General debate statement on the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons

Mr Vice Chair, I extend my warm congratulations to you and the Chair, and assure you of New Zealand’s full support.

Throughout the NPT’s existence, State Parties have agreed that this Treaty is our cornerstone. New Zealand remains fully committed to the NPT, and considers it as necessary as it ever was – both in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and in providing a legal basis for nuclear disarmament as set out in Article VI of the Treaty. And we acknowledge the important role the NPT plays in governing the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technology.

However, the gap between what was stipulated in Article VI and bolstered in subsequent commitments, and what has been implemented in recent times, is stark. This persistent failure to implement the legal disarmament obligation erodes the Grand Bargain at the Treaty’s very core.

Moreover, our concern grows about a raft of negative nuclear developments. These include an increase in salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, large-scale investment in and modernisation of nuclear weapon-related capabilities, expanding nuclear arsenals, an increase in threatening nuclear rhetoric, and new nuclear stationing arrangements.

Various reasons are given by those responsible for these things. My delegation simply underlines that, taken collectively, these developments add intense stress on the NPT.

And within the Treaty’s stewardship process, we have collectively and repeatedly failed to live up to our responsibilities, lacking outcomes from the last two successive review cycles. As we meet for the second PrepCom of this, eleventh, cycle, it is difficult to find any grounds for optimism that our direction of travel is any different.

We have much to lose from any further deterioration of the NPT regime.

That is why my delegation will not cease its efforts. New Zealand continues, through our membership of the New Agenda Coalition, to propose measures that could be taken on the path to nuclear disarmament, and to call on those in a position to take those steps not to turn away from their task. It is also why we’ve been advocating, with Ireland and Switzerland, for pragmatic steps for greater transparency and accountability, including actively searching for and consulting on ways forward to ensure the process of reporting is improved.

At the same time, we and many others have signed onto other obligations to complement and supplement those of the NPT. For New Zealand, these include the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as well as undertakings in relation to our membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And, alongside others, we continue to draw attention to the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, including the harrowing legacy of nuclear testing in our own region.

But even as firm supporters of the NPT we cannot stop, let alone reverse, the corrosive effects of the lack of nuclear disarmament without tangible actions towards it from those states that possess or rely on nuclear weapons for their security.

New Zealand will continue to reject the argument, and the logic underpinning it, that the security environment is not conducive to nuclear disarmament and arms control. Agreements forged during the depths of the Cold War prove otherwise.

Of course, there are differences between each of the nuclear-weapon states. And each will, understandably so, assert those distinctions. Each is accountable for its own actions and steps taken with respect to NPT obligations. Crucially, however, what these states continue to have in common is their ongoing possession of nuclear weapons 54 years after the NPT’s entry into force, despite their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals 24 years ago.

A major focus for my delegation is implementation of Article VI. However, we support the demand for full NPT implementation across all its review pillars. While we will elaborate our position in cluster statements, I reiterate our resolute opposition to the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and our deep concern about outstanding questions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. New Zealand continues to call on Russia to end its illegal war of aggression and withdraw from Ukraine’s territory, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. And we reiterate our firm support for the IAEA and the international safeguards system.

There is no doubt that we are facing turbulent geopolitical weather. In the face of this, we need immediately to take steps to ensure the NPT continues to stand, and which involve recognising the danger and responding tangibly. Progress on disarmament cannot be deferred indefinitely, whatever other challenges we are facing.

I will close by noting that New Zealand is not looking for grand gestures from this PrepCom. And such are the limits of ambition in the current NPT climate that we are not so naïve as to expect any major breakthroughs. Rather, we are watching intently for signs that other state parties, and the nuclear-weapon states most especially, recognise the collective danger we are in and reflect this in how they approach our work, particularly on Pillar I. Actions will speak louder than statements, and it is practical action that we need to progress the substantive work of this Treaty half-way through this Review cycle.

I thank you.