Ministry Statements & Speeches:
Thank you Mr Chair,
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are essential for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Confidence that NPT States Parties are not proliferating is a critical element of maintaining global peace and security.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of NPT obligations as they relate to non-proliferation. New Zealand continues to have full confidence in the IAEA’s professional and impartial work on nuclear safeguards. We will also continue to reject any attempts to undermine the Agency’s authority in these areas.
Chair,
Confidence in a state’s non-proliferation intentions requires ongoing attention and effort to sustain. Accordingly, the international safeguards system must be adaptable in the face of developments to ensure it remains fit for purpose.
As such, New Zealand is firmly of the view that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol is the current verification standard. Together, these provide the IAEA with the tools it needs to provide assurances that nuclear proliferation is not taking place. We encourage those States Parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol.
We also encourage remaining States with a Small Quantity Protocol (SQP) that is based on the original standard text to either amend their SQP to the modified text, or to rescind it and replace. In this regard, we congratulate Sao Tome and Principe, Bolivia, and Nauru, for their recent contributions to the strengthening of the global safeguards regime. We sincerely hope that further progress in this regard will be achieved shortly.
Chair,
It is essential that the right frameworks and tools are in place to provide confidence in the IAEA’s ability to carry out monitoring and verification activities. But it is just as fundamental that the Agency can carry out such activities unhindered. Our system faces significant challenges in this respect.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its continued illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, have prevented the proper implementation of safeguards by the rightful Ukrainian authorities and present unacceptable threats to nuclear security and safety. We again call on Russia to cease its occupation of the Zaporizhzhya complex and immediately withdraw from Ukraine’s territory.
New Zealand is also alarmed by the mounting proliferation risk posed by Iran’s expanding nuclear programme, compounded by its deliberate and unjustified curtailment of IAEA monitoring and verification activities. Iran has made little, if any, progress towards addressing the outstanding safeguards concerns raised by the IAEA. At the same time, Iran continues to undertake nuclear activities far beyond the scope of what is credible for a peaceful nuclear programme. It is imperative that Iran addresses the IAEA’s outstanding safeguards concerns so that the Agency can provide the requisite assurance to NPT Parties that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
We also regret that there appears to be no prospect for restoring the JCPOA at the present time. New Zealand again calls on all JCPOA parties to remain committed to finding a way forward.
New Zealand remains seriously concerned about the DPRK’s continued advancement of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We have observed further provocations from the DPRK in the last year, including the scaling up of nuclear activity and attempted launches of military surveillance satellites. Regrettably, it appears the DPRK also remains poised to conduct a further nuclear weapons test.
New Zealand is gravely concerned by the transfer of ballistic missiles from the DPRK to Russia, for Russia’s use against Ukraine. We are also concerned about what the DPRK may be receiving from Russia in exchange for those weapons. These actions threaten peace and security, violate UN Security Council resolutions, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. These transfers must cease.
We also urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, adhere to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Chair,
The challenge that such situations present for the international safeguards system and the IAEA must not weaken our collective commitment to non-proliferation. As my delegation noted in our General Debate statement, we and many others have signed onto other obligations to complement and supplement the non-proliferation regime. In New Zealand’s case, these include the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established our region’s nuclear weapon-free zone, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We encourage others to do the same.
And we will continue to uphold our national export controls as a member of the international export control regimes, intended to give effect to our non-proliferation obligations including under the NPT.
In closing, New Zealand emphasizes that disarmament and non-proliferation are inextricably linked. While we must bolster the non-proliferation regime, during this Review cycle we must also achieve real progress on nuclear disarmament. Doing so will support the credibility and integrity of the NPT.
Thank you.