Ministry Statements & Speeches:
Thank you Mr President, and we thank Malaysia for organising this important meeting.
The past two years have been troubling ones for efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or WMD.
The threat of non-state actors acquiring and using such weapons is no longer a hypothetical question.
We’ve seen credible allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons against civilians in Syria, by both non-state actors and by a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Terrorist groups such as ISIL have demonstrated they are capable and willing to make and use such weapons.
Insecure stockpiles in countries experiencing conflict have heightened the risk of dangerous weapons or precursors falling into the wrong hands.
The increasing accessibility of information and rapid advances in science and technology have brought WMD capabilities within reach to many dangerous non-state actors.
It was precisely to prevent such outcomes that resolution 1540 was adopted in 2004.
That resolution was the Security Council’s first attempt at a comprehensive response to the risks of relating to non-state actors. It imposed significant obligations on all Member States regarding both implementation, monitoring and reporting.
The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 currently under way is therefore timely. It provides an opportunity to consider whether the existing regime is adequate and effective and how it can be strengthened.
New Zealand agrees that consideration should be given to a new resolution later this year to update the 1540 framework in light of the Review.
New Zealand will continue to focus in particular on three objectives.
First, we want to ensure the 1540 framework is “fit for purpose” and capable of meeting emerging threats and implementation challenges.
Second, we would support a sharpened strategic focus, by prioritising the work and attention of the 1540 Committee and Group of Experts towards issues and regions of identified risk, vulnerability, and need.
In this regard, New Zealand supports empowering the Group of Experts to proactively identify and approach States to propose in-country visits. This would better ensure that resources were targeted to activities and regions where they can have the greatest impact. Such visits would, of course, still require host country consent.
New Zealand also supports a more flexible approach to engaging states with low risk profiles. While we recognise the importance of universal implementation of the 1540 regime, we caution against an approach which measures success simply by counting the laws enacted or reports submitted.
Third, we need to ensure that the compliance burdens are both necessary and realistic, especially for small states.
This requires restraint in imposing new obligations, as well as a willingness to consider flexible approaches. But there is little sense in taking a rigid, one-size-fits all, approach to implementation by states that do not produce, store or act as transit points for sensitive materials.
Similarly, we see little value in imposing significant additional reporting requirements or new universal legal obligations that are simply not realistic – or justified - for small states with limited capacities.
Exploring flexible, pragmatic approaches for such states, such as reducing reporting for lower-risk States and providing a greater role for regional organisations, could help smaller states to improve implementation while reducing compliance burdens.
Focusing outreach and support in complementary areas such as counter-terrorism, border security, non-proliferation, and export controls also has a role to play in helping small states meet their obligations.
This is the approach New Zealand has taken in supporting the implementation efforts of partners in our region, most recently in a workshop we hosted for Pacific Island Countries, in partnership with UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the Financial Action Task Force, Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the 1540 Committee Group of Experts.
Reform of the current assistance mechanism is also important for small states. The input of the Group of Experts is critical in this regard, in helping develop clear requests for support, and we would support a review of whether the current composition of the group is adequate for this purpose.
Mr President,
The recent success of non-state actors in Syria and Iraq in manufacturing and using chemicals as weapons has raised questions regarding the adequacy of current international frameworks.
For example, while the Chemical Weapons Convention contains a clear legal prohibition against use of chemical weapons by anyone, including non-state actors, there is currently no explicit requirement for States Parties to the Convention to report chemical weapons-related activities by non-state actors in their territory to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or OPCW. Nor is there a duty on States Parties to investigate such activities.
We welcome the ongoing discussions in the OPCW on options for addressing this issue. We also welcome the OPCW Director-General’s establishment of a “Rapid Response Assistance Team” for dealing with alleged incidents.
There may also be scope for this Council to complement these efforts. For example, we would see merit in considering what steps the Council might take to encourage and support states to monitor, investigate and report possible chemical weapons activities by non-state actors within their jurisdiction, as well as to reaffirm the various investigative tools available to the international community.
We could also consider ways to ensure regular reporting to keep the Council fully appraised of incidents of chemical weapons use by non-state actors, so that it can respond appropriately.
In addition, consistent with its recent decision with respect to Libya, the Council could signal its commitment to consider authorising the transfer of chemical weapons or precursors to other States for destruction in situations where they have been seized from non-state actors or are at risk of falling into their hands. This would of course have to be done in close cooperation with the OPCW.
Finally Mr President, we echo comments by the Secretary-General and High Representative Won Soo, that we must restart progress on the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. It is only through complete, and verifiable nuclear disarmament that we can be sure to eradicate nuclear related weapons of mass destruction and to eliminate their chances of youth.