than emissions. Emissions from Tokelau are very small and not included in the table, totalling 0.0042 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e in 2020.

<sup>65</sup> Gross emissions comprise the Energy, Agriculture, Industrial Processes and Product Use & Waste sectors as well as emissions from Tokelau. Net emissions are Gross emissions plus the Land use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector.


<sup>66</sup> In the inventory, emissions from transport are included in the Energy sector.

<sup>67</sup> Bulk imports of HFCs are to be phased down under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.

Interactive graphs of emissions from all sectors and categories in New Zealand's inventory can be accessed at <http://emissionstracker.mfe.govt.nz/>

### **Emissions projections:**

New Zealand's gross emissions (excluding LULUCF) are currently projected to remain steady in the short term before declining slightly through to 2030. New Zealand's net emissions (including LULUCF) are projected to increase until the mid-late 2020s before decreasing. New Zealand's planted forest estate has a large influence on its net emissions. Net emissions at any given point in time will be strongly influenced by the planting and harvesting cycles of New Zealand's planted forest in the LULUCF sector (Figure 1).



**Figure 1. New Zealand's actual (solid lines) and projected (dashed lines) emissions from 1990 to 2030 under the UNFCCC.**

Note: Gross emissions exclude the LULUCF sector. Transport has been separated out from the Energy sector for this graph. Updated emission projections based on the latest greenhouse gas inventory are to be published in December 2022 within New Zealand's Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report.

Data sources for the figure: 1990-2020 is from the 2022 submission of the greenhouse gas inventory. Data available at <https://environment.govt.nz/publications/new-zealands-greenhouse-gas-inventory-1990-2020/>. 2021-2030 is from New Zealand's projected greenhouse gas emissions to 2050. Data file available at <https://environment.govt.nz/what-government-is-doing/areas-of-work/climate-change/emissions-reduction-targets/new-zealands-projected-greenhouse-gas-emissions-to-2050/>.

Climate Change Directorate  
Ministry for the Environment  
May 2022

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade



Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Proactively released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade