

13 August 2024

195 Lambton Quay
Private Bag 18-901
Wellington 6160
New Zealand

Requesters name
redacted for proactive
release

T +64 4 439 8000
F +64 4 472 9596

OIA 29511

Tēnā koe Requesters name redacted for proactive release

We refer to your email of 8 July 2024 in which you request the following under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA):

Under the Official Information Act, please supply all formal briefings and reports, provided for and arising from, the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington.

On 10 July 2024, we sought your agreement to refine to your request to the below:

1. *The 'Visit Overview and Objectives' for the Prime Minister's visit to the US and attendance at the NATO Summit;*
2. *'NATO Overview Briefs' sent to the Prime Minister Rt Hon Christopher Luxon;*
3. *'NATO Background Briefs' sent to the Prime Minister Rt Hon Christopher Luxon; and*
4. *Formal reports back from NATO meetings as of the date of refinement.*

You accepted this refinement on 16 July 2024.

On 25 July 2024, you were advised that we had received a transfer from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) on 18 July 2024 for:

All written advice, notes, aides-memoire, briefings, and reports, provided for and arising from, a visit by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon to the United States of America from 9-12 July 2024.

At this time we contacted you regarding the scope of this request. You advised us to proceed with the refined request (dated 16 July 2024), and to disregard the request transferred from DPMC.

As of the date of your refinement (16 July 2024), we have not received any Formal Reports back from NATO meetings. Therefore, this part of your request is refused under section 18(e) of the OIA; the information requested does not exist.

The information relevant to your request is attached. We have withheld some information under the following sections of the OIA:

- 6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the New Zealand Government;
- 6(b)(i): to protect the passing of information from another government on a confidential basis;

- 6(b)(ii): to protect the passing of information from an international organisation on a confidential basis; and
- 9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments.

Where the information has been withheld under section 9 of the OIA, we have identified no public interest in releasing the information that would override the reasons for withholding it.

Please note that it is our policy to proactively release our responses to official information requests where possible. Therefore, our response to your request (with your personal information removed) may be published on the Ministry website: www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses/

If you have any questions about this decision, you can contact us by email at: DM-ESD@mfat.govt.nz. You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman of this decision by contacting www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Nāku noa, nā

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'SC', written in a cursive style.

Sarah Corbett
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Visit Overview and Objectives

1. Your visit to the US in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit will demonstrate New Zealand's commitment to international security; connect you with other leaders; support New Zealand's enduring relationship with the US; and promote investment and innovation connections with US interests.
2. The objectives for the visit are to:
 - i. Enhance New Zealand's security through lifting engagement with close partners and demonstrate our credibility as a reliable and relevant strategic partner;
 - ii. Position New Zealand and establish key personal connections ahead of the 2024 US presidential and congressional elections,^{s6(a)}
and
 - iii. Promote New Zealand exports and attract investment into New Zealand in support of the goal of doubling New Zealand's export value (the primary focus of the visit to San Francisco).

NATO Summit

3. The US is hosting the NATO Summit for the 75th anniversary of the alliance. The Summit will bring together the 32 NATO allies, NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners, two European Union (EU) leaders (Ursula Von der Leyen and Charles Michel), and Ukraine. It takes place against the backdrop of a deteriorating geopolitical environment,^{s6(a)} At its heart, the Summit is a forum for strengthening NATO allies' and partners' relationships, and demonstrating unity and mutual resolve to tackle shared challenges.^{s6(a)}
Your attendance will contribute to our US relationship, as well as those with key European partners, and demonstrates New Zealand's relevance on regional and international security matters.
4. This is the third time in a row that New Zealand has been invited to the NATO Summit in our capacity as a NATO Indo-Pacific (IP4) partner, alongside Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (all US allies). New Zealand's access to this influential event is important in demonstrating our stake in geopolitical challenges, and our credibility as a partner in responding to them.
5. You will attend three NATO events (there are NATO-only meetings which IP4 leaders and other guests do not attend):

- the 75th Anniversary opening reception;
 - a White House dinner for all leaders and spouses; and,
 - a NATO session with IP4 partners and the EU.
6. Ukraine will be the main focus of the Summit, ^{s6(a)}

Your contribution to discussions on Ukraine will be backed up by being able to announce further New Zealand support to Ukraine. Zelenskyy is expected to attend the Summit.

7. Within NATO, ^{s6(a)}

European allies are increasingly attuned to the interplay between the security of Europe and Asia particularly because of the deepening strategic convergence between Russia, China and North Korea and their support for Russia's aggression against Ukraine (for example, China's material support for Russia's defence industrial base). The US considers Europe and Asia as interlinked strategic theatres. Because of these links New Zealand, as an Indo-Pacific country, can offer valuable insights into this discussion.

8. The other theme will be burden sharing, as the European NATO allies demonstrate their commitment to shouldering more of the cost of their defence. NATO leaders agreed following Russia's annexation of Crimea to spend two percent of their GDP on defence by 2024 to strengthen the alliance's military readiness and to deter potential attacks. Increased European defence spending (particularly by Eastern European, Nordic and Baltic states) has been spurred by the threat posed by Russia. ^{s6(a)}

s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)

s6(a)

Out of scope

NATO Overview Briefs

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Headline Facts and Figures

NATO and IP4 Defence Spending

1. NATO is comprised of 32 allies from the Euro-Atlantic region. As an alliance, it has a total defence spend of 2.53 percent of NATO's combined GDP in 2023.
2. In 2014 NATO Allies reaffirmed their commitment to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their country's GDP on defence. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that this metric should be considered a "floor" rather than a "ceiling."
3. Recently, efforts to meet this goal have increased across the alliance, with 29 out of 32 NATO Allies (90 percent) announcing increases in defence spending this year. In June 2024, NATO confirmed that 23 Allies will spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defence (compared to only three in 2014).
4. While the NATO commitment does not apply to partners, NATO Allies will also be interested in partners' defence investment plans, including New Zealand. Of the fellow IP4 countries, the Republic of Korea (2.81 percent) and Australia (2.1 percent) already reach the NATO 2 percent target. Japan has committed to reaching 2 percent by 2030 (currently 1.2 percent), Australia 2.4 percent by 2033.
5. New Zealand's defence spend has been ~1 percent of GDP on average over the last ten years. See separate brief on defence spending for exact figures on NATO and IP4 countries' current and planned defence spend.

Military support for Ukraine

6. NATO has coordinated support to Ukraine through its Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), providing non-lethal military assistance. US\$700 million has been contributed to the CAP so far by NATO Allies. Lethal military assistance has been provided to Ukraine bilaterally by Allies.
7. The largest bilateral donors to Ukraine in net contributions (lethal and non-lethal military assistance,) have been the US (NZ\$83.3 billion), Germany (NZ\$48.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (NZ\$15.8 billion). However, Baltic, Nordic and Eastern European countries make up the largest donors of military assistance by proportion of GDP, likely driven by their proximity to Russia.
8. With New Zealand's further NZ\$6 million package of military assistance, to be announced during your visit (as part of the wider \$10 million package), the value of our military assistance delivered or pledged to Ukraine will reach NZ\$83 million (out of NZ\$124 million in total assistance).
9. According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker (which includes military, humanitarian, financial and other assistance), both by net contribution to Ukraine

and by proportion of GDP, New Zealand ranks 32nd out of 33 NATO and IP4 countries with available data, with Turkey ranked last.

10. Australia, as a regional point of comparison has committed over NZ\$1 billion, including NZ\$840 million in military aid (with military hardware making up a significant proportion of this), and NZ\$160 million in other assistance.^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

International Security and Disarmament Division

June, 2024

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

NATO-Related Deliverables

1. The following deliverables highlight tangible elements of New Zealand's relationship with NATO as well as our commitment to addressing shared challenges.

You will announce the finalisation of the New Zealand-NATO ITPP

The Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) is effectively a refresh of our previous cooperation arrangement with NATO. It provides a framework for officials level cooperation across key areas of focus over 2024-2027 including: operations preparation and training, emerging and disruptive technologies, public diplomacy, cyber defence, and climate change and security. It was finalised in May 2024.

You will announce New Zealand's participation in the NATO - IP4 Flagship Projects

The four Flagship projects^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)} . Covering cyber defence, support for Ukraine military healthcare, AI, and hostile information/disinformation in the Indo Pacific, the flagship projects will be presented to Leaders for noting during the NATO-IP4-EU session of the NATO Summit.

^{s6(b)(i)}

New Zealand is also contributing NZ\$2 million to the Ukraine military healthcare project to support the rehabilitation of wounded Ukrainian soldiers. The details of the other two projects remain under development with NATO and the IP4 partners.

You will announce additional New Zealand support for Ukraine

This comprises a total NZ\$10 million support package for Ukraine, including NZ\$2 million for the above Flagship project, NZ\$4 million to a project delivering military drones to Ukraine through the UK/Latvia-led Drone Capability Coalition, and NZ\$4 million in humanitarian assistance.

^{s6(a)}

s6(a)

International Security and Disarmament Division

June, 2024

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

RESTRICTED

NATO Background Briefs

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

New Zealand – NATO Partnership

General Background

1. NATO is a political-military alliance established in 1949 and currently comprising 32 members. NATO's core mission is the collective defence of the Allies through both conventional and nuclear means. Further membership of NATO is limited to European countries at the invitation of the existing Allies. Prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden are NATO's most recent members, joining in April 2023 and March 2024 respectively.
2. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg concludes his ten years in October this year, with his initial four-year term having been extended four times including twice to ensure a safe pair of hands as the war in Ukraine continues. Stoltenberg has been a champion for NATO's engagement with partners, including New Zealand and the IP4. Caretaker Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte is expected to be endorsed as the next Secretary General at the Summit, though we understand he will not attend.

New Zealand – NATO relationship

3. NATO is a long-standing, valued, and likeminded partner for New Zealand, with which we share a strong commitment to the rules-based international system and democratic values and norms. NATO and New Zealand have deployed side by side for over 25 years; including in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea. The NZDF's engagement with NATO provides beneficial access to leading military doctrine, tactics, and training. Such access better ensures the NZDF is interoperable with some of our closest partners.
4. New Zealand is focused on strengthening our relationship with NATO through working together to address collective security challenges. Our engagement with NATO has provided an invaluable platform to exchange views with likeminded partners. NZDF's longstanding operational cooperation with NATO is ongoing through NZDF participation in NATO exercises and activities. It is complemented by regular engagement in various NATO military forums aimed at enhancing interoperability and exchanging perspectives and technology.
5. In May, New Zealand and NATO finalised an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) which refocuses our engagement for the period 2024-2027, as outlined in the separate deliverables briefing. New Zealand and NATO signed our first Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme in 2012, and it was last refreshed in 2018.

International Security and Disarmament Division

June, 2024


RESTRICTED

Key Facts and Figures: Defence Spending and Ukraine Support


Defence Spending – NATO and IP4

NATO and IP4 defence spend as % of GDP in 2024

Data sourced from NATO and IP4 countries as of June 2024



NATO Defence Spending by Region: regional trends show a larger increase in defence spending in NATO regions closer to Russia



RESTRICTED

Support for Ukraine

Select countries' support for Ukraine – the below table represents publicly available figures from official statements as of June 2024 presented in NZD.

Country	Total support (NZD)	Military support (NZD)
US	Undisclosed	83.3 billion
Germany	Undisclosed	48.9 billion
UK	25.9 billion	15.8 billion
Denmark	12 billion	11 billion
Poland	43.5 billion	15.6 billion
Netherlands	Undisclosed	8 billion
Sweden	8 billion	6.7 billion
Canada	15.7 billion	4.7 billion
France	~5.2 billion	4.5 billion
Finland	5 billion	3.5 billion
Estonia	2 billion	1.6 billion
Belgium	1.9 billion	1.6 billion
Lithuania	>1.7 billion	Undisclosed
Latvia	1.3 billion	900 million
Australia	1 billion	839 million
New Zealand	124 million	77 million

International Security and Disarmament Division
June, 2024

Ukraine

Trajectory of the war

1. The war in Ukraine is at a delicate stage. Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city and only 30km from the Russian border, is enduring a sustained Russian bombing assault. In response to Ukrainian appeals, President Biden has joined the UK, France and Germany in approving the use by Ukraine of US-made weapons for limited counter-strikes within Russia.
2. In response, a Kremlin spokesperson said NATO member states "are entering a new round of escalations in tensions". There has also been an upswing in Russian references to nuclear weapons. This heightened rhetoric is not unexpected or unprecedented; it has occurred at other points in the war when Russia has felt under pressure, or in the lead-up to major events (such as the NATO Leaders' Summit).
3. Earlier in 2024, Ukraine^{s6(a)} for more international support to help resist Russia's devastation of Ukraine's energy infrastructure. About half of Ukraine's electricity generation capacity was taken out by Russian bombardment in March/April, when Ukraine's air defences were at a particularly low ebb.
4. The US\$61 billion assistance package for Ukraine passed by the US Congress in April provided a significant boost to Ukrainian morale and will help to sustain its defence this year.^{s6(a)}
5. Russia's strategy remains to outlast western support for Ukraine, and to degrade Ukraine's national resilience by bombing civilian infrastructure and making day-to-day life in Ukraine intolerable. Consistent announcements of assistance from Ukraine's supporters help to counter the narrative of Russia's strategic patience and declining western resolve. To this end, other recent packages of support from the United Kingdom (£500m) and Australia (A\$100m) have been warmly welcomed by Ukraine.
6. Ukraine's European partners have an enduring strategic interest in preventing Russia from capturing more Ukrainian territory or succeeding in overthrowing the democratically-elected Ukrainian Government. Many of them see Ukraine's defence as an existential issue for European security, prosperity, and stability. Ukraine is expected to begin accession talks to join the EU in the coming months; NATO members have also agreed that Ukraine will join their alliance at some point

^{s6(a)}

7. Ukraine's closest supporters have also been negotiating 'security guarantees' that commit them to long-term support for Ukraine and urgent consultations in the event of a future Russian attack. ^{s6(a)}

New Zealand support

8. Officials have prepared a NZ\$10 million package of assistance for Ukraine to be announced by Prime Minister Luxon at the NATO Summit. This is comprised of:
- a **NZ\$2 million** contribution to a NATO-led "Flagship project" alongside Indo-Pacific partners focused on supporting military healthcare in Ukraine;
 - a **NZ\$4 million** contribution to a UK/Latvia-led coalition which aims to deliver ^{s6(b)(i)} drones to Ukraine; and
 - a **NZ\$4 million** contribution for further Ukraine humanitarian assistance.
9. The military healthcare Flagship project includes the reconstruction and modernisation of medical facilities to rehabilitate wounded Ukrainian war combatants ^{s6(b)(i)} New Zealand, Japan, Australia, and South Korea have all been asked to contribute, ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}
10. The UK/Latvia-led drone capability coalition will provide funding for ^{s6(b)(i)} first-person view drones to be supplied to Ukraine, which have proven highly effective on the battlefield. ^{s6(b)(i)}
11. The delivery channels for the humanitarian support will be determined by officials in line with standard delegations, and further advice will be provided before the NATO Summit.
12. With the announcement of this NZ\$10 million package of assistance, the value of New Zealand's assistance pledged to Ukraine will exceed NZ\$124 million.
13. Minister Mitchell attended the Summit on Peace in Ukraine in June 2024 where he met president Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The president expressed "Thanks to the people of New Zealand for participating and for your support; we are thankful."

Europe Division

June 2024

NATO – Russia Relationship

Russia-NATO relationship and why Allies are worried

1. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has posed a significant long-term challenge to NATO's security. 11 of NATO's 32 Allies were formerly part of either the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, and have strong concerns about their own security as a result of the invasion. NATO's principle of collective self-defence will almost certainly continue to deter Russia from overt military actions against Eastern European member states. However, a recent NATO Defence Ministers meeting in June 2024 identified the need to respond to Russia's ongoing campaign of hostile actions against Allies in Europe.
2. The Russian invasion has also spurred Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Both had previously maintained a policy of military neutrality.
3. NATO has enhanced its forward presence in its eastern Allies and placed more troops on higher readiness. For example, NATO has doubled the number of battlegroups in Eastern Europe, made them larger, created four new Headquarters, and is increasing the size of the high readiness force six-fold. Every NATO Ally contributes personnel to at least one of these formations. At the Summit in 2023, NATO Leaders agreed new regional defence plans that aim to improve the coherence of NATO's collective defence planning, which they are now focused on implementing. NATO is running Operation Steadfast Defender from January to July this year, the largest NATO manoeuvre since the end of the Cold War, which aims to test NATO's newest defence and deterrence plans in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Russia's posturing ahead of the NATO Summit

4. In recent years and especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been seeking to project its military strength, to signal its resolve and to try to curb Western support for Ukraine. An important aspect of this has been Russia's nuclear signalling, including nuclear weapons drills and various threats to use nuclear weapons in the context of the war. Russia is also putting in efforts to strengthen its relationships with China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is the DPRK involvement that is particularly troubling for Japan and South Korea and indeed the wider Indo-Pacific.^{s6(a)}

5. ^{s6(a)}

Russian campaign of hostile actions

6. Poland, Baltic and Nordic countries are warning of an intensifying Russian campaign of hybrid threats. Threats include cyber-attacks, arson, sabotage and industrial espionage. Incidents on NATO countries' borders with Russia and Belarus also appear to be increasing, including interference with physical borders, challenging of maritime borders, and weaponising of irregular migration. These developments prompted a statement from NATO Allies condemning Russia's behaviour, and stating an intention to strengthen their collective resilience. Poland also announced major fortifications at its borders with Russia and Belarus.

Europe Division

June, 2024

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Indo-Pacific Issues of Interest to NATO

1. NATO's increasing engagement with the IP4 is based on the recognition that developments in the Indo-Pacific have a direct impact on Euro-Atlantic security. For example, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept - which lays out the Alliance's priorities for the next decade - publicly identified that China's stated ambitions and coercive behaviour are "a challenge to the Allies' interests, security and values".
2. Most NATO Allies are keen to encourage greater NATO-IP4 cooperation.^{s6(a)}
- 3.^{s6(a)}
- 4.
5. In 2022 China and Russia agreed their 'no-limits' friendship and have since intensified and scaled up joint military exercises.^{s6(a)}

The US Treasury has reported that Russia imported US\$5.2 billion worth of sensitive dual-use goods from China in 2023, an increase of more than 40 percent in one year.

6. NATO is deeply concerned by the DPRK's destabilising behaviour, in particular the unlawful transfers of large quantities of weapons from the DPRK to Russia. DPRK-Russia military cooperation is likely to strengthen following the signing of a security pact during Putin's recent visit to Pyongyang, which reportedly includes a mutual defence clause. New Zealand recently announced new sanctions against Russian entities, including an individual related to DPRK weapons transfers to Russia and used in Ukraine. Historically, NATO has also raised concerns about the DPRK's illegal missile launches. In 2023 Russia reportedly proposed conducting three-way naval exercises between Russia, China and DPRK, although this is yet to eventuate.

International Security and Disarmament Division

June, 2024

RESTRICTED

Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)

NATO's partners in the Indo-Pacific

1. The informal IP4 grouping has emerged as NATO has sought to enhance dialogue and cooperation with its four partners in the Indo-Pacific: New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Although NATO's mandate is the collective defence of the Allies in the Euro-Atlantic, it recognises that Indo-Pacific developments impact Euro-Atlantic security (and vice versa). Departing Secretary General Stoltenberg has been an enthusiastic advocate of the IP4.
2. The IP4 have been collectively invited to attend NATO meetings for the last three years at Foreign Minister and Leader level. We welcome greater IP4-NATO cooperation as a mechanism for strengthening our traditional relationships through additional leader-level engagement, and as a platform for demonstrating the weight of our shared commitment to the international rules-based order with a stronger, collective voice.^{s6(a)}
3. In 2022 NATO and the IP4 partners agreed the "NATO - Asia-Pacific Partners' Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges". The Agenda highlights ten cross-cutting areas for cooperation including cyber defence, emerging technologies and resilience,^{s6(a)}
4. This year NATO has developed four "Flagship Projects" to give political momentum to its cooperation with the IP4 on cyber, Ukraine military healthcare, AI and hostile information/disinformation. These are outlined in the deliverables 1 pager.
5. More broadly, this year's Summit will place significant emphasis on Allied efforts to achieve defence spending commitments and support for the shared Euro-Atlantic defence industrial base. In this context NATO Allies will be looking to IP4 partners to demonstrate tangible efforts to address shared security threats, particularly through our investments in capability and in the defence industrial base. IP4 partners are not bound by NATO's defence spending commitment, however Australia, Korea and Japan all either currently, or have announced plans to, spend at or more than 2 percent of their GDP on Defence.
6. The US is a strong advocate for the IP4^{s6(a)} engagement in the Indo-Pacific. During the Summit the US will look to highlight the contributions IP4 partners make to European security, especially through support for Ukraine.

IP4 as a standalone grouping

7. The IP4 is also a useful grouping in its own right (distinct but complementary to the IP4 in the NATO context), because of the four partners' shared interests. The four are likeminded Indo-Pacific liberal democracies, closely aligned with the US on security matters, but also with important trade and economic relations with China.

^{s6(a)}

8. Against this backdrop, IP4 meetings are an opportunity to:

- Advance New Zealand as a credible, active and engaged partner in the region;
- Seek insights on how the IP4 partners view key regional developments and trends, and offer New Zealand's own views;
- Engage the IP4 on the Government's strategic policy settings and posture, and work with key partners to advance shared interests; and
- Deepen our relationship with Japan and Korea ^{s6(a)}

9. ^{s6(a)}

10.

11.

International Security and Disarmament Division and Asia Regional Division

June 2024

RESTRICTED